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—Introduction— 
 
A relatively obscure talk—published under the title “Kultur and Culture” 
and delivered at the Hessische Hochschulwochen für staatswissenschaftliche 
Fortbildung in Bad Wildungen on 9 July 1958—contains Theodor W. Adorno’s 
only published comments on tape technology. Since the director of the event had 
decided to tape record the lecture for the purposes of transcription and 
publication, Adorno took the opportunity to open with a few words regarding 
recording. His introduction reads partially as an apology for the “improvised” 
nature of his presentation (although he had delivered a version the same talk on 
17 December 1956 at the Historical Society of the U.S. Army’s Third Division in 
Hanau near Frankfurt am Main) and partially as an apology for the broadness 
and generality of its subject matter (different understandings of the word “culture” 
in German and American contexts). At the heart of these opening remarks rests 
Adorno’s critique of tape recording as a practice: 
The author regards the ubiquitous tendency to record free speech 
[die freie Rede], as it is called, on tape, and then to disseminate it 
itself as a symptom of the administered world that even ties down 
the ephemeral word, whose truth lies in its own transience, and 
then makes the speaker swear to it. The tape recording is 
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something like the fingerprint of the living mind [lebendigen 
Geistes].1 
Adorno’s description of the tape recorder as a “symptom of the administered 
world” here, of course, aligns it with his analysis of scientific rationality and 
means-end instrumentalism that reduces human expression to a commodity. In 
Adorno’s analysis, even freedom and spontaneity have been repurposed by the 
Culture Industry as means to maintain the hegemony of late capitalism, which 
reflects here in the emphasis he places upon the danger recording presents of 
tying down the “ephemeral word, whose truth lies in its own transience” to the 
intentionality of the speaker. 
 In situating tape recording against the ephemerality of speech, Adorno 
articulates a position similar to a by now classic argument proffered by Peggy 
Phelan and others in performance studies, which grounds performance in 
corporeality and transience over and against the permanence of recording. In her 
book Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (1993), Phelan’s argument 
examines the intersection of visuality and representation. Working through a 
critical Lacanian framework, Phelan positions the feminine in performance as that 
which is “unmarked” and “invisible” in the normative field of social and 
technological reproduction. The troubled alliance between late capitalist modes 
of reproduction (including the documentation of performance) and patriarchal 
                                                
1 Theodor Adorno, “Kultur and Culture,” Social Text 99, 27.2 (2009): 145-146. 
   3 
 
regimes of visibility prompts Phelan to locate a resistive space for the feminine in 
disappearance, in the ephemerality of performance. Both Phelan and Adorno, 
who fundamentally differ in many other ways, agree on this single point: 
recording reduces performance (spoken, musical, theatrical, or otherwise) to a 
commodity and inserts it in the circulation of reified cultural production. For 
Adorno, resistance to the process of reification in reproduction entails more 
"difficult" works of art that privilege an individual intellectual encounter with the 
enigmaticalness of the art object. Phelan shares with Adorno an interest in 
unconventional works of art (for her, emerging trends in “body art” and 
“performance art”), but identifies resistance with the corporeal presence of the 
performing body vis-à-vis an audience: an affective experience that eludes 
recording and thus "disappears" into memory once the performance concludes. 
Phelan's association of performance with corporeality and visuality (and memory 
with disappearance) marks a crucial tension between her argument and Adorno's 
image of tape recording as “something like the fingerprint of the living mind.” 
Adorno's metaphor designates recording as a process analogous to the indexical 
trace of a finger (a residual corporeality) and thus emphasizes some material 
transfer of information between the human speaker and recording technology. 
Phelan, on the other hand, maintains an ontological distinction between 
performance and recording, which posits the latter in terms of the former’s 
“other.” In this dissertation, I locate my own particular interest in this tension by 
engaging with an array of musical and theatrical works that position tape 
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recording and playback as performance. Through a close examination of the 
materiality and historicity of magnetic tape crystallized in these works, I aim to 
nuance the critical position that identifies the materiality of performance with the 
corporeality of the performers/audience as distinct from its historicity in the 
inscriptive archive. These tensions and intersections rest at the heart of my 
particular methodology in materialist historiography. 
 Diana Taylor’s concept of “acts of transfer” repositions Phelan’s heuristic 
within the context of the performance of cultural memory in the Americas.  In The 
Archive and the Repertoire (2003), Taylor highlights the tensions between 
document/recording (archive) and embodied performance (repertoire) as two 
different configurations of cultural memory. As comprised of “supposedly 
enduring materials,” the archive “works across distance, over time and space; 
investigators can go back and reexamine an ancient manuscript, letters find their 
addresses through time and place, and computer discs cough up lost files with 
the right software.”2 Taylor’s argument, of course, identifies these various 
technologies of memory at work in the archive with Western logocentrism.  The 
repertoire resists or escapes regimes of inscription insofar as it “whether in terms 
of verbal or nonverbal expression, transmits live, embodied actions. As such, 
traditions are stored in the body, through various mnemonic methods, and 
                                                
2 Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in 
the Americas (Durham: Duke UP, 2003), 19. 
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transmitted ‘live’ in the here and now to a live audience.”3 Taylor’s distinctions 
between the inscriptive practices of the archive and the corporeal practices of the 
repertoire locate within the latter a space for resistance to Western logocentrism 
specifically aligned with the “liveness” of performance. Although this distinction 
functions as a very useful critical heuristic for her own project, which pertains to 
the legacy of colonialist inscriptive practices in Latin America and the politics of 
the “disappeared,” it nonetheless retains some traces of Western logocentrism in 
the stark opposition it sets up between the human body and technology. The 
broader frame of this dissertation approaches the unquestioned positioning of 
technology (particularly that of audio tape recording) as the body’s other in 
theatre and performance. 
 Traditionally, the division of labor in theatre and performance enforces a 
fairly rigid boundary between the performer and the technician. In no small part 
due to the division of theatrical space into stage and backstage, attentions to 
sound have generally tended to coalesce around practical task-based 
applications in sound design. Though manuals and textbooks for students of 
sound design in theatre and performance have become increasingly prevalent 
since the advent of film sound and sound recording (especially tape), only since 
the work of figures like Douglas Kahn, Gregory Whitehead, and especially Allen 
S. Weiss in the mid-to-late 1990s has sound emerged as an object of critical 
                                                
3 Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire, 24.  
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study in theatre and performance studies. Unsurprisingly, the work of all these 
scholars emerges from their study of the historical avant-garde, radio plays, and 
performance art. In the early twentieth century, Futurists and Dadaists privileged 
sound-in-itself through their radical performances of bruitist noise and sound 
poetry, which divorced sound from its function as conveyor of linguistic meaning. 
During the interwar period, radio plays reconceived sound as scenography in 
their use of recording and radio technology to split sound objects from their 
causal relationships to visual objects. And performance art drew from these 
positions and practices in the latter half of the twentieth century to challenge the 
conventional realistic/naturalistic apparatus of theatre. These intertwining 
developments mark key moments where the evolution of sound reproduction 
technologies and theatrical/performance practices inform and even influence one 
another. In their most radical instantiations, these developments question 
modernity’s foundation of representation in visuality and presence. The 
experience of disembodied sound more easily accomplished through 
technologies of sound reproduction similarly unsettles the grounding of sound in 
corporeality. All these various developments, already thoroughly explored by the 
above-mentioned authors, serve as the broader historical currents against which 
I (sometimes implicitly) analyze tape practices as performance practices. 
My work in this dissertation traces a materialist historiography of tape 
performance through several key figures in postwar music and theatre. The first 
and third chapters, which pertain to musical tape practices both focus more 
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intently on the tape recorder’s relation to conceptions of time, space, and 
memory in the philosophy of technology. On the other hand, the second and 
fourth chapters’ concern with theatrical presentations of the tape recorder, 
resingularize the more philosophical concerns of the other chapters in terms of 
performance studies debates concerning recording. As such, this dissertation 
should be read as a negotiation between theatre/performance studies and sound 
studies as mediated through the philosophy of technology. As a discourse, the 
latter largely restricts itself to a highly conceptual study of technology and its 
effects on human society and development. In bringing theatre and performance 
studies into critical conversation with music and sound studies through the 
philosophy of technology, I aim not only to map out a new interdisciplinary space 
between sound and performance, but also to bring questions of technology 
(already implicit in sound and theatre, as sketched above) to bear upon aesthetic 
objects outside the scope of its normal purview. Rather than approach this critical 
nexus purely at the level of theory/concept, I arrive at my positions by way of an 
immanent critique of concrete aesthetic objects. 
By triangulating my approach in this way, I trace through the course of 
these four chapters the formulation of a new concept: reel-time. The reader will 
immediately notice that this word bears a homonymic relationship with real-time, 
which refers to a particularly digital understanding of time, space, memory, and 
knowledge production organized around computers and telematics, i.e. 
technologies of long-distance communication. Real-time places emphasis on 
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instantaneous video and audio interaction and thus privileges an understanding 
of space and time as collapsing or shrinking in the wake of faster processing 
speeds and more efficient communications networks. I understand real-time as 
ideologically inextricable from both the globalization of capitalism as well as the 
increasing incursions of techno-science in human social organization and cultural 
production. My concept of reel-time, which of course puns on reel-to-reel 
technology, foregrounds the importance of delay and lag that not only comprise 
the function of tape recording, but also operate in the very material of the 
medium itself. If one can even speak of real-time’s materiality, it should probably 
be in terms of electricity suffusing air, copper wire, silicon, and fiberoptics. These 
are media in the sense that they transport or conduct a signal through 
themselves. Reel-time’s materiality, on the other hand, refers to the preservation 
of an electric signal as a magnetic trace in iron oxide particles adhered to a PVC 
strip: the hysteretic “stuff” of tape. If the ideology of real-time emphasizes speed 
of transmission at the expense of information retention, reel-time functions as 
both counterpart and countermeasure in its attention to memory and slowing 
down. Of course, our information age ideologically privileges real-time, but it also 
operates upon a foundation of reel-time as materialized in the magnetic memory 
storage of the computer hard drive, i.e. tape technology flattened into discs. 
As the ideological underpinning of our information age, real-time 
presupposes what Walter Benjamin refers to as the “homogenous, empty time” of 
positivist historicism in his theses “On the Concept of History” (1940). In his 
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theses, Benjamin proposes as an oppositional historiographic approach in 
“brushing history against the grain” as follows: 
There is no document of culture which is not at the same time a 
document of barbarism. And just as such a document is never free 
of barbarism, so barbarism taints the manner in which it was 
transmitted from one hand to another. The historical materialist 
therefore dissociates himself from this process of transmission as 
far as possible. He regards it as his task to brush history against 
the grain.4 
Setting aside more abstract theoretical concerns regarding history for just a 
moment, there is a startling concreteness to Benjamin’s metaphor worth 
momentarily dwelling upon. The image of documents “transmitted from one hand 
to another” registers tactile sensations of the apparently smooth texture of paper 
once grasped between thumb and forefinger. Culture and barbarism figure as 
two sides of this sheet of paper, the latter the end result of a process by which 
wood is cut, pulped, pressed, and thinly sliced along the grain of the pulp into a 
form that no longer resembles its hoary, natural shape. To brush against the 
grain means to rub the paper between finger and thumb, to summon the grain 
                                                
4 Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” Selected Writings Volume 4: 
1938-1940, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: 
Belknap/Harvard UP, 2003), 392. 
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into sound by means of friction against barely visible ridges in the skin of the 
fingers, and perhaps even to crinkle or tear the smooth surface of the paper in 
the process. Brushing against the grain, rendered most concretely as a practice 
upon material (if not quite yet as a “material practice”), corresponds to reel-time’s 
attentiveness to not only the grain of tape (rust) but also to the materiality of its 
entire mechanism. In its intended usage, which is in its normative purposiveness 
as a uniform electrical signal applied to the surface of a ferromagnetic strip, tape 
technology’s "ribbon of rust" functions as a veritable tabula rasa for the 
inscription and retention of information. From this standpoint, one might perhaps 
surmise tape’s conformance to the “homogenous, empty time” of real-time, a 
temporality whose material has been freed of blemishes and problematic artifacts 
and upon whose apparently smoothed surface memory might be linearly 
recorded and played back. However, for Benjamin’s materialist historiographer 
the apparently homogenous surface of this magnetic ribbon of rust also contains 
imbedded within itself a “secret index by which [the historical past] is referred to 
redemption.”5 In this context, brushing history against the grain cannot simply 
mean rewinding the tape and replaying history; rather, it must mean intervening 
in the process of recording and playback to uncover those noises and artifacts of 
the electromagnetic memory process itself. The redemptive impulse of the tape 
practices I examine in this dissertation thus entails more than the mere playback 
                                                
5 Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” 390. 
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of a recording, but it also folds in traces of the recording process itself and 
reveals the work of and upon the technological apparatus of tape. My own 
historiographic approach reflects this common aesthetic tendency that I find in 
the objects I consider in the following chapters. Where Peggy Phelan and Diana 
Taylor locate the materiality of memory in an ephemeral transfer between bodies 
over and against reading and playing back the document, I suggest (following 
Rebecca Schneider) that we should also seek it in that interval between 
recording and playing back which each of these tape practices differently folds 
into its process and audibly exhibits in its performance.  
Chapter one begins with the perceived break between analog and digital 
recording practices and tape's ambiguous place in relation to it. The 
historiographic portion of my argument explores tape's technological emergence 
during the Third Reich, particularly in the hands of two German companies (IG 
Farben and AEG) directly complicit in Holocaust atrocities. I place this historical 
development alongside the IBM punch card's important role in processing 
information for Nazi concentration camps and tape's status after the war as the 
foundational medium of the digital "information age." I read these historical 
currents through the writings of Holocaust survivor Primo Levi (who understood 
his experience of Auschwitz through the metaphor of the body as a tape 
recorder) and Steve Reich's compositions Different Trains (which intermingles 
tape and live performance to memorialize the Jewish experience of the boxcar en 
route to Auschwitz) and It’s Gonna Rain (which positions its audience as 
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cathartic witness to a primal scene of listening). Drawing these threads together 
in Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s analysis of the train and its relationship to (material 
and industrial) fatigue, I relocate traumatic memory’s material and discursive 
relationship to technology in both tape and the train. In doing so, I also establish 
a continuity between the Marxist analysis of technology (as instantiated in the 
thought of Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt) with anthropologist and 
philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon’s concept of transduction. Looking at 
the hysteretic material of tape (rust) in relation to the primary material of train and 
railroad (iron), I further argue for material continuity (as opposed to "break") 
between the analog/machine/industrial and digital/computer/postindustrial ages. 
Chapter Two begins again with these questions of continuity and “break” 
between the industrial and information ages as articulated in Richard 
Schechner’s essay on technology and the end of humanism in postwar 
performance. Running this question through Jean-François Lyotard’s and Jon 
McKenzie’s analyses of the relationship between technological performance and 
efficiency, I propose a critical approach to Samuel Beckett’s Krapp’s Last Tape 
and Rockaby that treats these two plays, both of which differently foreground 
tape technology’s place within the theatrical apparatus, as “information 
machines.” I understand Beckett’s engagement with the tape medium as 
proposing a model of memory whereby decay and production, repetition and 
erasure, remembering and oblivion reinforce and imbue (rather than oppose) one 
another. Drawing upon observations in sound studies regarding the early 
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marketing of the reel-to-reel tape recorder in Europe as an instrument of 
nostalgia (“acoustic family album”) as well as the history of the emergence of the 
cassette and the floppy disc, I consider how in positioning the theatrical 
apparatus in these two tape plays as a machine designed to fail, Beckett 
highlights the importance of delay and difference-in-repetition as resistances to 
the “efficient” technological use of the tape recorder. Fundamentally then, I 
explore how Beckett’s tape plays pertain more to the limitations and potentialities 
of technologies qua human memory as explored in Bernard Stiegler’s Technics 
and Time: in positioning both the recorded voice and the actor’s living speech as 
echoes of each other, Beckett’s tape plays resituates the corporeality of 
performance on the cusp of recording and playback. 
Chapter Three picks up these questions of resistance and runs them 
through Alvin Lucier’s I Am Sitting in a Room and Brian Eno’s Discreet Music to 
consider the potential of tape music for creating “other spaces,” i.e. alternatively 
imagined sonic environments that challenge the late capitalist ideological spatial 
strategies of “real time.” Beginning with Walter Benjamin’s considerations of the 
relationship between and technological reproduction as configured in his concept 
of aura, I propose that both Lucier’s and Eno’s tape processes function to 
disorient the listener rather than locate him or her in spatial proximity to the 
reproduction. Building on questionings of industrialized memory and real-time 
initiated in the preceding chapters, I resituate previous concerns with speed and 
delay within Henri Lefebvre’s analyses of rhythm and space. In my own analysis 
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of I Am Sitting in a Room, I examine not only how its process imagines and 
distorts the contradictory space of late-capitalism, but also how the piece 
overlays the seemingly oppositional roles of technician and performer. My 
analysis of Eno’s Discreet Music positions his long delay process not only within 
the historical emergence of the technique in both popular and avant-garde music, 
but also in the tension between accident and control that the process itself entails 
in practice. Taken together, both Eno’s and Lucier’s tape music pieces 
reproduce, even as they resist, the contradictory space of late-capitalism. In 
doing so, they also generate alternative tactics to the late-capitalist ideology of 
real-time. 
Chapter Four grounds its analysis of Enda Walsh’s misterman in a 
negotiation between Jean-François Lyotard’s engagement with psychoanalysis 
and technology alongside Rebecca Schneider’s concepts of reworking and 
reenactment. After a detailed consideration of the play’s overtly libidinal content, 
the chapter shifts into a three-part analysis of the play traced alongside Lyotard’s 
three-part synthesis of psychoanalytic memory processes (repeating, 
remembering, working-through) with his analysis of Stiegler’s “temporal 
syntheses” (breaching, scanning, passing).  The first section examines repeated 
scenes in the play as a well as repetitions within scenes reenacting his childhood 
memories in mimetic relation to replayed tape recordings. I relate this switching 
back/forth of roles and on/off of tape players to Rebecca Schneider’s analysis of 
the “theatrical switch” in the Wooster Group’s Poor Theatre. The next section 
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traces Lyotard’s concept of scanning alongside the main character’s often 
thwarted attempts to consciously summon his memory through belabored acts of 
rewinding and fast-forwarding held in tension with tape players that malfunction 
and play back of their own accord. The final section examines the two violent 
acts of bludgeoning death in the play (of a dog and a village girl) and their 
relationship to the Lyotard’s question of the unrepresentable in relation to 
psychoanalytic listening. I position my analysis alongside Rebecca Schneider’s 
notion of reworking as unfolded through a critique of Peggy Phelan’s seeming 
neglect of sound in her analysis of the ontology of performance. 
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 —Chapter One— 
Ribbons of Rust: Transduction, Trauma, and Steve Reich 
 
In “A Life of Learning” (1991), a Charles Homer Haskins Lecture 
presented at ACLS, Milton Babbitt describes, in retrospect, his early impressions 
of tape technology: 
But immediately after the war, the computer was not ready for the 
task of controlled sound production. What was available was the 
tape machine. Although this was basically a storage medium akin 
to the handwritten soundtrack, it was much more easily 
manipulable; sound from electronic and other sources could be 
stored on the tape which could be spliced into segments, and those 
segments represented precisely measurable durations. For all that, 
the medium was only too susceptible to trivial tricks with sound and 
words, as the early motion picture reveled in automobiles racing 
backward as fast as forward, divers leaping out of the water onto 
the diving board, and on and on; but there were soon works on tape 
by knowing composers, works that reflected musical needs that 
could not be satisfied in any other way.6 
                                                
6 Milton Babbitt. “A Life of Learning,” in The Collected Essays of Milton Babbitt, 
ed. Stephen Peles (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003), 451. 
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It makes perfect sense that Babbitt, a renowned composer and theorist of 
serialist computer music, frames his recollections of the tape recorder with an 
unfavorable comparison to the computer. After he founded the Columbia-
Princeton Electronic Music Center with Vladimir Ussachevsky and Otto Luening 
in the early 1950s, his two colleagues had much more success using tape 
recorders for musical compositions than he did—with the notable exception of 
Philomel (1964), perhaps Babbitt’s most popular work. In 1959, with a generous 
grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Columbia-Princeton Electronic Music 
Center achieved official high-tech status and world-class reputation with its 
acquisition of the RCA Mark II Synthesizer. If the tape recorder did not 
immediately begin to gather dust, then the massive physical space occupied by 
its technological rival likely ensured it a place in a corner somewhere. The field of 
electronic music is perennially concerned, one might even say obsessed, with 
securing the latest high-tech composition tools and musical instruments. This all 
too often results in a particularly serial approach to technologies, wherein a new, 
improved, better piece of equipment supersedes another and, in doing so, 
relegates the latter to the dustbin or the storage closet. Of course, tape would 
continue to be an important compositional tool for decades to come, both in the 
EMC and all around the world, but Babbitt’s “not ready” of the computer vs. the 
“was available” of the tape recorder marks a certain technocratic sensibility at 
work in his field. This tendency in electronic and computer music, of course, 
reflects similar priorities in larger powers structures outside the academy and the 
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conservatory, including philanthropist organizations (e.g. the Rockefeller 
Foundation) and corporations (e.g. RCA) alike. These, in turn, reflect larger 
economic shifts in the burgeoning (for the United States, at least) post-war 
economy, namely the rise of the “information age.” 
 This serial approach to technologies has a direct ideological complement 
in historiographic strategies such as self-promotion and periodization. Since 
corporations and foundations constantly generate cultural capital for themselves 
through endless circulations of advertisements and promotional materials, 
generous public and publicized private donations, and so on, they also exercise 
their power to write, erase, and rewrite their own histories. We know these serial 
histories well because we hear them repeated again and again: the digital era 
supersedes the analog era, the compact disc displaces the phonograph, 
computer music makes tape music obsolete, etc. Then techno-nostalgia reverses 
the polarity so the sequence can play in reverse. Regarding the history of 
magnetic tape for musical composition and home recording alike, we often hear 
narratives similar to Babbitt’s: “immediately after the war,” the tape recorder “was 
available.” In a 1965 essay written for Music Journal entitled “The Revolution in 
Sound: Electronic Music,” Babbitt provides us with a little more detail: “The 
strategic stimulus to the new era of electronic music was the emergence of 
   19 
 
magnetic tape recording and reproduction of sound after the war.”7  Of course, 
technologies do not merely appear: they have histories, often complex and sordid 
ones. Tape recording is certainly no exception, in this regard. 
 In this chapter, I am less interested in sketching broad trajectories than I 
am in accounting for short intervals, intersections, fragments, and inscriptive 
frameworks. Tape seems to occupy an ambiguous space between the categories 
of analog and digital. This “space between” is one such interval of interest. I am 
also interested in the historical gap, void, abyss of World War II, from which 
economic paradigms like the information age and technologies like magnetic 
tape suddenly “appear” as if ex nihilo. Upon closer examination, neither of these 
intervals is comprised of empty space and time; rather, their material has merely 
not yet been fully accounted for. In part, this chapter sets out to do just that. The 
primary subjects of this chapter, however, its focus of interest, are two tape 
compositions of Steve Reich, particularly those that use the recorded human 
voice as their primary subject matter. In themselves, these comprise an interval: 
the tape work It’s Gonna Rain (1965) marks the beginning of Steve Reich’s 
career as a composer, shortly thereafter he abandons the tape medium for live 
instrumentation, and Different Trains (1988) marks a return (albeit in dramatically 
different form) of Reich’s work with tape. When Reich composes It’s Gonna Rain 
                                                
7 Milton Babbitt, “The Revolution in Sound: Electronic Music,” The Collected 
Essays of Milton Babbitt. 71. 
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in the mid-1960s, musical experiments with tape were arguably at their numerical 
peak, poised on the cusp of crossover into mainstream culture: by 1967, The 
Beatles’ Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Heart’s Club Band introduced tape 
experimentalism to a wide popular audience. By 1988, however, tape music had 
not completely receded with the rise of digital media, but its presence was 
relatively muted in comparison to its heyday in the mid-1960s. The techniques 
and technologies involved in composing Different Trains bear the marks of that 
supposed moment of tape’s supersession by digital media. More importantly, 
Different Trains speaks directly to that other interval of note, the historical one: 
World War II and the experience of the Holocaust. The Holocaust and, in 
particular, the questions it poses regarding memory and history vis-à-vis gaps in 
witness testimony, presents an especially daunting interval: one for which it is 
outside the scope of this chapter to fully account. Accordingly, this chapter does 
not set out to tell the “whole story”—I am more interested in assembling useful 
fragments, examining their intersections and interrelationships, and considering 
how they are framed and represented (historically and/or aesthetically). My 
interests in this area pertain specifically to Reich’s narrative and musical framing 
of the Holocaust in Different Trains and tape recording’s particular place in 
relation to witness testimony.  
Inscription, Recording, Transduction 
The technological potential for storing, processing, and retrieving massive 
amounts of information pertaining to personal identity greatly expanded the 
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horizon of feasibility for the Nazi project in the 1930s and 1940s. Edwin Black’s 
book-length journalistic account IBM and the Holocaust (2001) explains how IBM 
punch card data storage technology was not only instrumental, during the 1933 
German census, in documenting Jews, communists, and others later to be 
deemed enemies of the Nazi state, but also how it was directly implicated in 
cataloguing prisoner populations and processing slave labor data at 
concentration camps. As meticulously documented in Black’s book, IBM Hollerith 
D-11 punch card machines were custom-designed, leased, and regularly 
maintained for all Nazi concentration camps by employees of IBM’s German 
subsidiary Dehomag with the knowledge and consent of IBM’s American CEO 
Thomas J. Watson. Dehomag is a truncation of Deutsche Hollerith-Maschinen 
Gesellschaft mbH and was named after Herman Hollerith, son of German 
immigrants to the United States and developer of punch card technology in the 
U.S. Hollerith’s “electric tabulating machine” was patented in 1889 and built 
under contract for the United States Census Office. His first major business 
success—the tabulation of the 1890 American Census using punch card 
technology—reduced the data processing time necessary in previous pen and 
paper census efforts from years to weeks and months. This success positioned 
his firm (Tabulating Machine Company, founded 1896) at the international 
forefront of the data processing industry for tracking and recording changes in 
large national populations.  Hollerith’s application of punch card technology for 
the first time made possible the collection of finely parsed demographic data 
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relating to ethnicity, religion, occupation, and other personal information. In 1911, 
Hollerith’s firm merged with three other companies to become Computing 
Tabulating Recording Company (CTR), which brought Hollerith’s technology 
under the same umbrella as William Bundy’s punch tape time clock. CTR was 
renamed International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) by CEO Thomas J. 
Watson in 1924. 
The tattoos that all slave laborers in the Auschwitz camp complex were 
forced to display on their bodies were serial numbers assigned to them using 
IBM’s Hollerith D-11 technology. As Black notes, the five-digit serial numbers 
initially issued to all prisoners upon interment by a Hollerith D-11 operator were 
literally (and brutally) inscribed on the bodies of Auschwitz slave labor.8 In this 
sense, the Nazi practice of tattooing at Auschwitz inscribes the laboring body 
itself within the bureaucratic logic of the Hollerith punch card. One online article 
from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum vividly details the evolution 
of Nazi tattooing practices in Auschwitz as follows: 
Originally, a special metal stamp, holding interchangeable numbers 
made up of needles approximately one centimeter long was used. 
This allowed the whole serial number to be punched at one blow 
                                                
8 Edwin Black, IBM and the Holocaust: the Strategic Alliance between Nazi 
Germany and America’s Most Powerful Corporation (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 2001), 352-353.  
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onto the prisoner's left upper chest. Ink was then rubbed into the 
bleeding wound. 
 
When the metal stamp method proved impractical, a single-needle 
device was introduced, which pierced the outlines of the serial-
number digits onto the skin. The site of the tattoo was changed to 
the outer side of the left forearm.9 
In its earliest iteration, the “special metal stamp […] punched at one blow” onto 
the chest of the inmate both literalizes and corporealizes the association between 
serial number (document) and laboring body (documented), effectively producing 
the body itself as punch card. The later revised practice, using inscriptions of a 
“single-needle device” applied to the forearm similarly inscribes the bodies of 
slave labor within the logic and technology of bureaucratic inscription. Rubber 
stamps and ink blotters, punch cards, pens and ink wells, tattoos: these various 
inscriptive technologies of Nazi bureaucracy serve to mark and document the 
passage of slave laboring bodies through the camp system in their inevitable 
progress toward physical exhaustion and death. 
                                                
9 “Tattoos and Numbers: the System of Identifying Prisoners at Auschwitz,” 
Holocaust Encyclopedia, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Online, 
accessed March 3, 2014, 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007056  
   24 
 
Per the Marxist critique, the stamp of the serial number upon the skin of 
the worker pushes the capitalist logic of the commodity fetish—in which “the 
social character of men’s labor appears to them as an objective character 
stamped upon the product of that labor”10—to its most extreme logical 
conclusions. In the Auschwitz tattoo, reification’s phenomenal logic of “phantom 
objectivity”11 appears as a serial number stamped on the body of the slave 
laborer himself, where the documented worker is indefinitely “punched in” for a 
shift that ends only in his death. In this sense, the Auschwitz slave labor system 
not only involved the involuntary production of materials for the Nazi war 
machine, but also simultaneously produced the bodies of slave labor as “dead 
labor” in the same process. Karl Marx could not have known that his important 
distinction between living, human labor and the dead labor of factory machinery 
would find so grotesque a reconciliation as it did in Auschwitz, but in the camp 
his metaphor achieves perhaps its darkest truth: “Capital is dead-labour, that, 
vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more 
                                                
10 Karl Marx, “Capital, Volume One” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. 
Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 320. 
11 Georg Lukács, “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” History 
and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968), 83. 
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labour it sucks.”12 In the situation of the Auschwitz slave laborer, the laboring 
body functions as a rough equivalent of the factory machine, transferring its 
intrinsic value (its health and its life force) directly to the materials it produces as 
it produces them. As Hannah Arendt notes in The Origins of Totalitarianism, the 
camp’s “mass manufacture of corpses is preceded by the historically and 
politically intelligible preparation of living corpses.”13 In Arendt’s analysis, the 
“preparation of living corpses” historically began with the systematic juridical and 
political exclusion of Jews and other “undesirable elements” from German civil 
society which, in turn, refashioned them as a stateless, outlawed mass: a 
“problem” for which the “mass manufacture of corpses” in the concentration 
camp functioned as the “final solution.” From its role in isolating undesirables 
during the 1933 census to its corporealization in the Auschwitz tattoo, IBM’s 
punch card consistently materialized the Nazis’ inscriptive logic of the stamp. 
This process of transferring value from machine to product in the Marxian 
analysis has conceptual analogues in both classical Newtonian mechanics and 
the emerging science of industrialism: thermodynamics. In the Newtonian model, 
work performed on an inert object transfers kinetic energy to that object and 
gives it momentum. According to the first law of thermodynamics, which in a 
                                                
12 Marx, “Capital, Volume One,” 362-363. 
13 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego: Harcourt, Inc., 
1968),  447. 
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limited sense refigures Newtonian mechanics on a microscopic scale, matter 
changes when thermal energy is transferred (conducted) to or from it. The 
process of the transfer of value from the machine to the commodity does not 
escape the mechanical and thermodynamic processes, but follows the course 
they trace through the raw material and corresponds to the transformations of 
said raw material into the commodity object. In short, the analogy I am 
suggesting here is not merely a rhetorical one. Marx’s discussions of technology 
draw from the same science as those machines they critique. Arendt’s analysis 
of the laboring body in the camp, which follows from the Marxist position, pushes 
the analogy further almost to the point of inverting the dialectic: there, dead labor 
(the machine, the slave) produces itself as the product of the camp. As Giorgio 
Agamben and others following Arendt note, this inversion of production—its 
spilling over into the expenditure of human life as its telos—marks the final 
transformation of capitalism, the moment where it, to paraphrase Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s appropriation of Pindar, becomes what it is. I do not disagree with 
the latter point and I do not wish to depart from the sprit of historical materialist 
critique, but rather to develop it beyond its implicit instrumental logic that 
positions technology as a mere tool of science and industry. 
Primo Levi’s memoirs provide an important, if heretofore underexplored, 
turn in this rethinking of technology (particularly tape) vis-à-vis the experience of 
the Holocaust. A chemist by trade, both before and after the war, he was 
conscripted by IG Farben as slave labor in the production of synthetic rubber at 
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the Monowitz-Buna laboratories at Auschwitz III. In an interview with Ferdinando 
Camon in 1986, one year before his untimely death, Levi relates his experience 
as a Jewish prisoner in Auschwitz in similar terms as I use above: “this dual 
experience, the racial laws and the concentration camp, stamped me the way 
you stamp a steel plate.”14 Levi’s comparison here is only barely a metaphor: for 
the duration of his lifetime outside the camp, he never had the stamp removed 
from his forearm. This image of the stamp recurs frequently in Levi’s work. In an 
interview, Primo Levi reflects on his role as primary witness to the horrors of 
Auschwitz: 
I still have a visual and acoustic memory of the experiences there 
that I cannot explain. … sentences in languages I do not know have 
remained etched in my memory, like on a magnetic tape; I have 
repeated them to Poles and Hungarians and have been told that 
the sentences are meaningful.15 
                                                
14 Primo Levi qtd. in Ferdinando Camon, “Chemistry and the Man,” 
Conversations with Primo Levi, trans. John Shepley (Marlboro, VT: Marlboro 
Press, 1989), 64. 
15 Primo Levi qtd. in. Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: the Witness and 
the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 1999), 26-27. 
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He repeats the metaphor again in The Drowned and the Saved (1986), this time 
in reference to the German translation of his first book Survival in Auschwitz 
(1947): 
Experience then taught me that translation and compromise are 
synonymous, but at that time I was driven by the scruple of 
superrealism; I wanted that in that book, particularly in its German 
guise, nothing should be lost of its harshness and the violence 
inflicted on the language, which for that matter I had made an effort 
to reproduce as best I could in my Italian original. In a certain 
sense, it was not a matter of a translation but rather of a 
restoration: [my translator’s] was, or wanted to be, a restitutio in 
prisinum, a retroversion to the language in which events had taken 
place and to which they belonged. More than a book, it should be a 
tape recording.16 
Levi’s body of work as a primary witness reflects a profound emphasis on the 
function of written and spoken language not only within the walls of Auschwitz, 
but also in the testimonies that follow the experience. In the first quotation, tape 
registers as an inscriptive metaphor. Similar to the tattoo “stamped” on his arm, 
the radical incommunicability of Auschwitz’ fractured polyglot community is 
                                                
16 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New 
York: Vintage, 1988), 172-173. 
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“etched” in his memory “like on a magnetic tape.” The second quotation unsettles 
Levi’s other association between inscription and the tape recorder by positioning 
the latter (opposite the book) as own his preferred practice of translation: “More 
than a book, it should be a tape recording.” Like the first passage, the second 
refers to the impossible situation of communication in Auschwitz, wherein so 
many nationalities of people speaking so many different languages were both 
forced to share a space and expected to labor together and coexist. In the fourth 
chapter of The Drowned and the Saved entitled “Communicating,” Levi describes 
this situation of Auschwitz as a “void” where the basic human need for 
communication with other humans meets with constant frustration and all too 
often collapses into resigned silence. This situation is further compounded by the 
Nazis’ insistence, with threat of beating and public humiliation, that all linguistic 
transactions be performed in German. The fact that the Auschwitz guards and 
Nazi officials spoke to (mostly screamed at) the prisoners in a dialect of German 
specific to the camps “skeletal, howled, studded with obscenities and 
imprecations” and thus “only vaguely related to the precise, austere language of 
my chemistry books, or to the melodious, refined German of Heine’s poetry”17 
persistently undermines communicability and ensures that everyone in the camp 
(Nazis and prisoners alike) continues down a steady path toward total 
dehumanization. Under this constant threat of complete linguistic and social 
                                                
17 Ibid., 97. 
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isolation, memory responds by assuming the function of a tape recorder: “I have 
noticed, in myself and others who came back, a curious effect of this void and 
need for communication,” Levi writes, 
At a distance of forty years we still remember, in a purely acoustic 
form, words and sentences pronounced around us in languages we 
did not know and did not learn afterward […] These foreign voices 
became engraved on our memories as on a blank tape; in the same 
manner a famished stomach rapidly assimilates even indigestible 
food.18  
The corporeal metaphor here complicates Levi’s constellation. As the “mental 
equivalent of our bodily need for nourishment,” memory vis-à-vis the situation of 
radical incommunicability records every scrap that it can in, as he further 
suggests, an “unconscious preparation for ‘later,’ for an improbable survival, in 
which every shred of experience would become a tessera in a vast mosaic.”19 
The primary witness, born of a situation of radical incommunicability, becomes 
for him- or herself in the camp, as well as for others in life outside the walls of 
Auschwitz, a corporeal tape recorder. No one recording can possibly contain the 
full truth of Auschwitz, in Levi’s view; instead, truth is reconstructed via a 
collective and reciprocal process of playing back thousands of fragments long 
                                                
18 Ibid., 94. 
19 Ibid., 95. 
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after the event itself. In placing communicability at the center of community, Levi 
recognizes in Auschwitz the most austere community conceivable and, even still, 
one that nonetheless contains within itself a community yet-to-come in the 
sharing and translation of fragmented experience. 
However, Levi’s association between inscription (“engraved” and “etched”) 
and tape still rings strangely in the ears. Inscription denotes the marking of a 
surface, usually with a sharp pointed implement such as a stylus. The surface of 
tape remains visibly unmarked after recording and its recording head is smooth 
and slightly rounded. Tape recording functions via an electromagnetic process 
scientifically designated as hysteresis. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the 
term as follows:  
hys-ter-e-sis: n Greek ὑστέρησις a coming short, deficiency, 
<ὑστερεῖν to be behind, come late, etc., <ὕστερος late., A 
phenomenon observed in some physical systems, by which 
changes in a property (e.g. magnetization, or length) lag behind 
changes in an agent on which they depend (e.g. magnetizing force, 
or stress), so that the value of the former at any moment depends 
on the manner of the previous variation of the latter (e.g. whether it 
was increasing or decreasing in value); any dependence of the 
value of a property on the past history of the system to which it 
pertains. 
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The process of hysteresis hinges upon a “lagging behind,” the magnetic residue 
of an electromagnetic process induced in, essentially, a ribbon of rust. As the 
magnetizing head passes over the surface of the tape, an electromagnetic pulse 
realigns the polarity of microscopic ferrous oxide particles chemically bonded to a 
pliable paper or plastic strip in patterns directly corresponding to the sound wave 
patterns produced by the sound source and its environment. A thin coating of 
plastic on the surface of the tape binds the ferromagnetic material to the 
substrate beneath, reduces friction against the recording head and ensures the 
durability, integrity, and cohesion of the tape as a whole. Writing, on the other 
hand, is a function of the friction between a pointed implement and a flat, smooth 
surface. This friction transfers material from the implement to the surface of the 
page. While tape recording does inevitably induce some small amount of 
mechanical friction in the form of heat, the recording head and the tape are both 
designed to reduce the friction between their respective surfaces as much as 
possible. Tape recording thus is decidedly less a function of material transfer 
than it is a transfer of electromagnetic information from one surface (the 
recording head) through another (the smooth surface of the binding) so as to 
realign magnetic particles in patterns directly corresponding to the shape of the 
electromagnetic pulse induced by the recorded sound source. When Levi makes 
a sharp distinction between the “tape recording” and the “book” in the context of 
translation, he draws upon this process of informational transfer through a 
surface. His corporeal analogy to the lining of the stomach and the chemical 
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process of nourishment reaffirms this. On the other hand, when he uses 
metaphors of inscription to analogize his corporeal sensorium with a tape 
recorder, Levi draws his comparison through the shared quality of material 
“permanence” (cf. “lagging behind”) ascribed to both writing and tape recording: 
both book and tape preserve a trace, a remainder that survives an original event 
of recording. 
This electromagnetic transfer of information active in the process of 
hysteresis concretizes a larger process that Gilbert Simondon calls transduction. 
Simondon’s concept of transduction refers to a process of individuation—either 
technological or biological, mental or social—whereby “an activity propagates 
gradually in a domain, by founding this propagation on a structuration of the 
domain that is realized from one place to the next.”20 Transduction thus occurs 
through a gradual process of differentiation (what Simondon calls individuation) 
that spreads through material via patterns of reorganization. Simondon considers 
crystallization to be exemplary of this transduction process. He articulates its 
function as a mental process and a philosophical concept as follows: 
The transduction that resolves things effects the reversal of the 
negative into the positive: meaning, that which makes the terms fail 
                                                
20 Gilbert Simondon qtd. in Gilbert Simondon: Being and Technology, eds. Arne 
De Boever, Alex Murray, et al. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 
230. 
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to be identical with one another, and that which makes them 
disparate […] is integrated with the system that resolves things and 
becomes a condition of meaning. There is no impoverishment in 
the information contained in the terms: transduction is 
characterized by the fact that the result of this process is a concrete 
network including all the original terms. The transductive order 
retains all the concrete and is characterized by the conservation of 
information, whereas induction requires a loss of information.21 
This passage of course explains how transduction traces the movement of the 
dialectic (“the reversal of the negative into the positive”) at the same time that it 
problematizes linear, chronological development. This characterization of 
transduction as a reversal in polarity, of course, directly connects to the 
electromagnetic process of hysteresis. Tape, perhaps more than any other 
technology, concretizes Simondon’s understanding of transduction as a mental 
process and philosophical concept in its material and mechanism. The idea of 
the “conservation of information” that Simondon elicits in his definition of 
transduction maps directly onto the functionality of tape itself as a material 
repository of information (memory). Not only are the recording and playback 
heads electronic transducers by definition—meaning they convert a signal 
                                                
21 Gilbert Simondon, “The Genesis of the Individual,” in Incorporations, eds. 
Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 315. 
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(sound) into another form of energy (magnetic pulse) and back again—but 
through Levi’s metaphor they also bring these processes to bear upon the 
relationship between corporeality and inscription. 
With the above in mind, we might further trace Levi’s metaphors through 
the complex history of the word “recording” itself. The Oxford English Dictionary 
traces the etymology of the verb “record” as follows: 
<Anglo-Norman and Old French, Middle French recorder (French 
recorder) to remember (about something) (first half of the 12th 
cent.; c1050 in reflexive use), to remember, recall (something), to 
repeat, to recite, to relate, tell, bear witness to, declare, to make a 
record of (all 12th cent.), to learn by heart, (reflexive) to reflect, 
meditate, (in law) to report, state, (intransitive) to make a record (all 
13th cent. or earlier in Anglo-Norman), to put on record, to declare 
as one's verdict (14th cent. or earlier in Anglo-Norman), to perform 
(music) (early 15th cent. or earlier) <classical Latin recordārī (rarely 
also recordāre) to call to mind, recollect, in post-classical Latin also 
to testify (9th cent.), to put on record (frequently from 12th cent. in 
British sources) <re- re- prefix + cord- , cor heart (see cordi- comb. 
form); compare accord v., discord v.1, etc. Compare Old Occitan 
recordar, Catalan recordar (14th cent.), Spanish recordar (13th 
cent.), Portuguese recordar (14th cent.), Italian ricordare (a1292). 
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In its Latin root cor (itself related to the Ancient Greek καρδία cardio or heart), the 
verb “record” carries a distinctly corporeal resonance through the notion of 
“learning by heart.” In this sense, recording thus tethers memory to the body, 
more specifically to the rhythms of the heart. To flesh out this part of the 
etymology a bit more here, recording in its earliest sense registers practices of 
recitation that commit oral histories and epic poetry to memory via the corporeal 
rhythms of the voice. Learning by heart thus implies, in the Western tradition, an 
understanding of recording that privileges a rhythmic interaction between 
physiologies of speaking (glottis, tongue, lips) and hearing (canal, eardrum, 
cochlea) as the corporeal pulse of memory: in short, a process of transduction at 
the corporeal level. From the ninth century forward, a distinctly juridical 
resonance of recording also runs alongside that of the corporeal and, by the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, situates ideas of witness, testimony, and 
hearing firmly within the inscriptive processes of law (transcription, sentencing, 
and so on). In light of Simondon’s concept of transduction, Levi’s metaphor of the 
Auschwitz witness as a corporeal tape recorder not only concretizes transduction 
at the level of concept, but also (and especially in light of the etymology of 
recording traced above) suggests a broader application of that concept beyond 
the body/technology binary. 
Iron and Rust, Teleology, Different Trains 
Steve Reich composed Different Trains in 1988, a musical piece in three 
movements for string quartet and magnetic tape. Commissioned by Betty 
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Freeman for the Kronos Quartet, each of its three movements is structured 
around tape-recorded recollections associated with train travel on both sides of 
the Atlantic Ocean. Reich’s choice of the train as a grounding figure for his 
composition recalls both Arthur Honneger’s Pacific 231 (1924), a composition 
that imitates and dramatizes the movements of trains using timbres and rhythms 
of orchestral instruments, and Pierre Schaeffer’s Etude aux chemins de fer 
(1948), an early phonographic experiment in musique concrète that organizes 
found recordings of train sounds into a quasi-musical composition. Whereas 
Etude aux chemins de fer anticipates Schaeffer’s later tape compositions with 
Pierre Henry and other members of the Groupe de Recherche de Musique 
Concrete (GRMC) during the 1950s and 1960s, Honneger’s Pacific 231 registers 
a proliferation of machine-themed music among early twentieth century 
composers variously associated with musical modernism and the historical 
avant-garde. The latter follow in the wake of both Luigi Russolo’s 1913 futurist 
manifesto “The Art of Noises,” which sought to distance itself from the traditional 
timbres of the orchestra so as to make musical use of “the infinite variety of 
noise-sounds” including “the noises of trams, of automobile engines, of carriages 
and brawling crowds.”22 Contemporaneous works in the vein of Pacific 231 
include George Antheil’s Second Sonata “Airplane” (1921) and Ballet 
                                                
22 Luigi Russolo, “The Art of Noises: Futurist Manifesto,” The Art of Noises, trans. 
Barclay Brown, (New York: Pendragon Press, 1986), 25.  
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Méchanique (1924), Sergei Prokofiev’s Pas d’Acier (1926), Alexander Mosolov’s 
Iron Foundry (1926-27), and Carlos Chavez’ H.P., i.e. Horsepower (1926-32).  
Reich’s Different Trains resituates these musical ideas and practices within a 
decidedly more “humanistic” frame by patterning the melodic phrases performed 
by the Kronos Quartet upon the sampled, looped, and triggered speech of its 
recorded human subjects. By carefully positioning these musical traces of the 
human voice alongside the recorded voices themselves and by layering all these 
over archival audio of train sounds, air raid sirens, and musical imitations of the 
train recorded by the Kronos Quartet, Reich’s Different Trains presents his elegy 
for victims of the Holocaust against a historical background of the relationship 
between technology and human beings since the industrial revolution. 
 Since its emergence in the eighteenth century, the railway has 
increasingly become an ambivalent emblem of both technological progress, more 
generally, and the industrial age, more specifically. Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s 
important book The Railway Journey: the Industrialization of Time and Space in 
the 19th Century (1977) explains how the railroad fundamentally impacts human 
spatiotemporal experience: 
on the one hand, the railroad opened new spaces that were not 
easily accessible before; on the other it did so by destroying space, 
namely the space between points. That in-between, or travel space, 
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which it was possible to ‘savor’ while using the eotechnical form of 
transport, disappeared on the railroads.23 
The expansion of spaces accessible to human travelers also marks a collapse of 
the space between the two points of departure and arrival, in terms of subjective 
perception: the physical expansion of available space corresponds to a 
compressed experience of time. The ideology of progress as codified under 
industrial capitalism and which follows in the wake of the locomotive and the 
steam engine, marries this compressed experience of space and time to an 
understanding of history.  G.W.F. Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History 
(1821-1831), perhaps the exemplar of this ideology of progress, proposes a 
dialectical model of universal history that moves from East to West, originating in 
the ancient civilizations of the “Orient” and reaching its final destination in the 
European nation state. This unilinear movement from East to West, according to 
Hegel’s self-justifying narrative of history, also traces the progress of Spirit’s 
coming into consciousness of its own freedom through the actions of World 
Historical Individuals, whose military struggles and victories mark the path of 
progress toward its terminal point in an enlightened bourgeois Europe. A 
fragment written by Walter Benjamin in 1940 crystallizes a crisis in the Hegelian 
                                                
23 Wolfgang Schivelbusch,  The Railway Journey: the Industrialization of Time 
and Space in the 19th Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 
37-38. 
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notion of teleological progress (inherited by Marx) vis-à-vis the figure of the train: 
“Marx says that revolutions are the locomotive of world history. But perhaps it is 
quite otherwise. Perhaps revolutions are an attempt by the passengers on the 
train—namely the human race—to activate the emergency brake.”24 With 
technological advances in the twentieth century contributing to two enormously 
destructive world wars as well as the cyclical crises of industrial capitalism 
worsening in their frequency and impact, the railroad as an emblem of industry 
and progress had taken on the valence of a demonic figure that all too swiftly 
hurtles human history toward inevitable catastrophe. “One might also say that the 
more civilized the schedule and the more efficient the technology, the more 
catastrophic its destruction when it collapses,” Schivelbusch writes of train 
accidents in the nineteenth century, “There is an exact ratio between the level of 
the technology with which nature is controlled, and the degree of severity of its 
accidents.”25 The historical materialist critique of technology—which 
Schivelbusch clearly articulates in this passage—locates catastrophe in the 
subjugation of nature necessitated by the pursuit of industrial progress. Following 
                                                
24 Walter Benjamin, “Paralipomena to ‘On the Concept of History’” in Selected 
Writings, Volume 4: 1938-1940, eds. Michael W. Jennings, Marcus Bullock, et al, 
trans. Edmund Jephcott and Howard Eiland (Cambridge: Balknap Press of 
Harvard University Press: 2003), 402.  
25 Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey, 131. 
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Bernard Stiegler’s critique (which I address in greater detail in subsequent 
chapters), I refer to this as the “instrumentalist thesis.” In this section, I would like 
to allow the instrumentalist thesis to unfurl through a reading of Reich’s Different 
Trains until it encounters a moment in Schivelbusch’s argument (in the next 
section) that arrives at a formulation close to that of Simondon’s transduction. 
From the instrumentalist standpoint, Different Trains figures the train 
ambivalently: as an emblem of leisurely travel in America, of catastrophe during 
the Holocaust, and of uncertain reconciliation after the War. 
Despite its title, “America—Before the war,” the first movement recalls the 
composer’s own childhood experiences of train travel between New York and 
Los Angeles slightly before and mostly during World War II (“from 1939 to 
1942,”26 as specified in the composer’s liner and program notes). The fudging of 
periodization in the word “before” reflects Reich’s intention in constructing a 
clear, linear narrative to match the more accurately periodized “during” and 
“after” of the next two sections. The musical mood of the first section, comprised 
of short homophonic melodies played over harmonized broken chords, is 
romantic: alternately optimistic and wistful. In the first section, Reich’s own 
experiences are mediated through tape recorded fragments of the voices of his 
childhood governess Virginia “now in her seventies,” who accompanied Reich on 
                                                
26 Steve Reich, “Different Trains (1988)” in Writings on Music 1965-2000, ed. 
Paul Hillier (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 151. 
   42 
 
his journeys, and a retired Pullman porter Lawrence Davis “now in his eighties,” 
who worked the lines between Los Angeles and New York during the same time 
period.27 Its text runs as follows: 
“From Chicago to New York” (Virginia) 
“one of the fastest trains” 
“the crack train from New York” (Mr. Davis) 
“From New York to Los Angeles” 
“different trains every time” (Virginia) 
“from Chicago to New York” 
“in 1939” 
“1940” 
“1941” 
“1941 I guess it must’ve been”28 
Most of the first six lined fragments, played back frequently in the first movement, 
either emphasize linear direction in physical space (“From Chicago to New York” 
and “From New York to Los Angeles”) or praise the speed and efficiency of the 
train (“one of the fastest trains” and “the crack train from New York”). Reich lays 
a teleological track through, and a conceptual bridge between, the first two 
movements in the rhythmic pattern of the paraddidle (an alternating drumming 
                                                
27 Ibid., 151. 
28 Ibid.,152-153. 
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rudiment played left-right-left-left/right-left-right-right). The paraddidle pattern, 
which supplies the rhythmic foundation for the piece, was performed by the 
Kronos Quartet and recorded as one track on Reich’s tape for playback with live 
accompaniment. As a musical figuration of the train, the paraddidle shifts in 
tempo and key signature in accordance with the rhythmic and harmonic content 
of the speech fragments, but remains a constant force throughout both 
movements. The train slows and accelerates, increases and decreases in 
momentum but never comes to a halt. The last four lined fragments of text 
above, also repeated frequently in playback, emphasize progressive, linear 
movement forward in time (“1939,” “1940,” “1941,” and “1941 I guess it must’ve 
been”) as the train lurches toward the Holocaust catastrophe of the second 
movement. 
Before approaching the second movement of Different Trains, it seems 
relevant to pause for a moment to consider the historical and material 
relationship between the train and the tape recorder. Upon first glance, the two 
technologies share little in common aside from the persistent linearity of both 
track and tape (the recoding jargon of “track” and “tracking” further affirms this) 
as well as similarly interlocking parts in the matching of tape to reel and wheel to 
track. Further consideration of their respective materials, however, reveals a 
much more important historical nexus. As Benjamin, Schivelbusch, and many 
others note, the historical emergence of the train is contingent upon three main 
factors: the invention and perfection of the steam engine as well as increased 
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mining of iron ore and coal. Of these three, iron supplies the raw material for the 
construction of both the locomotive and the railroad itself. Likewise, iron ore 
supplies a primary raw material for the rise of industry in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Iron thus materially grounds the figure of the train as emblem 
of the industrial revolution. As previously mentioned, the hysteretic material of 
tape is rust: oxidized iron. Seven years after the end of World War II, IBM 
announces its official entrance into the growing mainframe computer market by 
replacing the Hollerith punch card with magnetic tape as its primary means of 
information storage and retrieval. IBM’s patent for the 726 Tape Drive, filed in 
1952 and issued in 1962, lays the foundation for what would later be dubbed the 
“information age.” Technocratic grand historical narratives speak of shifts from 
industrial to information economies in terms of discontinuities and displacements, 
but the respective material foundations of these two economies instead seem to 
suggest continuity. Changes in labor forces, training procedure, etc. register the 
technocrat’s narrative of discontinuity, while material continuities remain largely 
unspoken. Why? The unspoken material foundation of the digital information age 
in ferrous hysteretic material, which remains with us even today in the flattened 
discs of computer hard drives as well as in data backup centers and archives still 
using tape media, also problematizes the analog/digital divide, since audio 
recordings from the mid-1950s forward were increasingly mastered on tape 
before being pressed onto phonograph records. Even most of today’s digital 
audio workstations (DAWs) rely extensively on ferromagnetic hard drives for the 
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storage, processing, and retrieval of digital sound recordings. Likewise, the 
videotapes from which Reich himself sources excerpts of Holocaust witness 
testimony for the second and third movements of Different Trains adapt 
ferromagnetic technology for the recording of visual as well as auditory 
information. Beneath all these developments, lie the partially sublated, 
sedimented remains of the industrial age refashioned into ribbons of rust. The 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ fetishization of mechanical speed in the train 
and this century’s fetishization of start-up and data access speed in the computer 
differ mostly in the oxidization states of their raw materials. 
The second movement of Different Trains, entitled “Europe—During the 
war” presents the voices of three Jewish survivors Rachella, Paul, and Rachel 
(“all about my age and now living in America,”29 per Reich’s notes) relating their 
experiences during the Third Reich. The composer’s careful editing and 
arrangement of their recorded video testimony places the visceral image of the 
Auschwitz tattoo toward the end of a fractured narrative of the railroad journey to 
Auschwitz as told through slivers and shards of speech that, despite their 
darkness, glimmer with significance. As in the first movement, the persistent 
paraddidle of the Kronos Quartet’s recorded rhythm track musically figures the 
forward motion of the train. In comparison with that of the first movement, the 
mood of the second is decidedly darker in its harmonic content, registering a shift 
                                                
29 Ibid., 152. 
   46 
 
into the chromatic scale. The digitally sampled train whistles, retrieved from 
sound archives and transposed and played by Reich on a MIDI keyboard, 
register this as well: “You may also note the difference between American (first 
movement) and European (second movement) train whistles,” Reich notes, 
“American trains whistles of this period in the ‘30s and ‘40s are mostly perfect 
intervals of long held fourths and fifths. European train whistles of this same 
period are mostly in short triadic shrieks.”30 The second movement’s “triadic 
shrieks” (recalling the dissonances of Igor Stravinsky and Arnold Schoenberg) 
underscore the demonic character of the train on its path toward the catastrophe 
that is Auschwitz, whereas the fourths and fifths of the first movement 
(summoning the mood of impressionists Maurice Ravel and Claude Debussy) 
lend it a lighter, more romantic air. The sampled archival sound of air raid sirens 
(like the whistle samples, transposed and played by Reich on a digital keyboard) 
cycling throughout the second movement completes its atmosphere of 
emergency. The narrative of travel to, and arrival at, Auschwitz comprises 
roughly the last half of the raw textual material in the second movement. It 
follows three brief and fragmented narratives of anti-Semitism and Nazi invasion: 
Rachella’s experience in Holland, Paul’s experience in Hungary, and Rachel’s 
experience in Belgium. Reich has Rachella’s voice (with one interruption from 
                                                
30 Steve Reich. “Answers to Questions About Different Trains (1994),” in Writings 
on Music, 182. 
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Rachel sutured in toward the beginning) narrate the journey. The entire text 
reads as follows (in this section, I will treat only the last eleven lines): 
“1940” (Rachella) 
“on my birthday” 
“The Germans walked in” 
“walked into Holland” 
“Germans invaded Hungary” (Paul) 
“I was in second grade” 
“I had a teacher” 
“a very tall man, his hair was concretely plastered smooth” 
“He said ‘Black crows invaded our country many years ago” 
“and he pointed right at me” 
“No more school” (Rachel) 
“You must go away” 
“and she said ‘Quick, go!’” (Rachella) 
“and he said, ‘Don’t breathe!’” 
“into those cattle wagons” (Rachella) 
“for four days and four nights” 
“and then we went through these strange sounding names” 
“Polish names” 
“Lots of cattle wagons there” 
“They were loaded with people” 
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“They shaved us” 
“They tattooed a number on our arm” 
“Flames going up to the sky—it was smoking”31 
Positioned as the closing image, “Flames going up to the sky—it was smoking,” 
not only directly evokes the cremation ovens used to incinerate corpses in the 
camps, but also answers the quotation embedded within the second lined 
fragment (‘Don’t breathe!’), a transition from Rachel’s recorded testimony that 
also carries forward the urgency of the Rachella’s imperative in the previous lined 
fragment (‘Quick, go!’) also deferred through reported speech. ‘Don’t breathe!’ 
moreover anticipates the fetid odor of the boxcars evoked in the next lined 
fragment (“into those cattle wagons”), also repeated four lines later (“Lots of 
cattle wagons there”), signaling the train’s arrival at the concentration camp. This 
synesthetic figuring of human breath and voice is juxtaposed with a marked 
emphasis on linguistic difference: “and then we went through these strange 
sounding names / Polish names.” Stripped of context and shored against the 
previous lined fragment (“for four days and four nights”) denoting the passage of 
time in a boxcar “cattle wagon”, this recorded fragment of Rachella’s testimony—
likely pertaining to the roll calls preceding the “selection” process upon entry into 
Auschwitz—induces a jarring reinscription of linguistic difference in spatial, 
arguably even geographic, terms.  The figuring of “strange sounding names” as 
                                                
31 Reich, “Different Trains (1988),” 153. 
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something “we went through” evokes the train’s passage through towns, regions, 
and countries across Eastern Europe on the track toward its terminal destination 
in Nazi-occupied southern Poland: Auschwitz. Weighted at the conceptual 
center, and positioned narratologically as the telos, of these various layered 
mediations of direct and reported speech, breath conveyed through corporeality 
and smell, spoken writing, written speech, language refigured in the rhetoric of 
time and space, etc., sits the mute figure of the tattoo. “They tattooed a number 
on our arm,” the fragment reads. With the plural possessive pronoun “our,” both 
“arm” and “number” read strangely: there should be many arms and many 
numbers, but Rachella reports only one. There are many bodies (“Lots of cattle 
wagons there” / “They were loaded with people”), but only one arm and one 
stamp. They are singular, but they should be plural.32 As Different Trains’ second 
                                                
32 In title essay of his book, aptly enough named Being Singular Plural (1996), 
Jean-Luc Nancy seeks to direct philosophical inquiry away from the “finitude” that 
delimits the radical singularity of Heidegger’s Dasein (Being) and, instead, 
reroute it through the plurality of Mitsein (being-with). The essay and the book 
recircle a path first traced by Nancy in The Inoperative Community (1986), which 
attempts to construct an ontology that resists both the atomized masses of 
individuals under late capitalism and the hypostasized communities of fascism. In 
Being Singular Plural, Nancy writes: “Being singular plural: in a single stroke, 
without punctuation, without a mark of equivalence, implication, or sequence. A 
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single, continuous-discontinuous mark tracing out the eternity of the ontological 
domain, being-with-itself designated as the ‘with’ of Being, of the singular and 
plural, and dealing a death blow to ontology—not only another signification but 
also another syntax. The ‘meaning of Being’: not only as the ‘meaning of with,’ 
but also, and above all, as the ‘with’ of meaning. Because none of these three 
terms precedes or grounds the other, each designates the coessence of the 
others. This coessence puts itself in the hyphenation—‘being-singular-plural’—
which is a mark of union and also a mark of division, a mark of sharing that 
effaces itself, leaving each term to its isolation and its being-with-the-others.” 
(Nancy, 37) Nancy’s philosophical prose is as mellifluous as Rachella’s 
fragments are densely packed, but both speak to similar questions of inscription, 
fractured community, and shared experience. Rachella’s tattoo visibly registers 
her being-with marked others. Like Rachella, these marked others all share the 
stamp in the same place on their left forearm, but sequence of their numbers 
differ. “Our arm” designates a common union (prisoner, slave laborer, potential 
witness) but it also divides (race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, political affiliation). 
Where Nancy’s “Being Singular Plural” designates no “equivalence, implication, 
or sequence,” Rachella’s “number on our arm” can only function via the camp’s 
inscriptive logic of equivalence and implication; it thus manifests pure sequence. 
In Auschwitz, the mark is the ground and the essence, the origin and the telos: it 
marks the prisoner’s point of entry into the slave labor economy of the camp and 
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circulates with the prisoner’s body until its final point of exit on the left forearm of 
the corpse. Its “single, continuous-discontinuous” line traces a perimeter of 
electrified barbed wire. Even still, being-with persists under the stamp, if only as 
a shared experience of stamped-otherness. Certainly the “we” of both boxcar and 
roll call is the same “we,” even if the (direct object) “us” after selection, shave, 
and stamp is now significantly lesser in number and hierarchically ranked both 
internally and vis-à-vis the “They.” Through this figure of the “They”—first 
contextualized in reference to the “cattle wagons” (“They were loaded with 
people”), then repeated again in reference to the prisoners, usually women 
conscripted from the camp’s standing reserve of slave labor, tasked with 
processing routines (“They shaved us”), and finally once more in reference to the 
Nazis themselves (“They tattooed a number on our arm”)—the involuntary and 
fractured community of the camp impresses itself on the “we” of the train journey. 
The precession of “Theys” attributed to boxcars and roll calls (serial, singular 
containments of the “we”), shaving (depersonalization), and finally tattoos 
(reification) marks an incrementally denuded “we” and, concomitantly, the 
assumed mantle of an “us.” In Auschwitz, any sharing must “efface itself” under 
threat of brutal beating (or worse) and the radical incommunicability of the camp, 
as reported in Primo Levi’s Drowned and the Saved, all but ensures that 
“isolation and […] being-with-the-others” coincide in absolute simultaneity. In 
short, the situation of Auschwitz presents a deeply fractured, inverted, negative-
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movement draws to a close around the dark images of tattoo, flame, and smoke, 
the tape recorded paradiddle entropically winds down as the train comes to a 
slow halt before the gates of Auschwitz.   
The slowing of the tape recorded backing track at the end of the second 
movement occasions another pause to consider the historical contingencies 
bound up in tape technology before continuing with an analysis of Different 
Trains’ third movement. The history of electromagnetic recording, at least in 
concept, spans almost as far back in time as the phonograph and the 
gramophone. Its scattered prehistory in wire recording and steel tape can be 
read in patents and licenses from multiple countries right up to the beginning of 
World War II. However, tape as we now know it—hysteretic material bonded to a 
pliable PVC strip—culminates in and emerges from Nazi Germany. In 1932, one 
year before Hitler’s rise to power and the 1933 Nazi Census, German electronics 
company AEG purchased Austrian inventor Fritz Pfleumer’s patent for iron-
coated paper tape and, soon thereafter, began a working relationship with BASF, 
a subsidiary of German chemical company IG Farben. Together, BASF/IG 
Farben and AEG developed the Magnetophon through a series of patents 
                                                                                                                                            
stamp image of Nancy’s concept of community. Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular 
Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byrne (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000). 
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between 1935 and 1943.33 The basic design of the Magnetophon will serve as 
the prototype for all subsequent models of the reel-to-reel tape recorder. After the 
fall of the Third Reich, Major Jack Mullin discovered the Magnetophon at Radio 
Frankfurt and quickly counted the device among the U.S. spoils of war. After 
discovering the device at Radio Frankfurt, Mullin took two AEG Magnetophon K-4 
models and fifty reels of BASF/IG Farben tape back to his home in California 
and, after some experimenting and fine-tuning adjustments with his business 
partner Bill Palmer, introduced it to American business interests on May 14, 1946 
at NBC broadcasting studios. By 1947, not only had U.S. entertainer Bing Crosby 
signed on with Mullin and Palmer as a major investor in their company Ampex 
but he had also used Mullin’s modified Magnetophon to record the first ever U.S. 
taped radio broadcast. In the same year, a competing corporation by the name of 
                                                
33 Edward Schüller’s 1934 patent for ring head technology (under the employ of 
AEG) as well as the state-run German radio service RRG’s first implementation 
of AC biasing in 1940 streamlined the operation and dramatically improved the 
sound quality of the reel-to-reel apparatus. Coupling these developments with 
BASF/IG Farben’s chemical patents for ferric oxide tape (1935) and a more 
durable PVC tape base material (1940), by the end of World War II, Nazi 
Germany held a distinct (if as yet largely unknown to its enemies) technological 
advantage over Allied Forces in the field of sound reproduction, even as the 
military power of the Reich began to crumble. 
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the Brush Development Company branded the first commercially available reel-
to-reel tape recorder in the U.S., appropriately marketed as the Soundmirror.34 
For the next fifteen years, various magnetic tape recorders similarly modeled on 
the Magnetophon not only became increasingly available to consumers around 
the world, but broadcast, film, recording, and computing industries worldwide 
also begin integrating their own variations upon the technology into their 
operations. During the Nuremburg trials following the collapse of the Nazi regime, 
both AEG, the manufacturer of the Magnetophon, and IG Farben, the 
manufacturer of ferro-magnetic tape, were found knowingly complicit in Nazi war 
crimes, including: the use of slave labor in Auschwitz and other concentration 
camps, and the manufacture of technologies directly serving the war effort. IG 
Farben patented and manufactured Zyklon B chemical gas. AEG wired all the 
camps for electricity. Both companies had been staunch material supporters of 
the Nazi cause since the Secret Meeting of February 20, 1933 where Adolf Hitler 
conspired with captains of German industry to overthrow the democratic 
principles of the Weimar Republic. IG Farben emerged as the largest corporate 
donor on this particular occasion, contributing 400,000 Reichsmarks to the rise of 
Hitler’s regime. Though official records do not seem to indicate that slave labor 
                                                
34 Beverley R. Gooch, “Building on the Magnetophon” in Magnetic Recording: the 
First 100 Years, eds. Eric, D. Daniel, C. Denis Mee, Mark H. Clark (New York: 
IEEE Pres, 1999), 76-79. 
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was officially employed in BASF/IG Farben’s Ludwigshafen branch, where 
magnetic tape was first manufactured, destruction of corporate records (both 
intentional, by the hands of the Nazis, and unintentional, in allied air raids) make 
it impossible to verify or falsify a direct connection between the camps and the 
Magnetophon tape recorder. Nonetheless, the technological lineage of the tape 
recorder does mark its contingent historical relationship to Auschwitz and the 
Third Reich. 
Writing of the phonograph in the sixth and final chapter of his book The 
Audible Past, Jonathan Sterne makes a provocative claim: “The embalmed 
corpse helped make sound recording what it is today.”35 Sterne’s account first 
traces the early discourses surrounding sound reproduction alongside the 
contemporaneous emergence of both food preservation (especially canning) and 
mortuary practice (especially embalming), all carefully positioned among general 
cultural attitudes toward death in the late-Victorian era. He threads this 
“preservation” trope through those anthropological discourses that advocate for 
phonographic sound recording in field notes and sound documentation as a 
means to preserve indigenous cultures in danger of being obliterated by Western 
modernity. In Sterne’s analysis, these disparate material conditions constitute a 
                                                
35 Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 332.  
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pervasive culture of preservation that undergirds Victorian-era society. In one 
passage, Sterne invokes John Philip Sousa’s criticism of the phonograph: 
John Philip Sousa’s famous remark that phonograph music was 
“canned music” may have been meant as an aesthetic criticism, 
but, as a metaphor, it suggests […that] the practical and imagined 
possibilities of recording’s permanence existed as part of a longer 
history and larger culture of preservation. In Sousa’s statement, the 
possibility of recording sound is just one more form of preservation, 
and chemical preservation was one of the major innovations of 
nineteenth-century American culture.36 
Sterne further elaborates this connection as follows: 
Sousa’s analogical connection between the engraved and later 
etched recording surface and chemically transformed food may or 
may not have been completely parallel, but, culturally, it made a 
world of sense […]: in canning, the food is preserved through a 
chemical transformation; in recording, the sound performance is 
preserved through a practical transformation.37 
                                                
36 Ibid., 292. 
37 Ibid., 292-293. 
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Sterne correctly recognizes in this late-nineteenth/early-twentieth century culture 
of preservation a future program for recorded sound,38 but the high modernist 
impetus to preserve—foods for later consumption, corpses for later viewing, the 
sounds of so-called primitive cultures on the brink of disappearance—against the 
insistence of time finds significant complication in a technology like tape likewise 
designed for the preservation of human culture, but built upon the systematic 
destruction of human life. This intersection of preservation and destruction of 
course, reflects the instrumentalist logic of technoscience more broadly speaking, 
but also partakes of the structure of the dialectic, particularly the moment of 
sublation (Aufhebung in German, which means both to preserve or “lift up” and 
“abolish”/”cancel”).  Over and against the “embalmed corpse” and “canned 
music” that, for Sterne, emblematize early-twentieth century sound reproduction 
in the discourses surrounding Sousa, the relationship between death and 
preservation sublated in tape recording technology materializes in its contingent 
historicity with the Holocaust: the complicity of IG Farben and AEG in the daily 
                                                
38 “Until the establishment of sound recording archives, until people making 
recordings learned how to preserve them, and until the recordings themselves 
were preservable, the scheme of permanence pervading sound-recording 
discourse was essentially a hyperbole, a Victorian fantasy. Repeatability from 
moment to moment was not the same thing as preservation for all time. The latter 
turned out to be a program for recorded sound.” Ibid., 332. 
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operations of the camps ensures that the “chemical transformation” of canning 
and embalming no longer sits comfortably as a mere rhetorical analogy to the 
“practical transformation” of phonographic sound preservation. 
Jacques Attali speaks of audio recording in terms of “stockpiled death” in 
his book Noise: the Political Economy of Music. Similarly to Sterne, he links early 
recording technologies to an initial cultural impulse toward preservation. 
However, as the music recording industry emerges over the course of the 
twentieth century and audio reproduction becomes a dominant cultural force, 
Attali sees something peculiar happening to recorded music as a commodity 
object: since recording preserves a sound event as a duration, the recording-as-
commodity sublates what Attali (repurposing the classic Marxian distinction 
between use value and exchange value) calls the use-time of the performer. 
Repetition (the network of power relations that dominate cultural production in the 
electronic mass media age) ascends as representation (the network of power 
relations clustered around the printing press and copyright law) recedes. A 
record collector stockpiles the use-time of recorded musicians and, in doing so, 
shores it up against his or her own available use-time for listening. Herein lies 
what Attali deems the “major contradiction of repetition”: 
people must devote their time to producing the means to buy 
recordings of other people’s time, losing in the process not only the 
use of their own time, but also the time required to use other 
people’s time. Stockpiling then becomes a substitute, not a 
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preliminary condition, for use. People buy more records than they 
can listen to. They stockpile what they want to find the time to 
hear.39 
In this particular situation of commodity exchange and in the logic of the record 
collector, preservation thus becomes stockpiling. As Attali notes, “Just as money 
constitutes a stockpile of exchange-time by registering the relative value of 
things, repetition constitutes a stockpile of use-time by registering their absolute 
values.”40 Where the market value of music once accumulated via systems of 
representation that both stood in for musical performance (by way of musical 
notation) and inscribed to it an exchange value (by means of copyright law), now 
use-time itself accumulates in recorded-music-as-commodity-object under the 
sway of repetition. As the system of repetition reproduces itself in labor practices, 
“the necessary labor for production is no longer intrinsic in the nature of the 
object, but a function of the number of objects produced. This information 
included and transmitted thus plays the role of the stockpile of past labor, of 
capital.”41 Here Attali suggests that, in the mass production of recorded music, 
the information contained on the medium (i.e. the use-time of the musician, his or 
                                                
39 Jacques Attali, Noise: the Political Economy of Music, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 101. 
40 Ibid., 124-125. 
41 Ibid.,128. 
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her recorded performance) displaces the value of labor expended in producing 
the object itself and, consequently, “the stockpiling of use-time in the commodity 
object is fundamentally a herald of death.”42 Once preservation crosses over into 
stockpiling, we can begin to speak of an information economy and this 
information economy sublates an irrepressible remainder of death.  
In its last movement “After the war,” Different Trains draws together most 
of the recorded voices previously introduced in its first two movements to 
assemble an ambiguous closing to its overarching narrative. In the recorded text, 
this ambiguity wavers between uncertainty and disappearance: although many 
familiar voices return in the form of reprised phrases and recapitulated themes, 
the new material introduced only opens questions, registers disappearances, and 
presents reconciliations that seem deeply ambivalent, at best. The text of the 
third movement reads as follows:  
“And the war was over” (Paul) 
“Are you sure?” (Rachella) 
“The war is over” 
“going to America”  
“to Los Angeles”  
“to New York” 
“from New York to Los Angeles” (Mr. Davis)  
                                                
42 Ibid., 126. 
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“one of the fastest trains” (Virginia)  
“but today, they’re all gone” (Mr. Davis)  
“There was one girl, who had a beautiful voice” (Rachella)  
“and they loved to listen to the singing, the Germans” 
“and when she stopped singing they said, ‘More, more’ and they 
applauded”43 
Announced first quietly by a single cello and then, gradually, building slowly into 
four-voice counterpoint with the rest of the quartet, Reich’s composition frames 
Paul’s opening declaration (“And the war was over”) with trepidation. Rachella’s 
question in the second lined fragment shifts this hesitance into uncertainty, only 
then to shift again and echo Paul’s declaration in the present indicative: Paul’s 
“And the war was over” becomes Rachella’s “The war is over.” Framed as such, 
the listener is left to wonder whether Rachella’s sudden shift into certainty 
indicates traumatic denial or decisive action. Violins played dynamically in double 
time and half off the string lend Rachella’s “going to America” a more optimistic 
air, perhaps suggesting escape and hope for a new life across the Atlantic 
Ocean. This optimism shifts, by way of violins and viola now playing on the 
string, into a more leisurely counterpoint in “to Los Angeles” which carries over 
into a more plaintive, meditative mood in “to New York.” The reprise of first 
movement material from Mr. Davis (“from New York to Los Angeles,” which 
                                                
43 Reich, “Different Trains (1988),” 153-154. 
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recapitulates Rachella’s previous two lined fragments) and from Virginia (“one of 
the fastest trains,” now reharmonized) also signals the return of the signature of 
the train in the paraddidle pattern over broken chords and sampled train whistles, 
which momentarily overrides the melodic counterpoint. The paraddidle suddenly 
scales back into a dramatically spare counterpoint built upon a base of slowly 
bowed sustained notes by the cello for Mr. Davis’ “but today, they’re all gone.” 
Rachella’s story about the singing girl applauded by Germans, which comprises 
the last four lined fragments and is echoed by the violins and viola playing in a 
counterpoint somewhere between a lilt and a sigh, seems to close the movement 
and the piece on a tone of reconciliation. However, the portentous quality of the 
long, sustained cello notes carried over from Mr. Davis’ new counterpoint 
material (“but today, they’re all gone”) gently disquiets any certain resolution. 
The composer considers the third movement of Different Trains “the finest 
of the three” insofar as it “brings us to the present, long after the war.”44 Musically 
speaking, it is certainly the most complex of the three and its narrative, on even 
on its own terms, prompts some very important questions. When questioned by 
Wolfgang Gratzner in 1994 about whether the skepticism of Rachella’s question 
(“Are you sure?”) positioned toward the beginning of the third movement tacitly 
reflects “a question about present forms of fascism,” Reich responds, “In all 
                                                
44 Steve Reich, “Answers to Questions About Different Trains (1994)” in Writings 
on Music. 182. 
   63 
 
honesty, I had no such question in mind. It is rather the tentative quality of voice 
and feeling that ‘Are you sure?’ gives, along with its purely musical content (b, b, 
f#) that made me choose it.” Almost as an afterthought, he adds: “I would say 
that during a visit to Berlin for performances of The Cave during 1993 I felt that 
fascism might not be completely dead in the streets of Germany.”45 Reich’s own 
hesitancy on the political question of fascism’s reemergence echoes the 
uncertainty and ambivalence of the third movement as unfolded in my analysis 
above. In describing the reprise of Virginia’s fragment from the first movement 
during the same interview, Reich notes, “The words ‘fastest trains’ seem now to 
imply that the ‘train of events’ moves quickly as well—especially in the voice of 
an old woman looking back on her life, now almost over.”46 On its surface, this 
statement articulates a certain nostalgia for train travel, but in light of Reich’s 
apparent ambivalence about the question of fascism’s potential resurgence, it 
might also register a sense of relief that the train can carry us all far away 
enough from the camp and the Holocaust. Reich’s framing of Rachella’s 
testimony regarding the singing Jewish girl at the end of the narrative seems to 
provoke more questions than it does resolve ambivalence. The thematization of 
uncertainty and disappearance in “After the war” gently gestures toward 
questions of trauma invoked by the intertwined narratives of the Holocaust and 
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the notion of progress figured ambivalently in the train. The medium of tape, 
deployed by the composer both to figure the musical signature of the train in 
paradiddle playback and to convey the memories of Holocaust witnesses, also 
emerges provokes ambivalence in both its contingent historicity as a Nazi 
wartime invention, a spoil of war, and a foundation for the postwar information 
economy as well as its own self-interrogation in Reich’s practice. 
Trauma, Speech-Melody, Transduction (Again) 
In light of what I have noted above regarding Reich’s Different Trains, 
Primo Levi’s analogy of the Auschwitz witness as a corporeal tape recorder takes 
on the full weight of its history. As such, the relationship between traumatic 
memory and magnetic tape is not one of mere metaphor, but rather a relationship 
grounded in material history. The concept of trauma, of course, precedes the 
experience of the concentration camp. As Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Cathy Caruth, 
Sigmund Freud, and many others note, “traumatic neurosis” first emerges in 
discourse around considerations of the belated shock induced by the train 
accident and the physiological condition known as “railway spine.” Schivelbusch 
marks trauma’s earliest emergence through the concept of “fatigue.” As he notes, 
the state of fatigue that apparently overwhelmed travelers after train 
journeys of some duration was due to the mechanical shocks they 
experienced. These ‘rapid, short vibrations and oscillations’ did not 
affect only the human body but equally the materials of the machine 
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transporting it; not only the travelers suffered from fatigue, the 
materials did too.47 
The shock of vibration registers as fatigue in both the human physiological 
organism and the material of the train’s mechanism: iron. In the apparent 
discontinuity between human beings and technology presented by the 
instrumental thesis, the migration of the term “fatigue” from body to machine and 
back again marks a moment of overlap during the industrial revolution. In his 
argument, Schivelbusch first locates this moment of continuity in discourse, citing 
“‘a fatigue of metals’” in an 1854 lecture before London civil engineers and 
passenger “‘shocks and vibrations [which] fatigue the travelers’” in an 1842 
technical report on the Paris-Versailles train disaster (among others), and 
culminating in August Wöhler’s pioneering work in the industrial science of 
materials testing.48 In his critical framing of the concept of fatigue, Schivelbusch 
establishes a material space for its discursive movement between medical 
physiology and materials science in the factory: 
That it was the ‘working’ of the machine, the work performed by it, 
which caused its component materials to suffer ‘fatigue’ was no 
mere figure of speech: there was an obvious connection between 
the rise of modern material testing and what Marx calls the 
                                                
47 Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey, 124. 
48 Ibid., 125. 
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‘intensification of labor’. Capitalist industry exploited, in fact, both 
material and human labor power. Marx described this as the 
‘increased expenditure of labour in a given time, heightened tension 
of labour-power, and closer filling up of the pores of the working 
day.’49  
Through Schivelbusch’s analysis of material and physical fatigue, we can thus 
trace how the transductive operation of the factory machine, which converts 
human labor power into mechanical force, parallels the transductive operation of 
the intensification of labor, which itself already traces the outlines of the situation 
of exploited labor in Auschwitz detailed in the first section. In its earliest 
discursive formation in shock and fatigue, trauma thus exhibits both corporeal 
and psychological aspects, each connected to (and through) transductive 
interfacings with technology. When cases of “war neurosis” or “shell shock” begin 
to emerge in the wake of World War I, the psychological explanation takes 
precedence over the physiological: trauma comes to be understood as an 
exposure to events of extreme violence that impacts the psychological organism 
in such way that it induces a belated arrival of symptoms. The delayed reaction 
that characterizes trauma is concretized in the hysteretic properties of magnetic 
tape. Levi reports many acts of extreme violence in his testimonies of Auschwitz, 
but his discussions of the corporeal tape recorder emerge consistently in 
                                                
49 Ibid., 127. 
   67 
 
reference to Auschwitz’ situation of radical incommunicability: its fractured 
community of speakers which struggles to understand the language of the other, 
the “skeletal, howled German” that resigns many to silence, and so on. As 
mentioned before, his traumatic playback consists in jagged shards of language 
that he himself cannot understand unless he shares them with another person 
who can translate the language of his memory.  
In Levi’s testimony, traumatic memory thus takes on a distinctly 
informational valence. In the Freudian model, problems with interpersonal 
communication register as one of many possible traumatic symptoms, but they 
are not themselves the cause of the neurosis. As Schivelbusch argues, Freud 
structures his “stimulus-response theory” of traumatic neurosis around his 
patients’ battlefield experiences during World War I: “Without the experiential 
background of that war, Freud’s theory of the destruction of the stimulus shield 
by great amounts of energy would be as hard to imagine as the nineteenth-
century theories of ‘railway spine’ and traumatic neurosis would be without the 
railroad and its accidents.”50 Levi’s corporeal tape recorder registers a 
qualitatively different experience of trauma premised not on overstimulation, but 
upon a fundamental lack of human communicative interaction: a poverty of 
meaningful information that induces a traumatic subject who records everything 
he or she hears so as to share it later.  
                                                
50 Ibid., 149. 
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As an emblem of the dehumanizing process in Auschwitz, the image of 
the tattoo on the left arm circulates as corporeal evidence in countless primary 
witness testimonies and as memorialization in many works of secondary 
witnesses, which include both documentary and creative works. Steve Reich’s 
Different Trains inhabits an ambiguous historiographic space between these two 
subcategories of secondary witnessing. In his 1988 program notes, the composer 
refers to the pieces as presenting “both a documentary and a musical reality.”51 
In a keynote address at annual meeting of Chamber Music America interview in 
1989, Reich repeats this same phrase verbatim and adds to it: in Reich’s words, 
Different Trains also “begins a new musical direction by introducing a kind of 
theatrical element into a chamber music form. In this particular piece the theatre 
is, so to speak, in the mind, since there is nothing visual beyond the musicians.”52 
Reich’s equivalence of these three very different representational practices 
(documentary, music, theatre) in reference to his own work raises a few 
eyebrows among historians of music and the Holocaust alike. Amy Lynn 
Wlodarski’s recent essay “The Testimonial Aesthetics of Different Trains” (2010) 
cogently analyzes how Steve Reich’s selection, narrative arrangement, and 
musical reframing of witness testimonies from the Fortunoff Video Archive for 
                                                
51 Reich, “Different Trains (1988),” 152. 
52 Steve Reich, “Chamber Music: an Expanded View (1989)” in Writings on 
Music, 158. 
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Holocaust Testimonies at Yale University bears many marks of the composer’s 
aesthetic intervention in the primary witnessing process, despite his own claims 
to documentary authenticity. Returning to the complete video testimonies 
themselves, Wlodarski learns, among other things, that only one of the three 
witness testimonies relates a direct experience of the railroad journey to the 
concentration camp. Rachel’s testimony narrates a mournful reminiscence of 
saying goodbye to her father for the last time before departing on a train that took 
her into hiding. Similarly, Paul’s testimony contains multiple recollections of 
taking a train into hiding, and (not incidentally, as Wlodarski argues) one of which 
seems to reflect Reich’s own youthful enthusiasm regarding train travel in 
America before and during the war. Only Rachella’s complete video testimony 
recalls an “authentic” experience of the railway journey to Auschwitz and, as 
such, comprises most of the second movement’s text. Even so, it also bears the 
marks of Reich’s careful process of selection and editing. Wlodarski points out an 
immensely relevant point regarding Reich’s intervention in the chronology of 
Rachella’s testimony when he moves an image from her testimony (“Flames 
going up to the sky—it was smoking”) from the moment of her arrival on the train 
at Auschwitz to the end for dramatic effect: a poetic image about encountering 
sunlight amidst the smoke and steam on the Auschwitz train platform, in Reich’s 
renarratization, now partakes of the iconicity of the infamous cremation ovens. 
The main thrust of Wlodarski’s critique regarding Reich’s use of Rachella’s 
testimony pertains to its universalizing quality: “What follows in her testimony—
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cattle cars, shaved heads, tattooed forearms—are the central images of 
Holocaust literature and art. Thus, by selecting Rachella’s testimony for Different 
Trains,” Wlodarski argues, “Reich ensured that the memorial contours of his 
piece would resonate for his postwar audience, who would have encountered 
similar portrayals of the Holocaust in media as diverse as Elie Wiesel’s novel 
Night and Meryl Streep’s films Holocaust and Sophie’s Choice.”53 
I am less interested here in pursuing Wlodarski’s questions of the 
universalizing narrative beyond the point of acknowledging their importance. 
However, it does seem to me that the universalizing move is clearly evident not 
only in Reich’s gestures toward “documentary reality” but also in how he frames 
the second movement’s testimonies as the middle part of a rather conventional 
Aristotelian beginning-middle-end dramatic structure or, in terms of the “chamber 
music form” context Reich offers, the exposition-development-recapitulation 
structure of the sonata form. My own interests lie more in the choices Reich 
makes within the strictures of this tripartite structure and how his choice of tape 
as a transductive medium inflects these choices, especially given the various 
contexts gathered around Levi’s understanding of the Auschwitz witness as a 
corporeal tape recorder as sketched in detail above. After setting aside tape 
music and speech melody aside for over two decades, Reich decides to return to 
                                                
53 Amy Lynn Wlodarski, “The Testimonial Aesthetics of Different Trains,” Journal 
of the American Musicological Society 63.1 (2010): 123. 
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both (with crucial modifications, of course) for Different Trains. From my 
research, I see no evidence that Reich has read Primo Levi. However, neither do 
I have a reason to doubt that he, as a Jewish American whose interest in 
Judaism and Jewish history culminates in this particular piece composed only 
two years after the publication of The Drowned and the Saved and one year after 
Levi’s death, has some familiarity with Levi’s work. Whatever the case, Different 
Trains resonates strongly with Primo Levi’s metaphors not only in its choice of 
medium, but also its deliberate emphasis on the collective sharing of a fractured 
narrative.  
In Different Trains, Reich selects short phrases of speech for their tonal 
and rhythmic qualities and uses these phrases, carefully transcribed into musical 
notation, as the basis of his composition. This “speech melody” process, as 
Reich deems it, is a foundational technique of his artistic practice that dates from 
his earliest tape compositions It’s Gonna Rain (1965) and Come Out (1966). “I 
remember it seemed disappointing to me that tape music, or musique concrète 
as it was called, usually presented sounds that could not easily be recognized,” 
Reich notes, “when what seemed interesting to me was that a tape recorder 
recorded real sounds like speech, as a motion picture camera records real 
images.”54 There is, of course, much to be said about musique concrète, but in 
the context of Reich’s comments above, two of its key concepts are of chief 
                                                
54 Steve Reich, “It’s Gonna Rain (1965)” in Writings on Music, 20. 
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importance: 1) acousmatics and 2) sound object. Musique concrète’s acousmatic 
procedures—which work directly on the material of magnetic tape with the 
explicit purpose of obscuring the original source of a sound recording by 
manipulating the recording’s pitch, timbre, or envelope structure—underscore a 
primary concern with the phenomenology of listening. Where Reich’s approach 
privileges the interval between sound recording and sound source, the 
acousmatic phenomenology of musique concrète focuses more on the 
relationship between recorded sound and listener. Pierre Schaeffer, Pierre 
Henry, and other practitioners of musique concrète use tape to radically 
transform found sounds with the expressed purpose of producing the conditions 
for a listening subject more attentive to sound in and of itself: “if [the tape 
recorder] creates new phenomena to observe, it creates above all new conditions 
of observation.”55 It follows, then, that the sound object (alternately translated as 
“sonorous object”) is that which is materialized by tape, but not identical with or 
even contained on the tape itself: “The object is not an object except to our 
listening, it is relative to it. […] Coming from a world in which we are able to 
intervene, the sonorous object is nonetheless contained entirely in our perceptive 
                                                
55 Pierre Schaeffer, “Acousmatics” in Audio Culture: Readings in Modern Music, 
eds. Christoph Cox and Daniel Warner (New York Continuum Press, 2004), 81. 
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consciousness.”56  In Schaeffer’s view, labor directly upon the material of tape 
also works indirectly on the consciousness of the listening subject.  
Reich’s emphasis on the “real sounds” of the recording bespeaks a more 
corporeal and performative understanding of “material” in Reich’s practice. In his 
own words, Reich is interested in “a compositional process and a sounding music 
that are one and the same thing.”57 In principle, speech melody thus layers 
composing and sounding together in one process. In Reich’s early tape 
practices, the entire work from inception to reception is process and this process 
exhibits a distinctively theatrical dimension. Of It’s Gonna Rain, he notes: 
Using the voice of individual speakers is not like setting a text—it’s 
setting a human being. A human being is personified by his or her 
voice. If you record me, my cadences, the way I speak are just as 
much me as any photograph of me. When other people listen to 
that they feel a persona present. When that persona begins to 
spread and multiply and come apart, as it does in It’s Gonna Rain, 
there’s a very strong identification of a human being going through 
this uncommon magic.58 
                                                
56 Ibid., 79. 
57 Steve Reich, “Music as a Gradual Process” in Writings on Music, 35. 
58 Reich, “It’s Gonna Rain (1965),” 21. 
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In this provocative passage, Reich sets aside more conventional understandings 
of mediation and reproduction (e.g. the taped voice as “disembodied” and, 
therefore, “text”) in favor of a more corporeal and theatrical formulation of the 
recorded voice as “persona.”59 The persona of the speaker, here an African 
                                                
59 A historical anecdote from World War II seems relevant here. Throughout the 
1940s, U.S. Signal Corps officers monitoring German radio broadcasts marveled 
at the uncanny frequency (and, sometimes, simultaneity) of Hitler’s broadcasts to 
the German people from various locations around the country. After having 
consulted recording experts and intelligence officials, the Signal Corps concluded 
definitively from the superior sound quality of the broadcasts that the 
transmissions could only be live. Recording technology historian W.E. 
Butterworth delivers the following anecdote, as told from the perspective of U.S. 
intelligence: “Those clever Germans had trained a whole flock of voice doubles 
for Hitler, probably recruiting them from the theatrical ranks, among those 
entertainers who earned their peacetime living as mimics. Those people were 
sneaked into the studios of the various stations of the Thousand Year Reich and 
put before a microphone to imitate the voice and tonal variations of the Führer, 
thus convincing, simultaneously the listeners of Radio Berlin, Radio Hamburg, 
Radio Frankfurt, Radio Munich, and the others that der Führer had taken time 
from the press of his many duties to journey to their hometown and address them 
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American street preacher named Brother Walter in San Francisco, emerges 
through the repetition of rhythmic patterns in fragments of his recorded speech. 
The “uncommon magic” of what Reich calls phasing60 exploits the mechanics of 
the tape recorder to disseminate (“spread”), duplicate (“multiply”), and 
dismember (“come apart”) the body in, of, and through the voice. This violence 
enacted upon the persona, this body of the voice, by the phasing process 
underscores the theatrical element of Reich’s early tape compositions: the “very 
strong identification” of catharsis. Reich even describes his first discovery of 
phasing during the process of composing It’s Gonna Rain in terms of a decidedly 
corporeal sort of catharsis: “The sensation I had in my head was that the sound 
moved over to my left ear, down to my left shoulder, down my left arm, down my 
                                                                                                                                            
personally.” W.E. Butterworth, Hi-Fi: From Edison’s Phonograph to 
Quadraphonic Sound (New York: Four Winds Press, 1977), 132-133. 
60 Reich narrates his discovery of the technique as follows: “In the process of 
trying to line up two identical tape loops in unison in some particular relationship, 
I discovered that the most interesting music of all was made by simply lining the 
loops up in unison, and letting them slowly shift out of phase with each other. […] 
The experience of that musical process is, above all else, impersonal; it just goes 
its way. Another aspect is its precision; there is nothing left to chance 
whatsoever. Once the process has been set up it inexorably works itself out.” 
Reich, “It’s Gonna Rain (1965),” 20. 
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leg, out across the floor to the left […] then it started going the other way and 
came back together in the center of my head.”61 In its original context of Ancient 
Greek and Roman theatre, the word “persona” denotes a mask, a prosthesis 
added to the body to amplify a particular emotion for, or to convey a particular 
character to, a large audience. Reich’s reworking of the concept in It’s Gonna 
Rain absorbs the body into the prosthesis: the tape recorder functions as a 
conduit through which catharsis assumes an especially corporeal character. 
The marked distinction between “text” and “persona” and the focus on the 
corporeality of the recorded voice here unsettles the inscriptive priority of 
conventional music composition, placing emphasis instead on the immanent 
relationship between composing and performing. Throughout his career as 
composer, Reich’s work consistently places special emphasis on the corporeal 
dimension of musical performance: his deliberate choice of short, repeated 
rhythmic or melodic phrases as material for most of his instrumental 
compositions (i.e. those composed for orchestral instruments) ensures that their 
scores are more easily memorized, consigned to muscle memory, set aside, and 
then played back by musicians in rhythmic variation with minimal effort. In 
minimizing the importance of the written score, Reich thus positions the 
performing body as a sort of tape recorder. In “Music as a Gradual Process” 
(1968), considered by most to be the definitive statement of his early period, 
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Reich formalizes his process as follows: “Material may suggest what sort of 
process it should be run through (content suggests form), and processes may 
suggest what sort of material should be run through them (form suggests 
content).”62 Repeated fragments of recorded speech suggest rhythms and 
melodies. These rhythms and melodies can of course be notated on the lines of 
a musical staff, but nowhere in his early, formative work, i.e. that composed 
between the years 1965 and 1968, does Reich list conventional musical notation 
as a vital part of his process. With the exception of Piano Phase and Violin 
Phase (both 1967), all of Reich’s paper scores during this period appear in the 
form of verbal notation, also a common practice for George Brecht, John Cage, 
and many others associated with Fluxus and “happenings” during this same time 
period. Most notably, neither It’s Gonna Rain nor Come Out have any paper 
score whatsoever: they exist only as tape recordings. 
In light of the complex network of metaphors that Levi clusters around the 
image of the primary witness as a corporeal tape recorder, Reich’s early 
emphasis on the corporeality of the tape recording takes on new resonance. 
Likewise, the violence inherent in his early phasing technique might be 
understood as a negative expression of incommunicability. Though certainly not 
expressive of the same radical incommunicability as in the camps, Reich’s 
contextualization of the political milieu around It’s Gonna Rain suggests some 
                                                
62 Reich, “Music as a Gradual Process,” 34. 
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possible parallels. “I recorded Brother Walter in 1964; this was San Francisco 
shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, and I thought we were going to be going up 
in so much radioactive smoke,” Reich writes, “With that hovering in the 
background and this preacher laying it down about the Flood and Noah, it really 
had a lot of resonance. So I wanted people to hear the words; I didn’t want to 
disguise them (as tends to happen in musique concrète).”63 In this passage, 
Reich underscores a particular moment in history (the Cuban missile crisis) 
where the stakes of miscommunication and misunderstanding between nations 
were incredibly high: certainly not comparable to the situation of Auschwitz, but in 
itself a potential disaster on a global scale. Brother Walter bears witness to his 
faith and to his historical moment. Reich, in turn bears witness to Brother 
Walter’s witnessing and expresses fidelity to his role as recorder: Brother 
Walter’s words should be presented clearly, and they should be heard by others. 
Despite the situational incommensurability between 1940s Auschwitz and 1960s 
San Francisco, Reich’s desire to be a witness here is clear. 
Both parts I and II of It’s Gonna Rain begin with one pristine playback of a 
selection from Brother Walter’s sermon before the phasing process begins. 
Below is my transcription of both selections:  
Part I: He began to warn the people. He said, “After while! It’s 
gonna rain after while! For forty days and for forty nights.” And the 
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people didn’t believe him, and they began to laugh at him! And they 
began to mock him, and they began to say “It ain’t gonna rain!” 
 
Part II: They didn’t believe that it was gonna rain, but glory to God! 
Hallelujah! Bless God’s wonderful name this evenin.’ I say this 
evenin’! After while. They didn’t believe that it was gonna rain, but 
sho nuff! It began to rain. Hallelujah. They began to knock up on 
the door, but it was too late. Woo! The Bible tell me, they knocked 
up on the door ‘til the skin came off they hands. Woo! My Lord, my 
Lord! I said ‘til the skin came off they hands! They cried. I can just 
hear they cry now. I can hear ‘em say, “Oh Noah! Would you just 
open the door?” But Noah couldn’t open the door. It had been 
sealed by the hand of God! 
As Steve Reich notes, It’s Gonna Rain induces a corporeal, cathartic sort of 
listening. Its rhythms, tonal clusters, and consonant fragments ensure an 
individualized, highly subjective experience. “As you listen to the result,” Reich 
notes, “you seem to hear all kinds of words and sounds that you’ve heard before, 
and a lot of psychoacoustic fragments that your brain organizes in different ways, 
and this will vary from person to person.”64 Reich’s early tape compositions work 
upon listeners by positioning them as witnesses to their own listening process. 
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As we listen to It’s Gonna Rain with eyes closed, the violent rhythms of Brother 
Walter’s speech—duplicated, disseminated, and dismembered—impact us 
viscerally. Our minds begin to discern words and sentences from the repeating 
psychoacoustic fragments (the words “gun,” “blade,” “rape,” “let go,” and 
“escape” emerge from my listening). The steady, churning pulse of phasing 
which pulls us forward and the insistently recurring motifs that reminds us where 
we have been, taken together, invite us to establish causal relationships: 
narratives. The movement of sound through the space of the stereo field prompts 
us to visualize our narratives and violence of the phasing process helps summon 
and solidify violent words, narratives, and images. Indeed, repeated threats of 
death in the opening pristine playback sequence perhaps already somewhat 
delimit the semantic field in advance for us. The ambient street noise slightly 
audible under Brother Walter’s shouting voice sets the scene outside, while his 
references to mocking and laughter from the crowd (not to mention the chorus of 
voices emerging through the process) make it all but certain that we are not 
alone in this primal scene of listening. As witnesses to a primal scene fashioned 
from jagged shards of language, we might surmise that our experiences as 
recorders and translators of It’s Gonna Rain somehow dully resonate with Levi’s 
recollections of unknown language in Auschwitz as “fragments torn from the 
indistinct, the fruit of a voiceless and unconscious effort to carve a meaning or 
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sense out of the senseless.”65 In a much more limited sense, Reich’s piece 
confronts its listener with a momentary, voluntary void of incommunicability, from 
which he or she almost unconsciously internalizes patterns of sound that, 
through repetition, become familiar and take on the shape of words and phrases. 
After our listening, perhaps we even feel compelled to share our experiences. 
Reich’s early work with tape and speech melody thus actively seeks to create a 
primal scene of witnessing and, in doing so, attempts to draw its audience into a 
cathartic relationship with the body in the voice.  
Some twenty or so years later after his earliest tape experiments, Reich’s 
speech melody technique reemerges in Different Trains, fully integrated into the 
inscriptive practice of conventional musical notation. Insofar as Different Trains 
reinscribes Reich’s earlier speech melody technique within the conventions of 
musical notation, it not only signals an aesthetic development by way of a return 
in the composer’s thinking and technique, but it also (and more importantly) 
subtly registers the relationship between inscription and corporeality in 
Auschwitz. Reich’s redeployment of the speech melody technique in Different 
Trains positions recordings of the human voice as raw compositional material. All 
melodic phrases to be performed by the viola and the violincello are first 
transcribed from the rhythms and intonations of the human voice. This process 
has several important implications in light of Reich’s earlier tape practices. In 
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Different Trains, Reich positions the recording as the “sound source,” the score 
as the “recording,” and the performer as “playback.” As a “sound source” the 
recording is invested with an authentic documentary reality. Even though the 
source speaks in the past tense, the soundscape of Different Trains (sampled 
train whistles and emergency sirens, train rhythms evoked by the recorded 
paraddidle patterns of the quartet in tape playback accompaniment) positions the 
“persona,” the body of the speaking voice, in the narrative and dramatic present 
of the recollection: that is, in the spatio-temporal dimensions of the historical 
event itself. As a “recording” of the event, Reich positions the musical score as a 
re-presentation that follows its “source” with as little mediation as possible. In It’s 
Gonna Rain, Reich subjects his sources to a violent, mechanical process: pitting 
each source’s voice against another taped version of itself and, in doing so, 
performing a rhythmic dismemberment of the body in the voice. In contrast, 
Different Trains quite pointedly does not subject its sources to such violent 
reworkings. Instead it gives each voice its space to speak (a fragment) and 
further underscores what they say in the transcription of the speech melody. In 
their role as “playback,” the Kronos Quartet thus merely repeat the “recording.” 
As in his early work, Reich positions the performing body as a tape recorder, but 
the complex and careful layering of mediations in Different Trains belies less 
concern with catharsis than with representing the belated temporality of trauma in 
the structure of its composition.  
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Throughout the first and third movements of Different Trains the 
chronological positioning of the taped speech fragments in relation to their 
corresponding speech melodies varies: often the transcribed musical information 
proceeds and anticipates the speech fragment, but especially in the case of the 
Holocaust testimonies, Reich fairly consistently lets the witness speak first and 
the transcribed speech melody follow as an echo or trace of their testimony. In 
his own words, Reich reserves special framing for the testimonies of Rachel, 
Rachella, and Paul: 
In movement 2, in contrast to movement 1 and some of movement 
3, it seemed appropriate not to repeat what was said. If you don’t 
hear what one of the Holocaust survivors says, you miss it. The 
speakers move more rapidly from one phrase to the next. More 
things are said in a shorter amount of time. These phrases cannot 
be ‘played’ with in the same manner as those in the first 
movement.66 
For the testimony of survivors, especially in the tumult of the second movement, 
musical inscription typically flows from the spoken word and rarely in the opposite 
direction. The exceptions to this rule are thus notable. Three-hundred six bars 
(06:08) into the second movement of Different Trains, we hear Rachella’s voice 
state, in a tone as plain as her words: “They tattooed a number on our arm.” The 
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vocal fragment repeats once more eleven bars later (06:26). The grain of 
Rachella’s recorded voice reveals no immediate emotion; it conveys only verbal 
information. “They tattooed a number on our arm.” Reich transcribes the speech 
melody for the viola as a progression of syncopated sixteenth notes starting from 
high D♮ and ascending one step before descending twice in two step intervals, 
and finally ascending one step again to end on B♭. Unlike most other transcribed 
speech melodies in the second movement, which mirror the entrance of the 
recorded fragment and then echo the recording in its absence, here the viola’s 
playing back of the transcribed speech melody precedes the arrival of the 
recorded voice by a full three measures. This anticipation of the recorded voice 
by the speech melody occurs only three other times during the second 
movement: 1) at measure thirty-four (0:46), two measures in advance of 
Rachella’s “walked into Holland” 2) at measure sixty-five (1:17), one measure in 
advance of Paul’s “I had a teacher,” and 3) at measure two-hundred thirty-three 
(4:31), six measures in advance of Rachella’s “Polish names.” From a 
narratalogical standpoint, each of these four instances marks a crucial turning 
point in the libretto of the second movement: 1) German invasion, 2) a first 
experience of anti-Semitism, 3) the process of selection, and 4) the stamp. In the 
performance of Reich’s composition, these crucial turning points in the narrative 
register as longer and more complex harmonic transitions that mark dramatic 
shifts in mood or tempo. In terms of both narrative and musical development, 
each of these events thus constitutes a liminal moment, an inscriptive act, a 
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passing through, a point of entry. Reich’s composition carefully frames each of 
these four moments so that the voice arrives too late and registers as an echo of 
its transcribed speech melody. This belated arrival of the taped voice fragment 
after the instantiation of writing (transcription, composition) underscores the 
function of the witness as corporeal tape recorder, not only repeating the 
structure of traumatic memory in musical form (as all the speech melodies do), 
but more pointed musically marking the traumatic instant of inscription from 
which the witness as corporeal tape recorder speaks. 
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—Chapter Two— 
The Mechanics of Failure: Techno-Performance, 
Industrialized Memory, and Samuel Beckett 
 
In 1979, two years after the publication of his formative book Essays in 
Performance Theory, Richard Schechner publishes an essay entitled “The End of 
Humanism” in Performing Arts Journal. In this essay, he traces emergent trends 
in postwar theatre alongside concurrent global political and cultural 
developments, particularly those connected with technological advancements in 
computing and telecommunications. In particularly striking ways, “The End of 
Humanism” registers a similar narrative of discontinuity that I traced in my first 
chapter, here rearticulated as a transformational shift from modernism to 
postmodernism. Like many others writing on the subject, Schechner positions 
this transformational shift from the modern to the postmodern around the liminal 
event of World War II, opening his essay with an unambiguous proclamation: 
“The parallel to ‘postmodern’ is ‘postwar.’ Postwar means anything that’s 
happened since World War II.”67 “The End of Humanism,” bearing the marks of 
Schechner’s aforementioned earlier work, examines this break in terms of a 
displacement of (modern) “narrative” by (postmodern) “ritual.” Yet here he also 
                                                
67 Richard Schechner, “The End of Humanism,” Performing Arts Journal 4.1 
(1979): 9. 
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marries this primary displacement to others: modern techniques of “action” by 
postmodern techniques of “indeterminacy,” political paradigms of “visibility” by 
those of “invisibility,” modalities of “change” by “stability,” and so on.68 The latent 
technological determinism in Schechner’s argument sounds loudest when he 
posits modernism’s foundation in “experience” as opposed to postmodernism’s 
grounding in “information bits that are behind/below experience”: he refers to 
postmodernism in terms of a “programming of experience,” wherein the “body is 
thought of as a processor” and “society and environment […] are thought of as 
manipulable” to such an extent that, in the postmodern age, “Rearranging 
information is the main way of changing experience.”69 Schechner’s schematics 
here crystallize a still active theoretical concern with the rupture that opens up 
around the category of the digital and positions the latter against the analog, 
industrialism, experience, and corporeality (each, within the specificity of its 
relevant discourse, imbued with a certain residue of the “authentic." 
Despite its problems, it is important to note that Schechner’s effort here 
represents perhaps the earliest sustained attempt to theorize technology and the 
postmodern in relation to performance: the publication of “The End of Humanism” 
precedes the first French edition of Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern 
Condition: a Report on Knowledge (1979) by four months. In that book, Lyotard 
                                                
68 Ibid., 13. 
69 Ibid., 13-14. 
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theorizes the relationship between technology and performance in terms of 
efficiency: 
Technical devices [...] follow a principle, and it is the principle of 
optimal performance: maximizing output (the information or 
modifications obtained) and minimizing input (the energy expended 
in the process). Technology is therefore a game pertaining not to 
the true, the just, or the beautiful, etc., but to efficiency: a technical 
move is “good” when it does better and/or expends less energy 
than another.70 
For the purposes of this chapter, I am less interested in periodizing the 
postmodern than I am in questioning this coupling of performance and efficiency 
that accompanies it. In the first chapter, tracing a historiography of trauma 
through Reich’s tape music, I argued that transduction defines the relationship 
between the human body and tape technology vis-à-vis memory. In this chapter, 
I will develop this further, but in the direction of a critique of this notion of 
“efficiency.” In Perform or Else: from Discipline to Performance, Jon McKenzie 
reads both Lyotard’s notion of performativity (sketched above) and Herbert 
Marcuse’s “performance principle” through Michel Foucault’s analyses of 
disciplinary power to position performance as “an emergent stratum of power and 
                                                
70 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
trans. Geoff Bennington (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 44. 
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knowledge”71 following World War II. This “onto-historical formation”72 registers 
not only in the increased focus on performance management (what McKenzie 
calls “organizational performance”) in the Taylorist workplaces of late capitalism, 
but also in what McKenzie calls “technological performance,” the latter 
characterized by a focus on the “effectiveness” of a given machine in executing 
the specific tasks for which it is designed. In Jon McKenzie’s analysis, the 
principle of organizational performance (“efficiency”) intersects the effectiveness 
of technological performance in the concept of the “decision-making process,” 
the latter of which should ideally intend toward the automation of management: 
the “programmed decision” as information.73 
In “The End of Humanism,” Schechner directly references tape recording 
only twice in passing, both times during a discussion of the use of media in Three 
Places in Rhode Island by Spalding Gray, Elizabeth LeCompte, and other 
members of the Performance Group (excluding Schechner himself). Ultimately, 
Schechner positions tape as one technical element among many others—
“abstract movement, drama, films, slides, tapes, music, lip-synch performing, 
                                                
71 Jon McKenzie, Perform or Else: From Discipline to Performance (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 18. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., 73-77. 
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environmental staging, forced perspective”74—all of which fall under the rubric of 
“multiplex signaling” which he characterizes as the “main mark of postmodern 
theatre.”75 The conceptual slippage between signal (sound/information) and mark 
(inscription) here finds further complication in Schechner’s hesitations on the 
plausibility of documenting postmodern performance: 
I won’t try to document performances—I don’t know if that can be 
done, especially with postmodern performances that specialize in 
sending multiplex signals. Multiplex signals can’t be successfully 
translated into simplex codes, like writing, even when augmented 
by photographs. This puts theatre in even more jeopardy than 
before. The art is evanescent. The postmodern is obsessed with 
information retention. Postmodern theatre is multiplex and therefore 
unretainable. […] Modern theatre had no such problem: narrative 
usually provided a script in writing and the best commentaries 
about modern theatre have actually been about drama. But 
because the drama carried the narrative the commentaries were 
reasonably accurate.76 
                                                
74 Schechner, “The End of Humanism,” 16. 
75 Ibid., 14. 
76 Ibid. 
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The “evanescence” of performance is here rendered explicitly in terms of 
information retention. Modernist theatre, in Schechner’s view, lends itself to 
documentation because it proceeds from the predominant logic of the text. Here, 
Schechner clearly privileges writing and narrative as memory-supports par 
excellance which, when reduced to being “other” to a more authentic corporeal 
“experience” in modernism, resolves in a paradoxical situation wherein 
postmodernism can only be understood as in terms of a proliferation of 
information technologies and an impossibility of “information retention.” The 
fundamental “break” operative on both sides of Schechner’s “post-” here is an 
instrumentalist split in understanding memory in binary terms of body/technology, 
inside/outside, subject/object, etc. wherein the first term is privileged over the 
other. In Schechner’s schema, an overabundance of information (multiplex 
signals) in the staging/presentation of postmodern theatre thus disrupts linear 
narrative and, in doing so, destabilizes the retention of inscriptive memory:  
The multiplex signaling of postmodern performance is different from 
what goes on in modern performing. Of course the modern and the 
postmodern coexist. In modern performances lots of signals are 
emitted: movement, dialogue, setting, music, etc. But this signaling 
is organized around a clear “line of creation”—such as playwright to 
director to designers and performers. And the play itself has a 
“spine” that literally supports and carries all the other signals. The 
ideal of most modern performances has been to make all the parts 
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of performance into a unity. […] There is no need to unify in the 
postmodern. Unity is inherent in the bits of information that underlie 
experience. Unity may be indeterminate. Signals are sent on many 
channels simultaneously. Switches from one channel to another are 
easy. The impulse is transformed—from movement to speech to 
media to space, etc. Each of the channels can be individually 
controlled. Artists play with turning up one channel and turning 
down another.77 
Schechner’s “line of creation” here positions “modernist” theatre as a Fordist line 
of assembly—replete with writers, directors, designers, and performing bodies 
working with a clear unity of purpose and governed by a hierarchical managerial 
structure—in its creative process which disappears in the postmodernist play 
amidst multiplex signals of information. The “spine” of the modernist play 
registers here as both a corporeal and textual metaphor: it both “carries” the 
narrative through distinct, embodied characterizations and also “literally supports” 
it in the book and the script. Here, the body and the text mutually support one 
another and reinforce their respective boundaries in modern dramatic 
performance. On the other hand, the focus on signals sent, channels turned 
up/down and switched on/off, and those “bits of information that underlie 
experience” belies a distinctly telematic idiom at work in Schechner’s 
                                                
77 Ibid., 16. 
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characterizations of postmodern performance that ultimately privileges the 
immediacy of “real-time” communications and instantaneous 
computing/processing over memory retention. 
Schechner’s foregrounding of media-as-information-transmission thus 
unravels mediation-as-retention (knowledge, memory) by decoupling it from 
writing and recording. This development has enormous ramifications for the 
realignment of recording and inscription against the privileged category of the 
body in performance studies. In setting up a relation of identity between 
postmodern performance and information processing, Schechner effectively 
deprivileges retention and memory in favor of experience. This, of course, marks 
Schechner’s decisive departure from the modernist emphasis on memory 
inaugurated by the ideas of Henri Bergson and William James in the late-
nineteenth century, if not earlier. However, it also tacitly elides the historical 
avant-gardes including the Dadaists and Futurists, whose non-representational 
performance practices foregrounded disorientation and disruption, and Antonin 
Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty, wherein the spectator is “placed in the middle of the 
action, [and] is engulfed and physically affected by it.”78 This displacement of the 
historical avant-gardes in Schechner’s schema not only effectively allows for the 
framing of postmodern performance as “new” (and thus repeats the late capitalist 
                                                
78 Antonin Artaud, “The Theater of Cruelty (First Manifesto)” in The Theater and 
Its Double, trans. Mary Caroline Richards (New York: Grove Press, 1958), 96. 
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logic of “style”), but it also reinforces a certain technological determinism that (via 
an oversaturation of new technologies in performance and in everyday life) frees 
human “experience” from memory. In this sense, the identity of human affect with 
the notion of network as understood in terms of real-time communication grounds 
the spectator, and ultimately the human subject, in an immediacy that 
overcorrects the Cartesian error. In this chapter, I argue that these developments 
coalesce around a fundamental neglect of human memory’s material in the digital 
information age: that ribbon of rust, magnetic tape.  
Although the material and mechanism of the tape recorder qua memory 
receive no direct attention in “The End of Humanism,” the device is nonetheless 
evident as a trace in Schechner’s schematizing the relationship between 
indeterminacy and narrative:  
Information that since the Renaissance adhered to stories—were 
drawn into specific patterns the way iron filings arrange themselves 
according the “lines of force” of a magnet—is now free. The 
narrative used to be the magnet. Along with the nation-state the 
narrative has vanished. But the elements of a performance don’t 
just fall anywhere. One of the key assumptions of the 
postwar/postmodern is that there are no accidents. Everything is 
connected to everything else; all experience is part of a system. In 
fact, the unplanned = the terrible, the catastrophic. What used to be 
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thought unplanned or anarchic or chaotic is now organized under 
the statistical heading “indeterminate.”79 
On its surface, this passage assembles a similar constellation of ideas 
established in my previous chapter: narrative, iron, system, and catastrophic 
accident all seem accounted for here, albeit in different arrangement. We can 
also discern the primary functions of tape technology figured in not-quite-
recording-head of “the magnet” and the not-yet-rust of “iron filings,” but as 
analogized with narrative’s posited disappearance in the postwar/postmodern 
period, tape recording appears here as an absent presence, a mere trace. In the 
passage above, Schechner aligns the teleological impulse of narrative with 
Michael Faraday’s nineteenth century experiments with magnetic “lines of force,” 
which establish the conditions of possibility for magnetic recording. These 
experiments open onto Faraday’s speculations regarding a unified field 
comprised entirely of “physical lines of force,” which included not only the curved 
lines of electromagnetic force, but also the straight lines of gravitational pull and 
the more diffusive, chaotic behavior of radiation. In the narrative of the history of 
science, James Clerk Maxwell’s experiments in induction (“tubes of force,” 
following Faraday) and the unification of light and electromagnetism not only 
forecast the existence of radio waves and thus anticipate the invention of radio, 
but also lay the conceptual and mathematic groundwork for Albert Einstein’s 
                                                
79 Schechner, The End of Humanism,” 12.  
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concept of relativity, the invention of the atom bomb, and ultimately quantum 
theory’s displacement of mathematical certainty by statistical probability in the 
first half of the twentieth century. Schechner’s narrative of the passage from the 
modern to the postmodern follows the chronology of the history of science point-
by-point and exhibits similar tendencies toward establishing a “unified field” for 
postwar/postmodern performance as “free” from both script and archive. Most 
importantly, Schechner’s chronological narrative ends in a formula—“the 
unplanned = the terrible, the catastrophic”—that articulates the logic of what Jon 
McKenzie calls “performance testing” and “technological performance.” In the 
first chapter, I outline this catastrophic trajectory as a function the instrumentalist 
thesis that positions technology as a means to an end, a teleological tool. While I 
do not hope to undo the logic of technological performance that governs even our 
systems of education in this chapter, I do wish to mark the possibility of 
resistance to that governing logic in rethinking technology (particularly tape) in 
terms of its fallibility, its failure, and its inefficiency. In further considering the 
transductive relationship between fallible technologies and human beings, we 
can think of the emergence of difference (“new” patterns) even and especially 
through failure, breaking, and falling apart. 
There is perhaps no greater thinker of failure on the stage and in print than 
Samuel Beckett. In this chapter, I consider the status of retention and failure in 
two plays by Samuel Beckett, Krapp’s Last Tape (1958) and Rockaby (1981), 
both of which prominently feature the tape recorder. Often figuring the expat-Irish 
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playwright and director as a fulcrum between modernist and postmodernist stage 
aesthetics, critics usually discuss Beckett’s theatre work in terms of its 
minimization of dramatic information on the stage, i.e. the characteristic paring 
down of character, dialogue, action, etc. to the only the most essential elements 
of dramatic form. Given the critical tendency to respond to the reduced 
information of Beckett’s stage with an overabundance of interpretive information, 
I aim to “interpret” Beckett’s plays as little as possible in the pages ahead. Let me 
qualify what I mean here: I do not explore how Beckett’s characters illuminate 
certain aspects of some de-historicized “human condition,” nor do I explicate the 
content of these plays in relation to broader thematic currents in the remainder of 
Beckett’s corpus. Rather than fill Beckett’s gaps and silences with “meaning,” I 
focus my attention on Beckett’s reduction of information itself so as to explore its 
relationship to the historical context of the information age from which it emerges. 
Instead of examining these plays as metaphors for something other than 
themselves, I first pay special attention to how their own internal system of 
mechanisms functions. In considering this, I attend to how Krapp’s Last Tape and 
Rockaby stage the relationship between character and the tape recorder. In 
short, I am concerned with how these two particular plays—each differently 
staging the material and mechanism of the tape recorder—perform memory 
through the technology of theatre, i.e. its idiom and apparatus. 
I approach Krapp’s Last Tape and Rockaby as information machines 
(communicative systems of inputs and outputs largely governed by binary logics) 
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expressly concerned with exploring the contradictions that emerge from 
associations between tape recording and corporeal memory. Working from the 
premise of magnetic tape technology’s compatibility with both digital data storage 
as well as analog sound recording practices and building on my observations 
regarding its material continuities with technologies of the industrial age, my 
analysis departs from Schechner’s schematic periodizations and paradigm shifts. 
In Krapp’s Last Tape, orthographic writing figures prominently alongside the tape 
recorder as a memory support. In Rockaby, the internal voice of memory runs 
through the apparatus of tape and exteriorizes in the rhythms of a rocking chair. 
In my readings of these two Beckett plays, I set aside the timeworn debates in 
“Beckett Studies” regarding the playwright’s quarrels with Descartes’ res 
extensa/res cogitans split—often clustered around characterizations of Beckett’s 
works as radically solipsistic “skullscapes”—to focus instead on a decidedly more 
transductive interfacing of human and machine performed in recording and 
playback. I treat Krapp’s Last Tape and Rockaby as neither philosophical 
meditations nor ciphers to be decoded or re-encoded. For my purposes, they 
reveal no “bits of information that are behind/below experience,” as Schechner 
would have it, but rather concern themselves primarily with the material and 
mechanism of information itself. I argue that experience, for Beckett, is less a 
skin to be peeled back so as to reveal information beneath than it is there glinting 
right on the surface among the patterns and rhythms of quasi-Boolean logics and 
routines. To momentarily couch this in the vocabulary of Freudian dream 
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analysis, my interest in these two Beckett plays lies less in working through their 
“ideational content” than in following memory traces of information age culture 
through the affective rhythms registered in the informational logics of these plays. 
Beckett’s information machines exhibit many of the same problems as any other 
mechanical system—material wear, increasing entropy, eventual breakdown—
and I argue Beckett deliberately designs his theatrical machines around the 
inevitability of their collapse. If performance testing drives the motor of 
technological performance, then these two plays similarly test the limits of 
industrialized memory. If one must speak of the capacity for resistance in these 
two performance experiments by Samuel Beckett, it should be understood in the 
mechanical sense: they function only to fail, and this failure is as much a “human 
condition” for Beckett as it is a technological one. 
The Krapp-Tape Information Machine: a Circuit Design Analysis 
Samuel Beckett wrote and published Krapp’s Last Tape in 1958, and the 
play premiered at the Royal Court Theatre in London under the direction of 
Donald McWhinnie as a curtain raiser to Endgame on October 28 of the same 
year. The one act, single actor play had a run of thirty-eight shows ending 
November 29, 1958 with its titular role performed by, and initially written for, Irish 
actor Patrick Magee. Beckett first encountered both Magee and McWhinnie in 
1957 by way of their involvement in BBC broadcasts of his work. McWhinnie, 
then Assistant Head of BBC Radio Drama, directed and recorded Beckett’s first 
radio play All That Fall for a January 13, 1957 broadcast on BBC 3. Toward the 
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end of that same year, on December 14, 1957, McWhinnie also produced a BBC 
3 “meditation for radio” that featured Magee reading excerpts from Beckett’s 
novel Molloy and his short prose piece “From an Abandoned Work.” As James 
Knowlson notes, “It was the distinctively cracked, world-weary, ‘ruined’ quality of 
Magee’s voice, as well as its Irish rhythms and intonations, that appealed to 
Beckett who, for some time, referred to the play simply as the Magee 
Monologue.”80 According to Ackerley and Gontarski,81 Beckett requested that 
BBC Radio mail tapes reels containing Magee’s radio performance to his home 
in Paris. From these raw materials, Beckett wrote his play. The circumstances 
surrounding the writing process and early performance history of Krapp’s Last 
Tape thus suggest not only that tape symbolizes memory, as many critics 
already note, but also that tape’s objectness, i.e. its materiality and mechanism, 
                                                
80 James Knowlson, “Introduction” in Krapp’s Last Tape: with a Revised Text: 
Beckett, Samuel, 1906-1989. Notebooks. Selections. Vol. III, ed. James 
Knowlson (London: Faber, 1992), xiii. 
81 C.J. Ackerley and S.E. Gontarski, The Grove Companion to Samuel Beckett: a 
Reader’s Guide to his Works, Life, and Thought (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 
passim. This volume and James Knowlson’s Theatrical Notebook (cited above) 
cross-referenced function together as my main source for stage history and other 
anecdotal knowledge of Krapp’s Last Tape throughout this chapter, unless 
otherwise noted.   
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comprise a central subject matter of the play. This is to say that Krapp’s Last 
Tape reflects the highly inter-mediated relations that flow through its inception: 
letters (and packages containing tape) sent in the mail, prerecorded radio 
broadcasts performed from preformed (i.e. written) materials, a written stage play 
occasioned by and tailored to the timbres, tonalities, and rhythms of Magee’s 
voice on the radio, etc. In Beckett’s writing process, we see a complex layering of 
mediations in various forms—writing, speaking, recording, playing back, listening, 
broadcasting, etc.—where each mediation runs through another. Moreover, 
these aspects of Beckett’s process also recur in the narrative, thematic, and 
theatrical elements of the play itself. For instance, the audience’s experience of 
the play—listening to Krapp interact with his tape-recorded voice—mirrors 
Beckett’s experience of writing the play while measuring the rhythms of Magee’s 
“cracked, world-weary, ‘ruined’” voice on tape. Beckett’s pen therefore doubles 
as the ear of the audience, which in turn, doubles the position of the head of 
Krapp’s recorder gliding over the surface of the tape, and so on. The 
performance of Krapp’s Last Tape turns on this mediation of one system of 
mediation (actor-audience, speaker-listener, recording-playback, etc.) through 
that of the others. As an information machine, Krapp’s Last Tape operates 
primarily through a series of binary switches, traceable through the text of 
Beckett’s meticulous stage directions, which execute precise control of every 
theatrical element: in stage blocking and simple mechanical motions in the 
manipulation of props and gesture, as well as careful choices in costuming, 
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lighting, and set design. In the paragraphs that follow, I treat each of these in full 
detail. 
On the whole, the minimal dramatic action of Krapp’s Last Tape mostly 
stays center stage, where the titular characters remains in a more-or-less 
stationary position: sitting, shifting his posture, reading from a ledger and a 
dictionary, recording and playing back his voice on his tape recorder. Its overall 
mood is one of marked stillness, occasionally punctuated by sudden (usually) 
intentional movements by the main character. All physical movements that 
proceed from this central point of stillness inevitably return back to it again with 
little variance or detour. A prelude, of sorts, in the form of a pantomime routine 
precedes the main dramatic action of the one-act play and frames many of the 
patterned routines that recur throughout its duration. I quote Beckett’s lengthy 
stage direction in its entirety below not only to underscore its repetitions, but also 
to mark the rhythms that pattern them: 
Krapp remains a moment motionless, heaves a great sigh, looks at 
his watch, fumbles in his pockets, takes out an envelope, puts it 
back, fumbles, takes out a small bunch of keys, raises it to his 
eyes, chooses a key, gets up and moves to front of table. He 
stoops, unlocks first drawer, peers into it, feels about inside it, takes 
out a reel of tape, peers at it, puts it back, locks drawer, unlocks 
second drawer, peers into it, feels about inside it, takes out a large 
banana, peers at it, locks drawer, puts keys back in his pocket. He 
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turns, advances to edge of stage, halts, strokes banana, peels it, 
drops skin at his feet, puts end of banana in his mouth and remains 
motionless, staring vacuously before him. Finally he bites off the 
end, turns aside and begins pacing to and fro at edge of stage, in 
the light, i.e. not more than four or five paces either way, 
meditatively eating banana. He treads on skin, trips, nearly falls, 
recovers himself, stoops and peers at skin and finally pushes it, still 
stooping, with his foot over edge of stage into pit. He resumes his 
pacing, finishes banana, returns to table, sits down, remains a 
moment motionless, heaves a great sigh, takes keys from his 
pockets, raises them to his eyes, chooses key, gets up and moves 
to front of table, unlocks second drawer, takes out second large 
banana, peers at it, locks drawer, puts back keys in his pocket, 
turns, advances to edge of stage, halts, strokes banana, peels it, 
tosses skin into pit, puts end of banana in his mouth and remains 
motionless, staring vacuously before him. Finally he has an idea, 
puts banana in his waistcoat pocket, the end emerging, and goes 
with all the speed he can muster backstage into darkness. Ten 
seconds. Loud pop of cork. Fifteen seconds. He comes back into 
light carrying an old ledger and sits down at table. He lays ledger 
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on table, wipes his mouth, wipes his hands on the front of his 
waistcoat, brings them smartly together and rubs them.82 
The pantomime routine is clearly marked by numerous actions performed and 
reversed: things (i.e. keys, envelope, reels of tape, bananas, alcohol) put in and 
taken out of receptacles (i.e. pockets, drawers, bottle, mouth), pacing and 
halting, locking and unlocking, etc. The pantomime routine repeats twice with 
variations, with each cycle ending in Krapp’s encounter with a banana peel. Of 
course, Krapp’s mute comic near-catastrophe is itself a familiar repetition of the 
old vaudeville slapstick routine (itself repeated again and again in silent cinema 
by Harold Lloyd, Buster Keaton, and countless others), but this repetition is also 
a reversal: in Buster Keaton’s version of the gag in his film The High Sign (1921), 
Keaton’s character eludes slipping on one peel and, in celebrating his triumph, 
slips on a second; in the pantomime routine that opens Beckett's play, Krapp 
slips on the first, learns from his mistake, and averts disaster in the second. In 
this reversal of the familiar comic trope, Krapp is first presented to the audience 
as a more dynamic character (within the austere limits of Beckett’s stage 
language, of course) than that of Keaton, functioning with adaptive intelligence 
rather than comic hubris. Krapp remembers the first incident and modifies his 
actions to avoid the second. In important ways, the pantomime routine sets up 
                                                
82 Samuel Beckett, “Krapp’s Last Tape” in Collected Shorter Plays (New York: 
Grove Press, 1984), 55-56. 
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the main character as a test of Henri Bergson’s understanding of the comic as 
“something mechanical encrusted upon the living,” wherein mechanical rigidity 
and routine are contrasted sharply with the “inner suppleness of life”83: an early 
iteration of Bergson’s vitalism, later fully developed in his concept of élan vitale in 
Creative Evolution (1907). For Bergson, the comic emerges in the agon between 
life force and mechanism and ultimately affirms the victory of the former over the 
latter in human laughter. When the information machine of Krapp’s Last Tape 
inevitably reverses the prelude’s presentation of the main character’s adaptive 
intelligence, Bergson’s vitalism fails the Krapp performance test and Krapp is re-
presented in the main action as remarkably forgetful and stubbornly rigid in his 
thinking. All the prelude’s actions performed and reversed (as well as their 
particular object-relations with keys, bananas, tape reels and so on) recur again 
in the main action of the play, but this time as permutations subsumed in the 
marked stillness of Krapp’s recording and playback routines. The pantomime 
routine’s pattern of reversal—heightened physical action punctuated by 
occasional pauses wherein Krapp, engaged in thought, “remains a moment 
motionless”—is itself reversed in Krapp’s extended stationary performances of 
remembering that suddenly erupt in violent physical expressions of frustration. 
Something of Bergson’s comic victory of human life over “something mechanical 
                                                
83 Henri Bergson, Laughter: an Essay on the Meaning of the Comic (Los 
Angeles: Green Integer, 1999), 38-63 passim. 
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encrusted upon the living” remains, but rendered there more grimly, as 
somewhat pathetic and grotesque. 
Krapp’s actions, smaller gestures, and minute variations in posture during 
the main action of the play also function according to this larger logic of reversal. 
In the play’s switch from the mute action of the prelude to the staged “dialogue” 
between Krapp and his recorded voice, the logic of reversal figures concretely in 
the action of switching the tape recorder on and off. This single stroke of a 
finger—a particularly corporeal digitality performed fourteen separate times, by 
my enumeration, in almost as many total pages of text—not only counts as the 
Krapp-Tape information machine’s most oft-repeated action, but also constitutes 
its predominant functional logic. Krapp’s decidedly more conventionally “analog” 
fumbles and searches through drawers, pockets, etc., performed repeatedly 
throughout the entire play, mirror the abrupt sonic transitions between rewind and 
playback in his interfacing with the tape recorder: another variation of switch and 
reversal. Krapp’s listening procedures likewise reflect a digital logic interspersed 
with analog retention storage systems. I quote again, at length: 
Krapp: [Briskly.] Ah! [He bends over ledger, turns the pages, finds 
the entry he wants, reads.] Box…thrree…spool…five. [He raises his 
head and stares front. With relish.] Spool! [Pause.] Spooool! [Happy 
smile. Pause. He bends over table, starts peering and poking at the 
boxes.] Box…thrree…thrree…four…two…[with surprise] nine! good 
God…seven…ah! the little rascal! [He takes up box, peers at it.] 
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Box thrree. [He lays it on the table, opens it, and peers at spools 
inside.] Spool…[he peers at ledger]…five…[he peers at 
spools]…five…five…ah! the little scoudrel! [He takes out a spool, 
peers at it.] Spool five. [He lays it on the table, closes box three, 
puts it back with the others, takes up the spool.] Box thrree, spool 
five. [He bends over the machine, looks up. With relish.] Spooool! 
[Happy smile. He bends, loads spool on machine, rubs his hands.] 
Ah! [He peers at ledger, reads entry at foot of page.] Mother at rest 
at last….Hm….The black ball…[He raises his head, stares blankly 
front. Puzzled.] Black ball?...[He peers again at ledger, reads.] The 
dark nurse….[He raises his head, broods, peers again at ledger, 
reads.] Slight improvement in bowel 
condition….Hm….Memorable…what? [He peers closer.] Equinox, 
memorable equinox. [He raises his head, stares blankly front. 
Puzzled.] Memorable equinox?...[Pause. He shrugs his shoulders, 
peers again at ledger, reads.] Farewell to—[he turns page]—love.84 
The Krapp-Tape information machine is also a literal machine: it writes and 
reads, files away and retrieves information, boxes and unboxes materials. Far 
from a model of performance efficiency, this system of retention persistently fails 
Krapp not ostensibly because of its carefully organized filing structure, but more 
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because of fundamental inconsistencies in its interface. Krapp’s machine 
produces analog sound recordings of his voice, but filing reels of tape require 
labels and boxes, which further necessitates brief textual descriptions in ledgers, 
which in turn ineluctably fade in their capacity as mnemonic devices with the 
physical process of aging and the passage of time. Even the ledger entry 
“memorable equinox” prompts Krapp’s puzzled thinking posture, which recur 
throughout the play: “He raises his head, stares blankly front. Puzzled.” On the 
other hand, Krapp’s playful elongation of the vowel in “spooool” and the 
consonant “r” in “thrree” not only register the pleasurable affect accompanying 
the remembrance of words, but also underscore the status of physical things and 
numbers not only as words but also as sounds. The Krapp-Tape information 
machine thus defers memory through multiple switches (writing/reading, 
recording/playback, sounding/hearing, speaking/listening) represented in the 
theatre space as media (paper, tape, acoustic space, body). Though any one of 
these media may function as potential entry point for accessing memory, the 
Krapp-Tape information machine does not function linearly, but rather relays 
signals through the entire complex network of switches. 
The tangled multiplicity of circuits that run through these various switches 
unsurprisingly function with remarkable inconsistency and delay, which outwardly 
manifest in the various gestures and postures that mark Krapp’s labored 
processes of thinking, searching, reading, and listening. Krapp listen to his tapes 
again in order to understand what the text he wrote in the ledger—a reversal in 
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the instrumental function of cataloging as a mnemonic device to archive 
recordings in the first place—but even during playback he encounters difficulties: 
When I look— 
[Krapp switches off, broods, looks at his watch, gets up, goes 
backstage into darkness. Ten seconds. Pop of cork. Ten seconds. 
Second cork. Ten seconds. Third cork. Ten seconds. Brief burst of 
quavering song.] 
Krapp: [Sings.]  Now the day is over, 
   Night is drawing nigh-igh, 
   Shadows— 
[fit of coughing. He comes back into light, sits down, wipes his 
mouth, switches on, resumes his listening posture.] 
Tape: —back on the year that is gone, with what I hope is perhaps 
an old glint of the old eye to come, there is of course the house on 
the canal where mother lay a-dying, in the late autumn, after her 
long viduity [Krapp gives a start] and the—[Krapp switches off, 
winds back tape a little, bends his ear closer to machine, switches 
on]—a-dying, in the late autumn, after her long viduity, and the— 
[Krapp switches off, raises his head, stares blankly before him. His 
lips move in the syllables of ‘viduity’. No sound. He gets up, goes 
backstage into darkness. Comes back with an enormous dictionary, 
lays it on table, sits down and looks up the word.] 
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Krapp: [Reading from the dictionary.] State—or condition—of 
being—or remaining—a widow—or widower. [Looks up. Puzzled.] 
Being—or remaining?...[Pause. He peers again at dictionary. 
Reading.] ‘Deep woods of viduity…the vidua or weaver-bird…Black 
plumage of male…[He looks up. With relish.] The vidua-bird! 
[Pause. He closes the dictionary, switches on, resumes, listening 
posture.]85 
Even language itself proves to be an inefficient archive of experience for Krapp. 
When he stops the tape and consults his dictionary to recall a word he cannot 
remember, circuitous paths through primary/secondary meanings and adjacent 
entries organized alphabetically around the word “viduity” momentarily divert the 
course of his recorded recollection. Here, a conflict in language itself—between 
the linear orthographic filing system of the dictionary and the planar operations of 
semantic association—short-circuits the function of tape recording. Both 
orthographic writing and recorded speech function in similar capacities to 
preserve memory and transmit it via media across time and space, but especially 
given the “relish” Krapp persistently demonstrates during playback and 
recollection, tape also exhibits an additional function to reinsert the listener back 
into the original affective context of recording. Beckett carefully designs his 
Krapp-Tape information machine to minimize certain variables that would prompt 
                                                
85 Ibid., 59. 
   111 
 
an audience to perceive Krapp’s memory lapses in terms of anything other than a 
function of the temporal delay between filing and retrieval: recording and 
playback occur in the same place, speaker and listener overlap in the same 
character. Even recording itself first runs through the procedure of orthographic 
writing. “Jotted down a few notes, on the back of an envelope,” notes Krapp in a 
recording made on his thirty-ninth birthday, a tradition he maintains in the 
dramatic present of the play:  
Krapp switches off, broods. Finally he fumbles in his pockets, 
encounters the banana, takes it out, peers at it, puts it back, 
fumbles, brings out the envelope, fumbles, puts back envelope, 
looks at his watch, gets up and goes backstage into darkness. Ten 
seconds. Sound of bottle against glass, then brief siphon. Ten 
seconds. Bottle against glass alone. Ten seconds. He comes back 
a little unsteadily into light, goes to the front of table, takes out keys, 
raises them to his eyes, chooses key, unlocks first drawer, peers 
into it, feels about inside it, takes out reel, peers at it, locks drawer, 
puts keys back in his pocket, goes and sits down, takes reel off 
machine, lays it on dictionary, loads virgin reel on machine, takes 
envelope from his pocket, consults back of it, lays it on table, 
switches on, clears his throat and begins to record.86 
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All the various elements of the Krapp-Tape information machine that appear here 
and elsewhere above function as an elaborate system of inputs and outputs. 
Things go into Krapp’s mouth—bananas, booze—and words come out. Both 
ledger and dictionary open and close, Krapp files entries in one and retrieves 
entries from the other. Keys lock and unlock drawers. Drawers open and close, 
things go in and come out of them. The line Krapp walks repeatedly from the 
tape recorder to backstage and back again mirrors the operation of the tape 
recorder in rewind and playback. None of these reversals occur quickly or 
efficiently, however: all are subject to Krapp’s fumbling, laborious routines of 
search and retrieval. And even the presumed spontaneity of Krapp’s rambling 
recollections is first rehearsed in writing on the reverse sides of envelopes. 
Temporality thus physically accumulates on the stage via a proliferation of 
matter and a system of filing routines and organizational regimens to manage it. 
Lighting and set specifications place special visual emphasis on the organized 
clutter of boxes piled on and around his listening table: “Front centre a small 
table, the two drawers of which open towards the audience. […] On the table, a 
tape recorder with microphone and a number of cardboard boxes containing 
reels of recorded tapes. Table and immediately adjacent area in strong white 
light. Rest of stage in darkness.”87 The symmetry of the table’s drawers further 
emphasizes the Krapp-Tape information machine’s binary logic and, moreover, 
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the polarization of darkness and light, black and white here also reflect in Krapp’s 
spoken and recorded monologues: the mysterious figure of a “dark nurse” 
described as “One dark young beauty […] all white and starch,” with a “big black 
hooded perambulator, most funereal thing,”88 a game of fetch with a “small, old, 
black, hard solid rubber ball” thrown to a “little white dog,”89 brief mention of an 
old flame named Bianca (meaning “white” in Italian, of course), and so on. As I 
have already suggested, Beckett deliberately designs the Krapp-Tape 
information machine around inefficiency to the point of failure. Its overlapping 
binary circuits inevitably conflict and overload: life and death encounter one 
another in the instant that speech falls into silence, actions fumble and indecision 
wavers around black and white logics, the mediation of writing through tape 
recording and vice versa induces hesitation, etc. The binary operation of the 
Krapp-Tape machine persistently produces resistance within itself as a 
remainder that its system cannot fully incorporate. In playing back his recorded 
voice, Krapp momentarily encounters this remainder in a metaphor: “Sat before 
the fire with closed eyes, separating the grain from the husks,” Krapp’s tape-
recorded voice begins to muse, only to hesitate once again: 
The grain, now what I wonder do I mean by that, I 
mean...[hesitates]...I suppose I mean those things worth having 
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when all the dust has--when all my dust has settled. I close my 
eyes and try and imagine them. [Pause. Krapp closes his eyes 
briefly.] Extraordinary silence this evening, I strain my ears and do 
not hear a sound.90 
In sorting through his thoughts, Krapp first arranges them using a metaphor of 
the harvest (grain and husk), but quickly reorganizes them in a metaphor of 
housecleaning (dust and things). This switch from one metaphor to another in 
Krapp’s line of thought also belies a reversal of figure and ground that turns 
around the question of use value: grain designates the useful product of a 
harvest while dust remains every household’s most pernicious and unavoidable 
dross. Krapp wants to compare husks and dust, but in doing so he also mixes 
dust with grain: from the standpoint of one so obsessed with organization as 
Krapp, this situation induces a hesitation in thinking, which falls into silence and 
begins again on a different trajectory. And so it does. When listening-Krapp 
closes his eyes during the interval of the pause, recorded-Krapp opens his ears 
to “extraordinary silence” and his recorded thoughts continue. In unsettling the 
question of use value—taken together, grain and dust are both totally 
incommensurable in terms of use and completely commensurate in terms of size 
and texture—Krapp’s mixed metaphor short-circuits the binary logic of analogy 
as an efficient tool for understanding. In associating the gathering of grain with 
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the accumulation of dust, Krapp decouples tenors from vehicles and recouples 
them in a catachresis. The insoluble remainder of this catachresis persists as a 
neutralized particulate matter (grain, dust) devoid of any real systemic 
usefulness. Krapp’s ruminations on grain and dust also register visibly on his 
clothing: “Rusty black narrow trousers […] Rusty black sleeveless waistcoat […] 
Grimy white shirt […] Surprising pair of dirty white boots.”91 The dusty circuits of 
the Krapp-Tape information machine thus not only fade bright white into grimy 
grey, but also clothe Krapp in rust: the hysteretic dust of magnetic tape.   
Performance Specifications: Krapp-Tape Information Machine 
In analyzing the circuit design of the Krapp-Tape information machine, I 
have isolated two interrelated primary mechanisms (switch/reversal, 
relay/intermediation) that govern its operation and failure, two mnemonic 
exteriorizations (writing and tape) that both supplement and conflict with one 
another, and two material residues (rust, grain/dust) that settle among and cling 
to its interlocking parts. The various operational conflicts among these elements 
result in the repeated hesitations of the information machine in storing, retrieving, 
and processing Krapp’s recorded memories. As I have suggested, Beckett 
deliberately designs the Krapp-Tape information machine to perform poorly, to 
fail. This circuit design analysis, as I have deemed it, has largely remained in the 
realm of description and textual analysis. Its performances, as both an 
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information system and as a stage play, still require evaluation. This section 
functions toward that end. 
Krapp’s Last Tape places the open reel recorder at center stage in the 
same year that the consumer recording industry declares its obsolescence. In 
1958, RCA Victor markets the first four-channel, two-sided commercial audio 
tape cartridge system—measuring five by nine inches, a much bulkier version of 
Philips’ compact cassette soon to follow in the early 1960s—which houses its two 
tape reels in a durable polystyrene casing and boasts faster loading time, 
automatic reverse for continuous playback, as well as a recording and playback 
speed fifty percent slower than conventional reel-to-reel recorders for twice as 
much storage capacity. These features, of course, improve upon some of the 
Krapp-Tape information machine’s inefficiencies: the elaborate procedures of 
loading and unloading reels integrated into a one-step routine of sliding in and 
popping out a single cartridge, the burgeoning mass of tape reels cut in half by 
higher storage capacity, intricate recording catalog systems simplified in labels 
affixed to the polystyrene casing of the recordings themselves. All of RCA’s 
improvements build on existing technology, but also manufacture consumer 
needs for user-friendliness and comfort. Moreover, this market trend toward 
streamlining design to commodify convenience displaces manual techniques 
onto automatic processes, pushing practical use increasingly further away from 
the actual use value of the gadget. To accomplish this, RCA both draws from the 
familiar and improves upon it: like the phonograph record, the cartridge/cassette 
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divides storage in two sides, but it also adds to it increased storage capacity, 
improved “fidelity,” and continuous playback. In the case of tape, instrumental 
knowledge thus proceeds not merely according the linear forward-thinking 
ideology of progress and “the new,” but also folds into that teleology a recursive 
impulse that recasts new in light of old so as to establish a practical frame of 
reference for consumer use. In repackaging the reel-to-reel as the cassette, 
“novelty” of form and user-friendliness displace the importance of medium 
specific “hands-on” knowledge onto an already well-established routine of music 
listening (stop, flip, reset). Freed from the “inconvenience” of threading tape from 
one reel, through capstan rollers, over recording and playback heads, and into 
another reel, the cassette user’s hands merely turn the tape over like a record 
and hit play again, or alternately, flip a switch to automate a smooth “hands free” 
transition from one recorded side to another. The movement from “hands on” to 
“hands free” operation here not only retraces the broader outlines of a much 
more complex shift from manual to automated labor during the industrial 
revolution, but more importantly also reveals how “hands free” technology 
disposes with the necessity of “hands on” medium specific knowledge and, in 
turn, effectively erases concern with the materiality of tape: out of sight, out of 
hand, out of mind. 
Beckett’s Krapp-Tape information machine thus preserves the “hands on” 
materiality of open reel tape in the very historical moment that opens onto its 
obsolescence in “hands free” convenience. As I have discussed, Krapp is, in 
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many ways, all hands—locking/unlocking and opening/closing drawers, flipping 
through ledgers/dictionaries, filing/storing tapes, writing notes to self, pressing 
rewind/playback/record buttons on his reel-to-reel, etc.—and in most cases, his 
elaborate routines of storage and retrieval depend absolutely on his ability to lay 
his hands on a given object. As I have further suggested, the inefficiency of the 
Krapp-Tape machine’s technological performance stems from conflicting 
operations (switches and reversals) in the multiple media controlled by its “hands 
on” interface. As an architect of inefficiency, Beckett deliberately designs the 
circuits of the Krapp-Tape information machine to resist the easy flow of data by 
placing marked emphasis on retention storage and retrieval tasks as corporeal 
actions performed upon material objects and media. 
This all reflects not only in the text of the play, as detailed in the previous 
section, but also in the history of its production. In an interview, Roger Blin, the 
director of the March 1960 French premiere at Théâtre Récamier in Paris, 
describes his “innovation” in staging Krapp’s Last Tape as follows: “My own 
innovation was – I don’t know whether Sam liked it or not – that, at a certain 
point, as Krapp is searching for the story of the girl in the punt and goes back on 
the tape, I had him do this with his fingers and so the sound was backwards too.” 
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92 Here, the physical intervention by Krapp’s finger in the operation of the tape 
recorder bypasses the button interface to underscore a more direct push and pull 
between corporeality and mechanism. In doing so, it materializes reversal in both 
sound and action. Jean Martin, who played Krapp under the direction of Beckett 
himself at a May 1970 Paris production also at Théâtre Récamier, explains both 
the importance and risk of live tape manipulation in his performance: 
We had some problems with the tape that Krapp listens to. Ideally 
one should hear the actual tape that the actor is using. But this is a 
little dangerous. It doesn’t always work; the actor can make a 
mistake; the tape can break. But Sam wanted this. So finally I used 
the actual tape, operating the tape recorder as Krapp operated it. 
[…] Playing it with or without the actual tape affects your acting. 
Because if you do have another tape-recorder in the wings, with a 
speaker under the table on which Krapp has his tape-recorder, no 
matter how well the tape is operated, with someone doing it from 
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some distance away, there is bound to be a small gap. It may go 
unnoticed by the audience, but it is felt nonetheless.93  
For the sake of both focusing the audience on the staging of recording and 
maintaining the viscerality of the actor’s reaction to the recorder, Beckett’s 
directing choice places “hands on” interaction with the tape recorder at center 
stage. As Martin notes, this decision both increases the probability of accidents 
and raises the stakes of the performance. In effectively reducing the “gap” 
between performance and playback, Beckett draws human and machine together 
through a palpable emotional tension tethered causally to the material tension of 
tape during playback, rewind, and recording. Beckett’s decision follows Alan 
Schneider’s January 1960 American premiere at the Provincetown Playhouse in 
New York City, which also had actor Donald Davis manipulate the tape himself 
onstage during live performance. Schneider further elaborates on the procedures 
and risks involved in this decision as follows: 
Davis expressed a wish to work the tape-recorder himself, and 
proved to be perfect at the task. Coloured leaders were inserted 
into the tape to indicate the various cuts, and Davis, who had a 
quick eye, never missed a cue. (One celebrated actor, who 
appeared later in the play, got so tangled up in the tape that the 
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performance had to be called off.) When Hume Cronyn acted the 
part in the Forum Theatre production […] he found that running the 
machine distracted him and interfered with his characterization, and 
preferred to have the stage manager deal with the sound. During 
the performance Cronyn ran a blank tape back and forth, just 
stopping it anywhere, while the stage manager, who had to be alert 
and precise in picking up the cues, played the actual tape.94 
The distinctions Schneider draws between these two performances underscore a 
fundamentally different approach to the relationship between human actors and 
stage technology. Schneider’s decision (later integrated into Beckett’s own 
production) exploits the actor’s intense focus on the movements of the machine 
to round out Krapp’s immersion in the recording and playback process. The risks 
involved in “hands on” interaction with the tape onstage persistently defer the 
actorly impulse to play to the audience. Schneider’s and Beckett’s choices to 
rethread the actor-audience feedback loop and run it first through the tape 
recorder test the limits of both actor and mechanism. “Hands on” playback thus 
repositions theatrical performance as performance testing. Cronyn’s more “hands 
off” performance defers the actor-audience feedback loop through the 
conventional theatrical division of labor and, on the surface, lessens the burden 
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of the actor and opens his performance more to the audience. However, this 
choice also heightens the risk of missed or mistimed sound cues, which might 
potentially disrupt audience-actor identification. Moreover, doubling the machine 
offstage does not reduce the risk of broken tape, but rather potentially doubles 
the risk of breakage or mechanical failure. Likewise, two synchronized operators 
further increase the chances of human error. Cronyn’s “hands off” performance 
must appear to the audience as “hands on” and, though introducing another tape 
recorder into the performance does distribute the risk throughout the theatrical 
machinery, it also introduces new problems and heightens the risk of failure in 
those areas. By deliberate design, both “hands on” and “hands off” approaches 
to the tape recorder stage performance testing differently: each presents a 
different set of risks to be tested and reduced through rigorous rehearsal, but 
both always run the risk of replicating inefficiencies always already built into the 
tape recorder itself.  
 In measuring his habits and gestures with the technological performance of 
the tape machine, the actor effectively positions the recorder as an interlocutor. 
An essay by Pierre Chabert, the actor in Beckett’s April 1975 Paris production at 
the Théâtre d’Orsay, details his gestures and motivations in performance as 
follows: 
In operating the tape-recorder, the actor should establish a close 
physical contact with it, playing with it like a child does with an 
object. As well as generating the action of the play, the tape-
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recorder is not simply there as a theatrical prop. It exists too as an 
interlocutor. Krapp has an emotional relationship to it, which 
involves looking at it and touching it in particular. The play of looks, 
punctuated with interjections, grunts, laughter, and so on, is 
extremely important. Every look directed at the tape-recorder 
interrupts the listening posture and immediately establishes the 
recorder as an interlocutor.95 
The relationship with the tape recorder that Chabert establishes in his 
performance, under Beckett’s direction, further underscores the importance of 
touch for the function of the Krapp-Tape information machine: not merely in 
Krapp’s manual operation of the reel-to-reel, but also in the emotional affect 
flowing through that circuit. In my circuit design analysis above, I suggested that 
Beckett’s text presents a particularly corporeal digitality in the interface between 
Krapp and the tape recorder that also circulates through its entire system of 
inputs and outputs by way of a manual flipping of switches, locking and unlocking 
of drawers, etc. Where Beckett’s script sets the stage for a grotesque 
mechanization of the human (as I argued through Bergson’s theory of comedy 
early on), Chabert’s performance balances this tendency with a “humanization” of 
the mechanical. The tape recorder often “interrupts” the stillness of Krapp’s 
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“listening posture” and startles him into movement. In turn, Krapp also regards 
the tape recorder as he might a friend in conversation. In Chabert’s description of 
Beckett’s theatrical process, this intimacy between human and machine functions 
as the “essential image” of the play: 
The very first task of production consisted in trying to find the 
listening position which was most likely to give concrete form to this 
confrontation. We were helped by chance in this, our tape-recorder 
having a handle. So the character appears clutching the tape-
recorder, gripping the handle, hunched up over the machine, with 
his ear virtually glued to it. In this way, Krapp and the machine 
become one. This is the essential image of the play. Krapp, with his 
body bent, as if it were joined to the tape-recorder, with his face 
raised as if it were rising out of a common trunk, and with his face 
and eyes turned towards the audience.96 
Beckett’s staging, which prioritizes proximity and touch as a central visual motif, 
reconfigures the concept of interface as a two-way circuit through which human 
affect and mechanical reaction flow equally and alternatingly in both directions. 
The Krapp-Tape information machine is thus not only a mechanism triggered by 
human activity; the inverse is also true: human action also encounters technology 
and reacts to it. Acts of memory (recollection via playback and memorialization 
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via recording) do not so simply emerge from the press of a button, as we have 
seen in their deferrals through multiple media and complex routines of storage 
and retrieval, but they are also trigger Krapp in his process of listening. The 
process of identification that matters most in Krapp’s Last Tape is thus not some 
immediate emotionality that circulates between audience and actor—the 
theatrical notebooks consistently maintain that sentimentality should be 
avoided—but an affective feedback loop between Krapp and his tape machine. 
Martin Held, who played Krapp in Beckett’s October 1969 Berlin production at the 
Schiller-Theater Werkstatt paraphrase an exceedingly rare, if even still somewhat 
oblique, proscriptive statement from Beckett regarding his intentions as 
playwright and director:  “Krapp is not a way of looking at the world (keine 
Weltschauung) and that in fact answers everything. No, this is just Krapp, not a 
world-view. It is not valid for everyone.”97 Held’s paraphrase of Beckett’s words 
highlight the insularity of the Krapp-Tape information machine’s self-referential 
structure, which does not communicate a moral message to its audience so 
much as it merely displays its complex and conflicted internal communications as 
a process. 
 As I have noted, one of the primary resistances built into in the circuitry of 
the Krapp-Tape information machine consists of a conflict between tape 
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recording and writing. This aspect of Beckett’s design reflects failed early 
marketing strategies of the reel-to-reel. In the early 1950s, European 
manufacturers attempt to carve out a market niche for the tape recorder not as a 
device for playback of recorded music, since the phonograph already had that 
market covered, but as a device of family nostalgia more complementary in 
function to that of the photograph: an “acoustic family album.” In “Storing Sound 
Souvenirs: the Multi-Sited Domestication of the Tape Recorder” (2009), Karin 
Bijisterveld and Annelies Jacobs describe the situation thus: 
the magnetic reel-to-reel recorder, introduced to mass consumers 
in the late 1940s, never became the commercial hit manufacturers 
had dreamed it would be. Manufacturers aimed to position the reel-
to-reel as a device clearly distinct from the gramophone and the 
radio. Their marketing departments promoted it as an acoustic 
family album, a device that consumers should actively and 
creatively use. The recorder was not meant to be another 
instrument for replaying music which listeners would listen to 
passively.98 
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Despite industry efforts to market the reel-to-reel as an acoustic equivalent of the 
photograph (i.e. as a repository of nostalgic memory), most users “increasingly 
turned to the reel-to-reel to do precisely what the producers wished to prevent: its 
use as a music recording and replaying device.”99 Bijisterveld and Jacobs 
suggest that this marketing strategy fails because the reel-to-reel recorder could 
not easily be assigned a single, permanent space in the home and because the 
device does not present a practical enough means of “storing and retrieving 
recordings as traceable memories.”100 Toward the end of their article, Bijisterveld 
and Jacobs register related sentiments regarding the viability of reel-to-reel tape 
as an “acoustic family album”: 
While a photo album can easily be retrieved from a book shelf, the 
tape recorder could not live up to that level of portability. While 
photos can be browsed and photo albums leafed through, the 
linearity of tapes and recording machines turned out to be a lot 
more cumbersome for analogous activities with sound souvenirs. 
Using the forward and rewind buttons was an option, but a time-
consuming one. And while it is easy to keep notes below pictures in 
a photo album, recording oral comments notes prior to a recording, 
or making notes in a separate notebook takes a lot of planning. 
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Without such arduous archiving and listing activities, the recordings 
could hardly be expected to reveal any information to later users, 
the heirs of the tapes.101 
The materiality of magnetic tape thus resists easy assimilation unto the logics of 
nostalgia. As an analog recording medium, magnetic tape retains a direct 
magnetic trace of some original acoustic event. In recording, this magnetic trace 
is drawn out linearly across meters upon meters of tape, making searches 
extremely time consuming. The materiality of tape displaces the friction of writing 
in favor of the smoothness of the electromagnetic pulse and the physical 
properties of tape permit the erasure of recorded content, either in whole or part, 
by accident or intention. The unique properties of magnetic tape—its 
undifferentiated surface, its persistent linearity, and its potential erasibility—enlist 
it as much in the service of memory as in that of oblivion. The reel-to-reel 
recorder turns out to be such a cumbersome technology of nostalgia not because 
the materiality of its medium refuses easy categorization as inscriptive, but 
because it actually proliferates technologies of writing. Rather than delimiting the 
inscriptive apparatus and streamlining archiving procedures of storage and 
retrieval, the reel-to-reel requires even more peripheral systems of meta-
memory. Bijisterveld and Jacobs list a number of failed inscriptive strategies, 
which include approaches both quantitative (tracking recording time with the tape 
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counter, numbering tapes and boxes of tapes with adhesive labels) and 
qualitative (cataloguing brief recording descriptions in diaries and notebooks), but 
the material qualities of tape technology consistently frustrate these spatio-
archival practices. According to these authors, user difficulties range from “lack of 
standardization between tapes and tape recorders” to the time spent “finding a 
particular recording through winding the tape” and the varying length of tapes 
“which made it hard to estimate how many minutes of sound had been captured 
on a particular tape,”102 etc. The problem thus becomes, as Bijisterveld and 
Jacobs call it, borrowing a term from Roger Silverstone’s domestication theory, 
one of conversion: “the role of the device in the relationship between its owners 
and persons outside the owners’ households.”103 Insofar as the reel-to-reel 
recorder consistently defers acoustic memory through labyrinthine inscriptive 
practices and compatibility issues complicate the former even further, tape fails 
its efficiency test as of “acoustic family album.” This marketing failure touches on 
a number of difficulties related to problems of portability, storage and retrieval, 
and most importantly, pens, paper and other writing accoutrements as a 
“material” supplement to the primary inscriptive apparatus of memory. The reel-
to-reel nostalgist finds himself or herself dependent upon making notes in a 
ledger to manage his or her acoustic archive and, ultimately, cannot successfully 
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locate the memory trace exclusively within the mnemic storage system of tape 
without resorting to elaborate inscriptive practices exterior to them.  
The Tape-Chair Information Machine: a Mechanical Blueprint Design 
Analysis 
 Samuel Beckett wrote Rockaby, a short one-act stage play for solo female 
actor and tape-recorded voice in 1980, for a State University of New York festival 
and symposium honoring the playwright’s seventy-fifth birthday. It premiered at 
SUNY Buffalo on April 8, 1961 under the direction of Alan Schneider (who, as we 
have already mentioned, also directed the U.S. premier of Krapp’s Last Tape in 
1960) with the solo part written for and performed by Billie Whitelaw, Beckett’s 
favorite female actor who appeared in numerous other Beckett dramatic works 
including “Play” (1963-65), Not I (1973-75), Footfalls (1976), Rough for Radio, II 
(on BBC 3, 1976), “Ghost Trio” (for television on BBC 2, 1977), and Happy Days 
(adapted for BBC TV, 1979). The occasion of Rockaby’s writing and 
performance, the playwright’s birthday, marks its status as a work of self-
commemoration. As such, the play’s emphases on memory and the approach of 
death reflect the playwright’s own looking back on his life and his previous work, 
especially Krapp’s Last Tape. Similar Krapp, Beckett finds himself revisiting his 
past work and radically revising it. If we are to think of Rockaby as a revision of 
Krapp’s Last Tape, a redesign of the Krapp-Tape information machine, we notice 
both continuities and modifications in design. Like Krapp’s Last Tape, Rockaby 
features only one character, here designated as W seated in a rocking chair and 
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“facing front downstage slightly off centre audience left.”104 Even more austere in 
its design than Krapp’s Last Tape, Rockaby distills stage action in minute, 
repetitive movements and the slightest of gestures: the pendular oscillations of a 
rocking chair, the opening and closing of a W’s eyes, and the slow tilt forward of 
her head when the rocker comes to rest at the end. Beckett’s stage directions 
specify that the rocking motion should be “Slight. Slow. Controlled mechanically 
without assistance from W.”105 and that W’s attitude should remain “Completely 
still till fade out of chair.”106 The play’s single act is divided into four sections, 
each set into motion by a single-word utterance spoken aloud in silence by W 
(“More.”) with the rhythms of the rocking chair synchronized to the rhythms of the 
recorded voice of W (designated as V) and coming to rest on an echo of the last 
line in each section. Like the single word that sets the apparatus into motion at 
the beginning of each section, W’s spoken parts are brief and occasional, but 
they also gradually decrease in frequency—three in section one, two in sections 
two and three, and none whatsoever in the final section—and are always 
delivered in tandem with the recorded voice. 
Unlike the Krapp-Tape information machine—which functions according to 
the hesitating logics of switch, reversal, and relay—Rockaby’s Tape-Chair 
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information machine operates through the gradual dimenuendo of fading as well 
as the periodic delay and incremental decay of echo. Rockaby is lighted similarly 
to Krapp’s Last Tape—both have light fixed on or around center stage, with the 
rest of the stage in darkness—but the Tape-Chair information machine 
specifically frames its action with an opening fade-up (“first spot on face alone, 
long pause, then light on chair”) and a final fade-out (“first chair, long pause with 
spot on face alone, head slowly sinks, come to rest, fade out spot”).107 The first 
three sections end in a “faint fade of light” that never resets and synchronizes 
with the echoes of the recorded voice and the slow coming to rest of the chair. 
W’s brief spoken utterances each sound “a little softer each time”,108 while the 
constant volume of the recorded voice throughout the first three sections 
becomes “gradually softer”109 toward the end of section four. The result is a 
precision-crafted performance of echoes and fades that position a decidedly 
incremental decresence within a more durational process of slowly winding-
down. These two processes function toward the same general end, but they also 
subtly underscore the Tape-Chair information machine’s non-uniform movement 
toward stasis: some mechanisms fade gradually throughout, others decay 
periodically and at predictable intervals, while still others remain constant and 
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dissolve only in the last possible moment. Precise synchronization thus serves 
the purpose of coordinating an efficient shutdown routine. Where the Krapp-Tape 
information machine accumulates conflicts, hesitations, and interruptions that 
inevitably grind its operations to a halt, the Tape-Chair information machine 
instrumentalizes failure more directly by designing it into procedure as a 
teleological process governed by regulatory mechanisms that manage its decay. 
In place of the clutter and dust that overwhelm Krapp’s stage, we find the Tape-
Chair information machine’s single rocking chair: “Pale wood highly polished to 
gleam when rocking.”110 In contrast to Krapp’s markedly dingy and disheveled 
appearance, Beckett outfits W in “Jet sequins to glitter when rocking” and, even 
though W’s head-dress is “set askew” over her “unkempt” hair, it too is equipped 
with “extravagant trimming to catch light when rocking.”111 Against more subtle 
visual cues of disorder, the persistent glitter, gleam, and polish of Rockaby 
visually adorns the Tape-Chair information machine’s performance of failure with 
the mechanical sheen of well-maintained and highly systemized efficiency. 
 Even despite the elaborate procedures designed to glide the Tape-Chair 
machine to its final rest, the recorded voice consistently introduces new 
information in each section. In some cases, patterned repetition carefully 
regulates difference from section to section: one and three both begin with “till in 
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the end”112 and end with “time she stopped,”113 two and four begin with “so in the 
end,”114 two and four use the present tense “saying to herself”115 where one and 
three employ the past tense “when she said / to herself,”116 etc. This oscillation in 
patterned speech from section to section mirrors the pendular motion of the 
rocking chair; the persistent repetitions of “to and fro” and “high and low”117 
likewise underscore the implacable movement of the machine as a whole. 
However, the introduction of new information from section to section also 
assembles the skeletal framework of narrative, an ordering/building function that 
counters the Tape-Chair information machine’s primary directive to unwind and 
dissipate. In section one, the recorded voice sets a pattern that repeats with 
minute variations for the duration of the play. Beginning with, and always 
returning to, ending—“in the end,” “close of a long day,” and “time she 
stopped”118 recur relentlessly in all four sections—the semantic trajectory of V’s 
speech traces the shape of an ellipse that always arrives again at its origin in 
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closure. Syntactically, the recorded voice operates in accordance with 
grammatical function of the ellipsis: short, interchangeable fragments of 
sentences easily broken apart and rearranged in repetition. This ellipse/ellipsis 
logic that patterns V’s speech highlights a tension between cyclical continuity and 
dissolution reflected in what I have detailed above as the Tape-Chair information 
machine’s systemized shutdown routine. However, V does not circle only around 
closing and stopping, but also persistently (“all eyes / all sides”)119 searches “for 
another / another like herself / another creature like herself / […] another living 
soul”120, thus veering toward the possibility of opening her circuitous routine to 
difference.  In appending different phrases “like herself,” “creature like herself,” 
“living soul” to the word “another”—a consistent pattern of repetition and 
recombination that functions not only in this instance but in others, and with 
different words and phrases, throughout all four sections of Rockaby—she slowly 
fashions new circuits of meaning: a process also reflected in her introduction of 
new information in each subsequent section. 
I would like to examine V’s voice in section two repeats the same patterns 
as the first, but also integrates new material. I quote starting from the beginning, 
focusing especially on those passages containing new information: 
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so in the end / close of a long day / went back in / in the end went 
back in / saying to herself / whom else / time she stopped / time she 
stopped / going to and fro / time she went and sat / at her window / 
quiet at her window / facing other windows / so in the end / close of 
a long day / in the end went and sat / went back in and sat / at her 
window / let up the blind and sat / quiet at her window / only window 
/ facing other windows / other only windows / […] / another living 
soul / one other living soul / at her window / gone in like herself / 
gone back in / in the end / close of a long day / saying to herself / 
whom else / time she stopped / time she stopped / going to and fro 
/ time she went and sat / at her window / quiet at her window / only 
window / facing other windows / other only windows121 
A new variable “went back in” emerges quickly in the pattern and, through 
repetition, the ubiquitous “time she stopped” settles into the more specific action 
“time she went and sat.” With this new information, the elliptical patterns of V’s 
speech searching for “another” generate a further piece of new information—“at 
her window”—which, through further elliptical processing, opens onto further 
permutations (“quiet at her window” “facing other windows”) and, in turn, a new 
reported action: “let[ting] up the blind.” As V continues to reprocess old and new 
information together, a new relationship emerges: in the passage from “only 
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window / facing other windows / other only windows” to “another living soul / one 
other living soul / at her window / gone in like herself” V’s elliptical routine 
increases the probability of “another like herself.” As section two winds down, 
“one other living soul” replaces the “time she stopped” that closes section one. 
Section three picks up from this new focus: 
Till in the end / the day came / in the end came / close of a long day 
/sitting at her window / quiet at her window / only window / facing 
other windows / other only windows / all blinds down / never one up 
/ hers alone up / till the day came / in the end came / close of a long 
day / […] / all eyes / all sides / high and low / for a blind up / one 
blind up / no more / never mind a face / behind the pane / famished 
eyes / like hers / to see / be seen / no / a blind up / like hers / a little 
like / one blind up no more / another creature there / somewhere 
there / behind the pane122 
Section three’s routines test the validity of “another like herself” and proposes 
two possible alternatives: “all blinds down / never one up” and “one blind up.” 
Here the other blind functions as a digital switch, a basic Boolean gate: if 
up/open, it confirms the other’s existence; if down/closed, there is no other. In her 
continued elliptical searching, V twice reports blinds that seem to open but then 
quickly close. Is this confirmation of another like herself who remains hidden from 
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view? Or is it a coded communication, perhaps something like Morse code from 
a signal lamp? V speculates (“another creature there / somewhere there / behind 
the pane”) and laments (“behind the pane / famished eyes / like hers / to see / be 
seen”), but the closed blind never fully satisfies the conditions of certainty. 
Perhaps the most important new information to emerge from this Boolean test, 
the default binary position in a situation of uncertainty, is one single word “no”: in 
section three the word functions either as a position or a declination to decide on 
that position, but its purpose is less ambiguous in section four.  
so in the end / close of a long day / went down in the end went 
down / down the steep stair / let down the blind and down / right 
down / into the old rocker / mother rocker / where mother rocked / 
all the years / all in black / best black / sat and rocked / rocked till 
her end came / in the end came / off her head they said / gone off 
her head / but harmless / no harm in her / dead one day / no / night 
/ dead one night / in the rocker / in her best black / head fallen / and 
her rocker rocking / rocking away / […] let down the blind and down 
/ right down / into the old rocker / those arms at last / and rocked / 
rocked / with closed eyes / closing eyes / she so long all eyes / […] 
/ time she went right down / was her own other / own other living 
soul / […] / saying to herself / no / done with that / the rocker / those 
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arms at last / saying to the rocker / rock her off / stop her eyes / 
fuck life / stop her eyes / rock her off / rock her off123  
In the final section, V’s elliptical routine turns twice around the word “no.” In the 
first instance, V self-corrects: “dead one day / no / night / dead one night.” The 
second marks V’s final refusal to continue her search for another like herself: 
“saying to herself / no / done with that.” Both suggest some sense of agency and 
self-consciousness emerging from V’s repetitive routines, but the still persistent 
elliptical patterns in her speech and the origins of the word “no” in a Boolean 
performance test in the previous section also call that into question. The 
appearance of “mother” presents some evidence of the operation of retention, 
but it also might simply be a permutation of V’s habitually repeated “other.” 
“Down the steep stair” builds from previous routines (“all blinds down”), as 
confirmed by its variation in the line immediately following (“let down the blind 
and down”). The word “rocker” (and all its derivates), however, does not logically 
emerge from V’s elliptical routines: its introduction announces V’s awareness of 
the rest of the machine, a supposition confirmed by her accurate description of 
W’s dress (“all in black / best black”) and actions (“with closed eyes / closing 
eyes”). W’s consciousness of V is clear in her repetition of V’s words, but section 
four confirms that the opposite has also come to be true. 
Performance Specifications: Tape-Chair Information Machine 
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 In 1980, the year of Billie Whitelaw’s first performance of Rockaby, Seagate 
Technology introduces the ST506, the first hard disk drive for microcomputers. 
Earlier hard drives, available since IBM’s 305 RAMAC in 1956 (two years before 
the premiere of Krapp’s Last Tape), were bulky and expensive. The emerging 
home computer market had been demanding smaller, faster data retention 
storage and the ST506 answers the call. The confluence of trends in smaller size 
and increased speed had already been underway for decades in the computing 
industry: the 1960s and 1970s saw a boom in the development of increasingly 
smaller integrated semiconductor circuits, effectively reducing massive space 
required by the component transistors of the 1950s, and the emergence of 
magnetic disk storage in the 1960s and the floppy disk in the 1970s streamlined 
the laborious storage and retrieval processes of tape by flattening ferro-magnetic 
material into disks for faster access. Similar to the emergence of the audio 
cassette tape during the same time period (discussed in some detail in the pages 
above), this confluence of speed and portability also marks a trend toward the 
disappearance of magnetic media behind protective casings, within home 
computers, and so on. The notable absence, as compared with Krapp’s Last 
Tape, of the tape recorder onstage in Rockaby registers this trend toward media 
hidden from view and protected from human touch. Krapp’s “hands on” 
manipulations of memory via the transport controls of the tape interface register 
much differently than W’s vocal trigger in the simple command “More.” Like the 
DOS “run” command, “More” initiates V’s routines, but only the spoken voice 
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functions as interface: here, there is no keyboard and no manual tape transport 
control. Where Krapp interacts directly with his tape machine, caressing it and 
speaking to it, W’s hands grip the arms of a rocking chair synchronized to the 
rhythms of an offstage recorded voice, initiating the run command and allowing 
its conflicts to bring the whole machine to rest. In Rockaby, the tape recorder is 
still present, but remains hidden in the subtleties of stage machinery. One can 
barely trace the movement of tape over a recording/playback head, for instance, 
in the gentle, gliding contact of the chair’s curved runners with the stage floor. 
Likewise, one can visualize and hear the vestiges of the stop/playback functions 
of tape transport controls in the play’s three prolonged pauses. But the Tape-
Chair machine neither moves nor stops quickly and thus does not readily exhibit 
the sudden switches and reversals endemic to the Krapp-Tape machine’s 
malfunction. The Tape-Chair machine’s hiding of the tape apparatus in the 
subtlest of stage details reflects similar tendencies toward integrated and 
diminutive design in microcomputers. 
 On their surface, the Tape-Chair information machine’s graceful movements 
and subtle gestures seem to express some efficiency in design, but as I have 
already discussed, the machine operates according to a logic of managed 
decay—an highly efficient shutdown routine that implacably approaches disorder 
and stasis—which always encounters conflict in V’s persistent attempts to order 
and reorder fragments of speech into a narrative. As I have suggested, the 
gradual diminuendo and fading of sound and lights register the machine’s 
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primary directive to shut itself down slowly. The elaborate system of echoes 
circulating between W’s diminutive gestures and V’s elliptical speech should 
function in tandem with the Tape-Chair machine’s slow fade into stasis: after all, 
in highly controlled situations such as Beckett’s stage, echo should occur at 
periodically delayed intervals as well as register both regular decreases in 
amplitude and incremental decays in sound envelope structure. The Tape-Chair 
information machine’s primary conflict consists in a runtime error in its 
programming: rather than running straight through her routine, V continually re-
patterns it and, in doing so, introduces new material into the highly regulated 
function of the machine as a whole. New patterns among the old generate 
irregular echoes, which in turn interfere with primary directives.  Only when V 
says “no / done with that” and only after she refuses to continue her elliptical 
search for “another like herself” does the Tape-Chair information machine finally 
complete its shutdown cycle. 
 However, as I have noted previously, it remains uncertain whether the 
elliptical patterns in V’s speech constitute some intervention of self-
consciousness or merely evidence technological malfunction. Furthermore, the 
question of agency also persists in the automated rocking of W’s chair, synced to 
V’s recorded voice, as measured against W’s run command “More” that sets the 
apparatus into motion again and again. What constitutes human agency? Which 
is more “human”: W or V? Which is more “mechanical?” What does “human” 
mean? Does one locate it in cognition or recognition, in language or in the body, 
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in corporeal movement or in the movement of thought? Where do error and 
malfunction fit in these inquiries? These are the crucial questions that Rockaby 
poses for itself. Ultimately, Beckett’s careful theatrical staging of these questions 
does not present them as answerable. However, these questions do return us to 
the transductive relationship between human beings and tape technology. In 
Rockaby, transduction is constitutive of human consciousness itself. If “agency” 
emerges anywhere in the Tape-Chair information machine it originates from an 
error that initiates changes in the pattern. If transduction functions in a reciprocal 
reorganization of/by technology and of/by the human, moments of hesitation and 
irregularity in this process mark the place of agency. 
 In his three-volume work Technics and Time, Bernard Stiegler theorizes 
technology in general as an exteriorization of human memory. Thus far, I have 
discussed tape technology in terms of Simondon’s concept of transduction, not 
merely in terms of its functionality (recording and playback are transductive 
processes, by definition), but also in terms of its relationship to a human user. 
Stiegler brings Simondon’s concept to bear on the concept of the human itself. In 
his assessment, human beings develop, both individually and as a species, 
through an exteriorization of their consciousness in technology. This 
exteriorization is transductive insofar as it effects structural changes in non-living 
matter, i.e. reorganizes it as technology, which in turn effects structural changes 
in human culture. In my assessment Krapp’s Last Tape, I am marking one such 
moment of cultural reorganization, instantiated in theatrical performance, which 
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pivots around the new technology of the tape recorder. Likewise, my analysis of 
Rockaby marks a further development in tape technology toward an obstensibly 
more efficient means of retention in the computer hard drive. Stiegler expands 
Simondon’s idea of transduction toward (and beyond) the Husserlian concept of 
retention. In his lectures On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal 
Time (1893-1917), Husserl distinguishes between primary impressions 
(awareness of a present event as present) and retention (awareness of a past 
event as present). Retention is not merely past, but trails through the present of 
perception. The latter necessitates further distinction between the retention of the 
past in the present (primary retention) and the retention of the past as past that is 
accessible through recollection (secondary retention). As an exteriorization of 
human memory, Stiegler thus understands technology in terms of tertiary 
retention that—like orthographic writing, which supplies its paradigmatic 
example—extends human memory beyond the individual and the cultural. In 
Stiegler’s assessment, tape and other recording technologies that permeate our 
age of “industrialized memory” mark a shift in function toward efficiency of 
access, itself understood in terms of speed and accuracy in retrieval. As I noted 
in my critique of Schechner in the opening pages of this chapter, the 
technological development toward “real-time” obscures the operation of retention 
that rests at the heart of recording and playback. Rockaby and Krapp’s Last Tape 
each differently resist the call of speed and accuracy by deferring action through 
deliberation and hesitation. In this way, they not only underscore the importance 
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of retention in the era of real-time, but also allow the human to emerge as error, 
as agency, and as thought. 
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—Chapter Three— 
The Reproduction of Space: Collaboration and Control 
in Alvin Lucier and Brian Eno 
 
In his influential essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility,” Walter Benjamin traces his concept of aura through an 
emergent spatial relationship between the mechanical reproduction of artworks 
and their reception by mass audiences. For Benjamin, the concept of aura 
bridges two cultural phenomena: 1) “the desire of the present-day masses to ‘get 
closer’ to things spatially and humanly” and 2) “their equally passionate concern 
for overcoming each thing’s uniqueness […] by assimilating it as a 
reproduction.”124 In Benjamin’s assessment, aura functions through a dual 
process that collapses the spatial distance between the artwork and the viewer 
by commodifying mechanical reproductions of the artwork and thus making them 
readily available to the buying public. The historical emergence of aura, which 
Benjamin understands in terms of a conception of the artwork’s uniqueness, 
corresponds with the emergence of mechanical reproduction: only in the 
presence of a copy does the concept of an original hold any significant meaning 
or value. This correspondence between aura’s emergence and decay suggests 
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the interdependence of both processes and thus also implies their mutual 
imbrication: even in the moment of its emergence, aura is always already 
undergoing a process of decay. One can find an analogue to this formulation 
elsewhere in Benjamin’s thought in his concept of the dialectical image, wherein 
“The past can be seized only as an image that flashes up at the moment of its 
recognizability, and is never seen again.”125 Aura’s decay in mechanical 
reproduction thus not only collapses spatial distance and displaces the identity of 
the artwork across a proliferation of copies, but also underscores the operation of 
difference within the process of repetition. This chapter tacitly considers tape 
processes in light of Benjamin’s arguments regarding aura and reproduction. The 
reader will find that the aspect of Benjamin’s argument regarding the collapse of 
spatial distance, which he initially proposed vis-à-vis film and photography, 
undergoes considerable revision in my analysis such that the particular tape 
techniques I examine do not so much bring the art object closer to the listener as 
they purposefully produce a sonic sense of space in their processes. In short, 
these techniques deploy tape against its intended use value to realistically 
reproduce the sounds of a given space and instead produce an other sonic 
space for the listener. On the other hand, the two tape processes I examine both 
underscore the aspect of Benjamin’s argument that privileges the operation of 
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difference within repetition. This chapter analyzes two tape works, best 
categorized as systems or, in Steve Reich’s terms, “gradual processes” than 
intentional compositions: Alvin Lucier’s I am Sitting in a Room (1969) and Brian 
Eno’s Discreet Music (1975). In I am Sitting in a Room, Lucier’s process of 
rerecording the playback of his voice using two tape machines in an enclosed 
space slowly displaces the sound of his voice with the resonant frequencies of 
the room. Brian Eno’s Discreet Music runs two musical phrases of differing 
duration and shifting timbre through a long delay tape system; by means of 
relaying signal feedback from one tape recorder to another, Eno sets into motion 
a continually evolving canon of echoes that displace the signal in time. 
Both of these two works, each through its unique electroacoustic process 
and sonic effects, reproduces space by displacing it and, in doing so, each 
differently engages the listener in a process of disorientation. Working through 
the ideas of anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan in his assessment of “The 
Genesis of Disorientation” in the second volume of Technics and Time, Bernard 
Stiegler extends the Marxist axis of alienation-reification-instrumentalization to 
the emphasis on speed and real-time in our age of industrialized memory: 
It is rhythm that marks the implementing of instrumentalization qua 
gramme of speed, before its decomposition into abstract time and 
space. Since rhythm is conditioned by programs, issues of speed 
and program are indissociable. […] The articulation of programs 
consists of heterogenous rhythms—cosmo-geographic, 
   149 
 
physiological, and stylistic—made to cohere: […] This 
superimposition onto cosmic programs, which is also what 
suspends their reification, is a paramount principle of a 
decontextualization aiming to reach its goal of the de-realization of 
space and time.126 
Here, Stiegler places emphasis on the importance of rhythm and speed (as I 
have already examined differently in the two previous chapters) in the 
instrumentalization of memory in computers. He notes that that the speed and 
rhythm of programs is not homogenous and linear, but rather heterogeneous and 
transductive, manifesting parallels cosmo-geographically, physiologically, and 
stylistically. As he notes, the transcendent move into “cosmic programs” (the 
“space race” and the “information revolution” each drives the others’ 
development) constitutes the primary means by which this entire apparatus is 
reified as being universally true and incontestable. My argument in this chapter 
pertains to how these particular uses of tape technology resist this insistence on 
absolute time and space that fold into the ideology of real-time. In making my 
argument, I take recourse to Lefebvre’s Marxist readings of space and rhythm to 
underscore how tape technology, in the hands of Alvin Lucier and Brian Eno, can 
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and does produce a differential space that is other to the 
contradictory/catastrophic space of late capitalism. 
 
 
1969: Alvin Lucier, I Am Sitting in a Room 
As a whole, Alvin Lucier’s work in experimental music reflects both a 
focused engagement with acoustic physics and a persistent return to questions 
of electronic communication. Lucier’s earliest works for orchestral and chamber 
ensemble from 1952 until his landmark composition Music for Solo Performer 
(1965) reflect his training in the Western classical music tradition at Yale and 
Brandeis. Most scholars agree that Music for Solo Performer marks a sharp turn 
in Lucier’s oeuvre toward questions of acoustics and communication; the 
composer himself marks this piece as that which properly inaugurates his 
musical project, broadly considered. Music for Solo Performer pares musical 
performance down to a soloist and with only his brain as musical instrument: by 
means of electrodes attached to the soloist’s scalp and calibrated to receive 
alpha waves, the piece communicates the cognitive process of the performer 
working toward a meditative, non-visual brain state through a system of amplified 
signals rigged to produce vibrations in various percussion instruments dispersed 
around the performance space. Vespers (1968) deploys hand-held sonar 
echolocation devices, originally designed to communicate with dolphins and 
wielded by human performers, to acoustically map the spatial characteristics of a 
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darkened room. Music on a Long Thin Wire (1977) exhibits the acoustic 
phenomenon of interference beats through the medium of piano wire suspended 
across a room between a tone oscillator and a magnet with contact microphones 
affixed to wooden bridges at both ends to pick up vibrations induced in the wire. 
This piece functions as a meditation on the observer effect: as bodies move 
through the space around the apparatus, they induce fluctuations in the system’s 
delicate electromagnetic field, which in turn induces transformations in sound. 
Clocker (conceived in 1978 and realized, once digital delay technology had 
adequately advanced, in 1988) uses human emotional responses detected by a 
galvanic response sensor affixed to a performer’s skin to control a digital delay 
system slowing down and speeding up the sound signal of a steadily ticking clock 
running through the system. These works and many others reflect Lucier’s 
persistently recurring concern with intersections of acoustic phenomena—as 
mediated through electronics interacting with human corporeality and presence—
and electroacoustic communication of (and within) the spatial contours of built 
environments.  
 I Am Sitting in a Room (1969), Lucier’s best known work and perhaps the 
most elegantly designed and executed distillation of his ideas, routes many of the 
above concerns through the medium of magnetic tape. Like the others, this piece 
positions itself as a gradually unfolding process—the particular recording I 
reference in this section is just over 45 minutes long—but in I am Sitting in a 
Room, conceptual emphasis lies particularly on the repeated recording of a 
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recorded recitation of text and the differences that emerge slowly through each 
successive generation of playback. Necessary equipment for the process 
includes two tape recorders (one of which plays back the recorded text into an 
open room and another that records the playback as it sounds within the 
acoustics of the space), one microphone for receiving sounds as well as an 
amplifier and a loudspeaker for playback into the room. For the listener, the effect 
of I am Sitting in a Room, (with its generations ordered serially and 
chronologically by the composer) unfolds as a slow degradation in the 
intelligibility of speech occurring simultaneously with a gradual increase in 
audibility of the room’s resonant frequencies. In typical situation of speaking and 
listening, the resonant frequencies of a room carry the voice to the ear of the 
listener: they add to his or her voice the presence of the acoustic space, of 
course, but they also convey it, even amplify it. What the listener encounters in 
this typical listening situation is the speaker’s voice enveloped in the reverberant 
acoustic resonances of the space in which the act of speech occurs: from its 
location vis-à-vis a listener, the voice speaks through the acoustic properties of 
the room. Lucier’s I am Sitting in a Room uses the process of recording and 
playback to invert the typical listening situation so that the room speaks through 
(and in place of) the voice. The room slowly inhabits the voice and, in doing so, 
destroys its intelligibility.  
Lucier’s performance instructions, which read stylistically like a set of 
procedures and specifications from a technical manual, do not designate a 
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specific space for the user: “Choose a room the musical qualities of which you 
would like to evoke.”127 In Lucier’s own performance of the process, however, he 
does demonstrate some preferences that reveal much regarding its concept. 
Before turning to the technical details of the process itself, I would like to first 
consider Lucier’s preferences regarding the ideal staging location for I am Sitting 
in a Room, because they reveal some important contradictions in the work:  
I am not as interested in the resonant characteristics of spaces in a 
scientific way as much as I am in opening that secret door to the 
sound situation that you experience in a room. For example, I made 
a preliminary version of I am Sitting in a Room in the Brandeis 
University Electronic Music Studio, a small, bright, somewhat 
antiseptic room in which I never enjoyed being very much. It was 
filled with electronic equipment, and one wall consisted of several 
large glass windows. The resonant frequencies got reinforced very 
quickly after the fifth or sixth generation, resulting in harsh, strident 
sounds. But the version I did at 454 High Street, in Middletown, 
took a longer time because it was a softer, friendlier room with a 
wall-to-wall carpet and drapes on the windows. When I first moved 
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into the apartment I never dreamed that I would come to enjoy wall-
to-wall carpeting, but I soon learned that if you do it, people enjoy 
sitting on the floor. After some of the evenings we’ve had there, 
people have even gone to sleep on the floor, which they would 
have felt like doing in the Brandeis Studio. Anyway, the carpet and 
drapes cut down on the production of the resonant frequencies so 
they took longer to achieve, but it gave us a more beautiful 
result.128 
This long excerpt from a 1980 interview with the composer draws a clear 
distinction between two types of spaces: the “antiseptic” space of the laboratory 
and the “softer, friendlier” space of his apartment. Lucier quickly departs the 
“harsh, strident” resonances of the Brandeis Electronic Music Studio’s “scientific” 
space and turns instead to “that secret door” that marks the point of entry to the 
private space of urban domesticity. Here, his process can unfold more slowly and 
beautifully. In the course of his explication, Lucier’s words momentarily take on 
the quality of nostalgic reverie (“I never dreamed that…”) in relating the comforts 
of 454 High Street, before his “Anyway…” signals a return to the topic at hand: 
his work, I am Sitting in a Room. The sharp distinction between institutional and 
domestic spaces reads quite palpably in this moment and intersects a number of 
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other key functional oppositions in late capitalist spaces of representation: 
labor/leisure, public/private, interior/exterior, etc. 
The late capitalist cultural imaginary tends to situate “home” as a space 
removed from the pressures of work and the clamor of city life, as an isolated 
domestic sphere within which one can retreat and withdraw from the world. In his 
recollections, Lucier gives himself over to this idealized representation of the 
home. And who can blame him? Because after all, there is something distinctly 
alienating about a process that allows the resonant frequencies of a room to 
inhabit and destroy one’s own voice, which staging in a familiar, domestic 
environment might conceivably temper. However, the composer’s later 
recollections in his book Music 109: Notes on Experimental Music (2012) suggest 
that even the comforts of home remain far from tranquil and impermeable:  
I placed the two Nagras [tape recorders] on a table outside the door 
so the spinning reels wouldn’t make noise. I unplugged the 
refrigerator, turned off the heat. I waited until the radiator pipes had 
cooled and the room got quiet. I waited until after 11 o’clock when a 
nearby bar, the Three Coins, closed. It was snowing that night so it 
was relatively quiet outside. There was not a lot of traffic going by. I 
went outside into the hallway, turned on one of the Nagras and, 
returning to the living room, read the text into the microphone. 
When I was finished, I went back out into the hallway, stopped the 
machine, and listened to the results through headphones. The 
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levels on the meters were okay. They hadn’t peaked into the red 
zone. That would have indicated distortion. I transferred the tape to 
the second recorder, which was routed through the amplifier to the 
loudspeaker. I had positioned it on the chair I had been sitting in. I 
wanted the copy to sound as much like my original speech as 
possible. I wanted it to sound as if I were there in person actually 
talking in the room.129 
Even recording in the safe domestic space of his own apartment, far removed 
from the institutional space of the laboratory, Lucier assumes the role of 
acoustician: placing sound source (loudspeaker) in proper relative position to the 
receiver (microphone), testing equipment to minimize distortion levels, ensuring 
the optimum fidelity of the recording, and dampering external and internal noises 
as much as possible. The emphasis in the process here clearly lies in precision 
and control. Even so, this cannot intrude upon the duration of the process: “I was 
careful not to influence the results in any way,” the composer-technician notes, “I 
didn’t raise or lower volume levels on purpose to make the process go faster or 
slower. I did have to carefully monitor the levels, however, in order to keep the 
recording from going too soft. I did this minimally. I wanted the room to do the 
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work.”130 This part of Lucier’s process—which, his published verbal score (to be 
discussed momentarily) elides—can best be characterized as a balancing act 
between control and, in the words of his friend and colleague John Cage, 
“[g]iving up control so that sounds can be sounds.”131 
Essentially, aside from the initial spoken text and periodic resetting of the 
recorders (removed to a staging area in the hallway), the composer’s role in the 
process entails managing inputs and outputs: not only those of the electrical 
equipment, but also those within the domestic space of the apartment itself. 
Those noisy radiator pipes connect the apartment to networks of gas and 
plumbing, the electrical outlets of the refrigerator and recording equipment all 
connect to a power grid, and so forth. Such flows of energy, as Lefebvre notes, 
permeate the modern house, snap it onto a network of overlaying grids, and 
represent it as “an image of complex mobilities, a nexus of in and out conduits. 
By depicting this convergence of waves and currents, this new image […] would 
at the same time disclose the fact that this piece of ‘immovable property’ is 
actually a two-faceted machine.”132 The two “facets” in question here are the 
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Lectures and Writings (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 72.  
132 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith 
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well-planned grid of city planning and the burgeoning networks of late-capitalist 
information production. This particular representation of space (the house as 
machine) maps well onto Lucier’s I am Sitting in a Room, which positions the 
room as a filter system: “the space acts as a filter; it filters out all of the 
frequencies except the resonant ones. It has to do with the architecture, the 
physical dimensions and acoustic characteristics of the space.”133 In I am Sitting 
in a Room, the eponymous room is not only a space of inhabitation (i.e. a space 
on is “sitting in”), but it is also a space through which sounds and signals flow (a 
“convergence of waves and currents”). Just as Lucier, in the description above, 
cedes his chair to the loudspeaker and leaves the room to record, so does the 
sound of the room come to inhabit the place of the voice. In I am Sitting in a 
Room, inhabitation and flows interact in a dialectical process, itself instantiated in 
the figure of the apartment itself. In later recollections, Lucier’s description of 454 
High Street situates the apartment squarely within the property relations of 
contradictory space: “It was a sordid habitat, the kind universities rent to part time 
faculty. […] The kitchen was supplied with one pot, a skillet, and a coffee cup. 
But that was okay; I was by myself and ate out a lot anyway.”134 A space 
inhabited, a space moved through.   
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Having detailed some important spatial relationships mobilized in I am 
Sitting in a Room, I now shift my analysis to the crucial function of the voice in 
this work. Lucier’s recorded text, part of a larger verbal score for performance, 
reads as follows: 
I am sitting in a room different from the one you are in now. 
I am recording the sound of my speaking voice and I am going to 
play it back into the room again and again until the resonant 
frequencies of the room reinforce themselves so that any 
semblance of my speech, with perhaps the exception of rhythm, is 
destroyed. 
What you will hear, then, are the natural resonant frequencies of 
the room articulated by speech. 
I regard this activity not so much as a demonstration of a physical 
fact, but more as a way to smooth out any irregularities my speech 
might have.135 
This text, recorded in the composer’s own voice, begins by foregrounding its 
status as a recording by distinguishing two events (of recording and of playback) 
organized around two subject positions (of the speaker “I” and of the listener 
“you”). Lucier addresses a presumed audience dislocated in time and space from 
the site of the process and, thus, the work is not complete until this circuit 
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between speaker and audience is closed. As I have already suggested, this 
dislocation registers in Lucier’s departure from the room beginning with the 
second generation of the recording process. From this point forward, he listens at 
a situational remove: monitoring playback and recording in the hallway through 
headphones. Interestingly, Lucier’s prose above positions rhythm as (“perhaps”) 
the acoustic remainder of a process that filters the voice through the room until 
“any semblance” of the former “is destroyed.” This process of destruction, as I 
have already noted in the pages above, occurs through a repeatedly recycled 
flow of sound through the room-recorder circuit it gradually inhabits the place of 
the voice. In the closing sentence, the composer frames his entire process as a 
means to “smooth out any irregularities” in his speech, referring to the occasional 
stutter in his voice, most audible on the recording, interestingly enough, around 
the words “rhythm” and “smooth.” 
Speech therapy pathologizes the stutter as an impediment, an interruption 
in the smooth flow of language, an arrhythmia. Acoustics defines noise in terms 
of “non-periodic motion” and “irregular vibration.”136 In this sense, one might 
consider the stutter as a rough equivalent to noise in patterned speech and thus 
conceptualize I am Sitting in a Room as an extended noise reduction process. 
Certainly, Lucier’s expressed desire to “smooth out” the irregular rhythms of his 
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speech suggests some analogy. One might also construe Lucier’s attentiveness 
to the control of ambient noise and electronic distortion throughout his process as 
support for this hypothesis, but only if one disregards his exertions in the 
opposite direction not to distort the process. Further, one should not disregard 
the noises Lucier allows and even augments: “I chose speech to test the space 
because it is rich in sounds. It has fundamental tones (formants) and lots of noisy 
stuff—p’s, t’s, s’s, k’s.”137 This bundle of contradictions clustered around a 
relationship between noise and control brings us, as they say, to the heart of the 
                                                
137 Lucier, Music 109: Notes on Experimental Music. 90. This analysis of the 
material of human speech in terms of consonants/noise vs. vowels/tone has a 
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pop screens) and effects (electroacoustic reverberation), the latter tend to draw 
out the formant vowel sounds of words in their singing to exploit the more 
“musical” qualities of language. Considered from the standpoint of the Western 
musical traditions, the tonal quality of vowel sounds has a marked privileged over 
the noisiness of consonants. 
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matter, that is the matter of sound, and most importantly, of rhythm. In Lucier’s 
process, the room inhabits speech by infusing it with resonant material until its 
harmonic shapes are no longer recognizable, even as (despite what he says) the 
rhythms of speech—the spaces between words, their spacing—persist. In The 
Production of Space (1974), Henri Lefebvre analyzes urban space as a site of 
conflicting interests and thus a product of contradictory forces. In the ideal 
situation (i.e. from the shared standpoint of capitalist and technocrat), built 
spaces are designed and planned by architects working in cooperation with 
contractors and developers, all of whom adhere to building and zoning codes 
established by law. The conflicting interests of capitalism and the state, however, 
often produce tensions: where capitalism seeks to carve up space as property, to 
demolish and build in accordance with the turbulent demands of the market, the 
state seeks to construct logically designed spaces and to maintain rational 
channels for the flow of energy, laboring bodies, and information. The rhythmic 
tensions between capitalist productivity and state controls—both of which disrupt 
corporeal rhythms—thus induce arrythmias within the social body. If we follow 
Helmoholtz’ definition of noise as “non-periodic motion” and “irregular vibration”, 
then we might further posit that these arrythmias of contradictory space operate 
as a sort of noise at the level of social organization. Capitalism thus not only 
emanates noise as a byproduct of factory labor, mechanization, and automation, 
but it also weaves noise into the social fabric of everyday life. 
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Early in his essay “Music, Mutic,” Jean-François Lyotard introduces the 
concept of the sonorous gesture: “Music struggles […] to leave a trace or make a 
sign, within the audible, of a sonorous gesture that goes beyond the audible.”138 I 
am Sitting in a Room traces such a sonorous gesture in its process: “Every room 
has its own melody, hiding there until it is made audible,”139 Lucier says, and he 
seeks the melody of the room in a process of “smoothing out” the irregularity of 
speech. Yet, as Craig Dworkin suggests in his critical reading of I am Sitting in a 
Room, “the cyclic patterns that result from the repetitive process of the work […] 
extend the local instances of Lucier’s stutter to the entire sonic field, making the 
stutter into the most salient characteristic of the music as a whole.”140 I concur 
with Dworkin here and my own listening process suggests that “smoothing out” 
ultimately reverses the relationship between figure and ground, so that the stutter 
now trembles in the background—or, as Lyotard might suggest, it mumbles, 
moans, or mutters. Regardless, rhythm remains. And this remainder confronts 
Lucier’s sonorous gesture to make a room speak through his voice on. Lefebvre 
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notes that the “rhythm that is proper to capital is the rhythm of producing 
(everything: things, men, people) and destroying (through wars, through 
progress, through inventions and brutal interventions, through speculation, 
etc.).”141 The contradictions I have noted in Lucier’s process, often clustered 
around problems of noise control, concentrate around a similar dual rhythm of 
production and destruction: the process of I am Sitting in a Room produces 
space by destroying the voice, it reproduces the home but only in repositioning it 
house-machine, etc. This dual rhythm is not the only one that remains at the end 
of its process, however. “Rhythm appears as regulated time, governed by 
rational laws, but is in contact what is least rational in human beings: the lived, 
the carnal, the body,”142 Lefebvre reminds us. Capital, of course, draws its 
rhythms from human bodies and these it cannot fully subsume under its 
machinations: human rhythms remain and, like Lucier’s stutter, even proliferate. 
1975: Brian Eno, Discreet Music  
In many ways, Brian Eno’s Discreet Music contains the entirety of 
“ambient music.” Of course the composer himself cites this piece as its 
foundational gesture. The generic term and its musical expression of course 
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change over time, not only as other artists assume the genre’s mantle, but also 
as Eno enacts his own variations on Discreet Music in subsequent ambient 
works. Rather than try to account for these variations, it suffices merely to note 
here that the idea of variation—repetition with a difference—always already 
functions as the key organizing musical principle of ambient music, beginning at 
the level of song structure and expanding outwards from there. Sadly, readers 
looking for a detailed survey of the genre or a full account of Eno’s place within it 
will not find it here. My critical interest in Eno’s Discreet Music pertains 
specifically to its particular applications of open reel tape recorders to produce a 
spatial effect of echo through a long delay process. This echo effect (whether 
achieved with tape or later digital emulations of tape echo) not only persists as 
an important sonic signature of Eno’s ambient music and of the genre more 
broadly, but it also instantiates in sound a particular production of space. The 
Centre for Research on Sonic Space and Urban Environment (CRESSON) 
proposes a definition of the “sound effect” that expands the more conventional 
understanding of “prop,” i.e. something merely added to a sound or signal: 
As soon as it is perceived contextually, sound is inseparable from 
an effect, as subtle as it can be, a particular colouration due to 
collective attitudes and representations or to individual traits. In this 
way, there exists, between the sound and the sonic effect, not a 
relation of similarity but rather a set of mutual references between 
the sound, physically measurable although always abstract, and its 
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interpretation, the particular fashioning by which it enters into 
perceptive development.143 
In this sense, echo activates a cluster of relationships—social, historical, 
ideological, cultural—bound up within its occurrence. As a technological process, 
tape echo involves a series of temporal delays deferred through physical space. 
The long delay technique exploits not only the spatial intervals between the 
erase, record, and playback heads featured in most open reel recorders, but it 
also involves the use of a second recorder which takes up the tape from, and 
plays back the signal of, the first. When the playback from the second machine 
feeds back into the audio input of the first, the delayed sound of the signal 
produces a cumulative echo effect. In time, this cumulative effect is also 
accumulative: echoes of the original signal stack up in the process of rerecording 
feedback signals. With the signal gain of the first recorder dialed in at an optimal 
setting below unity, these accumulating echoes also gradually decay in amplitude 
as one might expect of an acoustic echo in a built space or natural environment. 
The duration of the delay, i.e. the lag time between the “original” sound event and 
its echo, is a direct function of the length of tape necessary to span from one 
recorder to the other; this duration can be lengthened or shortened by increasing 
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or decreasing the physical space between the machines or by speeding up or 
slowing down the tape itself. All these variables—the intervals between record 
and playback heads, the physical space between machines, gain settings, tape 
speed, and even the feedback signal—can be manipulated to vary the echo 
effect. So as a production of abstract space in sound, tape echo functions 
through concrete configurations of material objects in space and sound events in 
time.  
Brian Eno, of course, did not “invent” tape echo nor was he the first to use 
it. The history of tape echo begins in the early 1950s, shortly after the tape 
recorder’s commercial availability to producers. Popular music historians place its 
origins in Les Paul’s slapback echo effect on a hit single with his wife Mary Ford, 
“How High the Moon” (1951), which became the sonic signature of early 
American rock n’ roll by way of Sun Studios’ and Chess Records’ respective 
appropriations of it throughout the rest of the decade. By the end of the 1950s, 
tape echo found varied expression in almost every major genre of American 
popular music: country and western, blues, jazz, doo wop, and even Hawaiian 
slack tune slide guitar music all adapt variations of the slapback echo technique 
into their sound. In his book Echo and Reverb: Fabricating Space in Popular 
Music Recording (2005), Peter Doyle analyzes tape echo in Deleuzian terms as 
a territorializing sonic effect that produces “virtual spaces” of otherness in the 
1950s U.S. cultural imaginary: 
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Echo and reverberation made it seem as though the music was 
coming from a somewhere—from inside an enclosed architectural 
or natural space or “out of” a specific geographic location—and this 
“somewhere” was often semiotically volatile. On reflection it 
became clear that with the addition of echo and reverb, “place” and 
“space” had become part of the larger musical equation, a new 
component in the musical totality.144 
In Doyle’s analysis, the semiotic volatility of those virtual spaces produced with 
tape echo mirror “issues of ‘production’ and production values; these in turn 
involve powerful social forces from beyond the studio—in particular, tensions 
around class, racial, and sexual politics.”145 
Historians of “new music” and the postwar avant-garde mark tape echo’s 
emergence in Paris musique concrète (Pierre Schaeffer and Pierre Henry) 
around 1952, roughly contemporaneous with Vladimir Ussachevsky’s and Otto 
Luening’s early experiments with tape echo at the Columbia-Princeton Electronic 
Music Center. During the same time period that Les Paul’s slapback echo was 
reterritorializing the sound of U.S. popular music, Pierre Schaeffer and Pierre 
Henry were experimenting with more radical applications of tape echo for their 
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work with the Groupe de Recherche de Musique Concrète (GRMC) in Paris—
renamed the Groupe de Recherches Musicales (GRM) in 1958—which 
culminated in the invention of an entirely new device called the morphophone. 
Composer and current GRM director Daniel Teruggi, describes the device thus:  
This machine, developed during this period [what Teruggi calls the 
“mechanical period” and periodizes between 1948 through the early 
1960s], was conceived to build complex forms through repetition, 
and accumulation of events through delays, filtering and feedback. 
It was basically made of a large turning disk, 50cm in size, on which 
a tape was ‘stuck’, with its magnetic side looking towards the 
outside. A series of magnetic heads were distributed around the 
disk, in contact with the tape and their position could be moved 
along the circle. There were twelve heads: a recording head, an 
erasing head, and ten playing heads. The principle was that a 
sound was recorded along the looped tape (four seconds of sound 
could be recorded) and then the ten playing heads would read the 
information with different delays in relation to their position around 
the disk. Each playing head had its own amplifier and a band-pass 
filter in order to modify the spectrum of that sound; feedback loops 
completed the system and could send the information towards the 
recording head. The result consisted of repetitions of a sound at 
different time intervals, with the possibility of filtering and creating 
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feedback. Artificial reverberations or continuous sounds could 
easily be obtained through this system.146 
Teruggi’s emphasis on the spatial dimensions of the turning disc (“50cm in size”), 
on its design concept to “build complex forms” in sound objects and 
“accumulation of events,” the design principle of “different delays in relation to 
their position around the disk,” and the aesthetic result in “repetitions of a sound 
at different time intervals” highlight the complexity and depth of the device’s 
capabilities to manipulate the temporal and spatial aspects of sound objects. 
Peter Manning describes its sound potential in terms of a “pulsed type of 
reverberation.”147 The morphophone builds space and accumulates time through 
multiple processes of repetition that do not merely reproduce the sound object, 
but rather produce it again (and again and again) as a difference. This production 
of difference is a direct function of the variable intervals between the recording 
and playback heads of the device. A more general comment on the tape 
compositional process by John Cage likewise applies to tape echo: “It made one 
aware that there was an equivalence between space and time, because the tape 
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University Press, 2013), 26. 
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you could see existed in space, whereas the sounds existed in time. That 
immediately changed the notation of music. We could put a sound at any point in 
time.”148 Not only does Cage’s notion of an “equivalence between space and 
time” locate tape practices squarely within post-Euclidean/Newtonian 
representations of space (i.e. Einsteinian relativity), but it also registers an 
emergent spatial practice—theorized toward the end of the twentieth century as 
time-space compression (David Harvey) and “real time” catastrophic collapse 
(Paul Virilio)—as advancements in communications and transportation 
technologies from the 1950s forward spread the infrastructures of globalization. 
Whereas the spatial practice of late capitalism marks an increasing emphasis on 
the speed of signal relay and an increased concern with clarity and “real time” 
precision in communications, the repetition and feedback of a delayed sound 
signal on tape (a “happy accident” “built into” reel-to-reel technology itself) opens 
an alternative space of representation in avant-garde musical practice wherein 
users exert some control over the contours of sound objects and time the arrival 
of sound events. 
In avant-garde developments contemporaneous with musique concrète on 
the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, Vladimir Ussachevsky’s and Otto Luening’s 
earliest collaborative compositions (Sonic Contours, Fantasy in Space, etc.) at 
                                                
148 qtd. in Thom Holmes, Electronic and Experimental Music: Technology, Music, 
and Culture, Third Ed. (London: Routledge, 2008), 124. 
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the Columbia Princeton Electronic Music Center in 1952 place special emphasis 
on the relation between control and improvisation actualized by feedback in the 
tape echo process. In an introduction and analysis of these scores, Ussachevsky 
describes the feedback circuit in vivid detail as follows: 
Feedback is an automatic but controllable repetition of any sound 
or sounds being recorded on magnetic tape. In the normal 
magnetic head configuration on a professional tape recorder the 
tape passes by the erase head, then record head and then the 
playback head. A sound is first recorded and then heard a fraction 
of a second later through playback head. If the output of the 
playback head is immediately shuttled back to record head, 
everything that is being recorded will be immediately repeated. If, 
as is predominantly the case, the sound pattern is longer than the 
rate of repetition, then, obviously, overlapping of the original and 
the subsequent repetitions take place. The number of repetitions 
can be regulated but the quality of the recording deteriorates.149  
The technical details above are indispensible for understanding how electronic 
feedback functions in tape echo and they speak clearly to much of what I have 
                                                
149 Vladimir Ussachevsky, “Background of the Compositions and Analyses of 
Sonic Contours and Incantation” in1952 Electronic Tape Music: the First 
Compositions (New York: Highgate Press, 1977), 5.  
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already noted in the previous few pages (which is why I have included them), but 
Ussachevsky’s framing here prompts some important questions regarding tape 
echo’s relationship to performance and spatiality. The formulation of feedback as 
an “automatic but controllable repetition” positions tape echo as a careful 
negotiation between the process of mechanical reproduction and human control. 
Peter Manning further elaborates the dangers of feedback: 
If the feedback control is set to unity gain, the reiteration will recycle 
at constant amplitude, continuing theoretically to infinity. In practice 
the increasing degradation of quality with each rerecording limits 
the useful life of the recording process. It is more useful therefore to 
set the feedback control to a less than unity gain, giving rise to an 
exponential decay in the amplitude of successive reiterations.150 
The limitations of tape technology thus present, for the tape echo performer, a 
series of choices positioned between an exponential increase in distortion (i.e. 
tape saturation) or no audible signal whatsoever, with a exponential decay in 
volume being the desired effect. Ussachevsky describes the process of dialing in 
this ideal position, in decidedly corporeal terms, as “a delicate balance between 
the eye directing the hands and watching the meters, the ear constantly alert and 
ready, also to instruct the fingers to move controls with the obvious and, 
                                                
150 Manning, Electronic and Computer Music, 59. 
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sometimes, almost sensuous application of touch.”151 The performance of space 
via tape echo thus entails what Ussachevsky deems nothing less than human 
“collaboration”152 with the tape machine. For the purposes of my argument, I am 
                                                
151 Ussachevsky, Vladimir. “Afterword: Random Thoughts on Creative 
Collaboration with Machines.”1952 Electronic Tape Music: the First 
Compositions. 41.  
152 The passage in full reads: “Collaboration with machines! What is the 
difference between manipulation of the machine and collaboration with it? 
Control of machines is one of the most common human activities, and there is a 
degree of collaboration even in driving a car. All sense may be involved in 
manipulating tape recorders and associated electronic facilities (even the sense 
of smell is useful in detecting an overheated electronic component; the sense of 
taste should be transferred to the aesthetic area). There exists in the midst of 
composing with tape a delicate balance between the eye directing the hands and 
watching the meters, the ear constantly alert and ready, also to instruct the 
fingers to move controls with the obvious and, sometimes, almost sensuous 
application of touch. Many a sensitive engineer could probably attest to the 
feeling of creativity associated with the elaborate mixing. A composer engages a 
new regulatory element—his imagination. A complex stimulus and response 
mechanism involves a total interaction between one’s creative ability, experience, 
and the knowledgeable supervision of the unfolding mechanical process. A 
   175 
 
less interested in tracing origins here than I am in simply noting the call and 
                                                                                                                                            
capacity for instant comprehension of the opportunities during the improvisational 
mode of machine operation is a must. I have sometimes experienced a state of 
dynamic tension rising in me out of what would seem to be a status of mutual 
responsiveness between the machine and myself. Such a state could require 
hours of concentrated preparatory exploration, coaxing of machines, connecting, 
so to say, one’s own sensibilities, one’s own nerve endings to the totality of the 
tuned-up controls. And suddenly a window would open into a vast field of 
possibilities; the time limits would vanish, and the machines would seem to 
become humanized components of the interactive network now consisting of 
oneself and the machine, still obedient but full of suggestions to the master 
controls of the imagination. All then seemed possible: one leaned on the horizon 
and pushed it away and forward until utter exhaustion would set in and, one by 
one, the nerve endings ceased to connect, the possibilities contracted, and an 
automatic reversal to routine solutions was a sure danger signal to quit. An 
affectionate pat on a control here and there was not to be resisted. Switches and 
lights off! If there is an unfinished bit of conversation between you and the 
machines, either take note of all the controls or leave them alone until tomorrow. 
Recapturing the exact circumstances of such periods as just described is not 
easy. Tomorrow it may seem all cold steel, copper and colored plastic. The 
coaxing may have to start all over again.” Ibid. 
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response temporal structure, the echo or delay, between applications of tape 
echo in popular music and the avant-garde in the 1950s. These trends intensify 
through the 1960s and 1970s when long delay tape echo experimentation in 
popular music (e.g. The Beatles and Pink Floyd, to name only the two best 
known) and the avant-garde (e.g. Terry Riley’s and Pauline Oliveros’ work at the 
San Francisco Tape Music Center) come to define a “spacey” new sound of the 
post-psychedelic era.  
These currents converge in the work of Brian Eno, a self-proclaimed “non-
musician” who has nonetheless achieved a high-degree of success in popular 
music. His work as producer with David Bowie, Devo, U2, Talking Heads, 
Ultravox, and many others contributed significantly to the continuing redefinition 
of Western pop music from the 1970s through the present. As Eno’s production 
career established his mainstream credibility, his more experimental and 
exploratory musical collaborations with artists such as David Byrne of Talking 
Heads, German electronic noise experimentalists Cluster, and Robert Fripp of 
King Crimson place him near the more avant-garde outer fringes of rock n’ roll. 
His influence in both the mainstream and the vanguard in popular music 
positioned him as a conduit, of sorts, between the two, which occasionally 
resulted in some crossover: not only in his work with collaborators, but also in 
work of others in whose work he took a keen interest. For instance, his active 
involvement in the promotion, recording, and release of the No New York 
compilation (1978) effectively captured a document of no wave—a radically 
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uncompromising underground noise music scene in downtown Manhattan that 
infused punk rock’s abrasive volatility with the atonal skronk of free jazz and 
performance art’s self-conscious confrontation of audience—in the very moment 
of its implosion. More directly relevant to my concerns here is Eno’s short-lived 
but enormously influential Obscure Records label (1975-1978), which introduced 
a number of important works by avant-garde musicians (Gavin Bryars, John 
Adams, David Toop, Michael Nyman, Harold Budd and even John Cage) to a 
broader popular audience; Eno’s own Discreet Music was the label’s third 
release. Most, however, best know Eno as the founder of ambient music. In its 
contemporary iterations, the genre is often classed as a subgenre of EDM 
(electronic dance music) with many permutations in that category (ambient 
house, ambient dub, etc.), but in Eno’s conception ambient music expressly 
shares much more in common with the musical minimalism of Steve Reich, the 
chance operations of John Cage, the “furniture music” of Erik Satie, and (of 
course) Muzak. I will return to ambient music in a shortly after an analysis of 
Eno’s long delay process. 
Of all its various applications in recorded music, Eno’s Discreet Music 
represents perhaps the most focused meditation on the long delay process qua 
process. As applied in Discreet Music, long delay serves as a primary means to 
generate subtle variations within patterned repetitions of sequenced musical 
material run automatically from a synthesizer, through an equalizer and echo unit 
(a self-contained device that generates echo by means of a tape loop run 
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through multiple recording and playback heads), and into the two-machine long 
delay system described above. In his liner notes to the album, Eno describes his 
role in the process: 
Having set up this apparatus, my degree of participation in what it 
subsequently did was limited to (a) providing an input (in this case, 
two simple and mutually compatible melodic lines of different 
duration stored on a digital recall system) and (b) occasionally 
altering the timbre of the synthesizer’s output by means of a 
graphic equalizer.153 
Like Lucier in I am Sitting in a Room, Eno positions himself here more as a 
sound engineer supervising the process than as composer, conductor, or 
musician. Though his apparatus also includes two tape recorders like Lucier’s, 
Eno filters his sequenced sounds electronically by means of a graphic equalizer. 
So Eno and Lucier attempt different elisions of artistic intention within their 
respective works: where Lucier’s repeated process of playback and recording 
filters space through the voice for the ostensible purpose of normalizing irregular 
rhythms, Eno’s long delay process entails a gradual accumulation of echoed 
polyrhythmic variations upon two simple musical sequences programmed and 
looped at different lengths. Lucier plays voice against the acoustic resonances of 
                                                
153 Brian Eno, Album liner notes for Discreet Music, original recording 1975 on 
Obscure Records, digitally remastered 2004 on Astralwerks. 
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a room, while Eno plays sequence against sequence against echo; where the 
one aims to gradually “smooth out” and strip away, the other uses a tape process 
to generate more rhythmic and melodic complexity. Despite their differences, 
both gesture toward Steve Reich’s coupling of the “impersonal” with “complete 
control” in his gradually changing musical processes:    
Musical processes can give one a direct contact with the 
impersonal and also a kind of complete control, and one doesn’t 
always think of the impersonal and complete control as always 
going together. By “a kind” of complete control, I mean that by 
running this material through the process I completely control all 
that results, but also that I accept all that results without 
changes.154 
As Eno notes inside the album, “It is a point of discipline to accept this passive 
role, and, for once, to ignore the tendency to play the artist by dabbling and 
interfering.”155 The relationship between impersonal passivity and 
discipline/control inherent within Eno’s process of course prompts important 
questions regarding the relationship between process and performance in 
Discreet Music.  
                                                
154 Reich, “Music as a Gradual Process,” 35. 
155 Eno, Album liner notes for Discreet Music. 
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The “gradual processes” of Reich, Lucier, and Eno adapt these broader 
trends to musical performance with one major difference: none of them applies 
tape technology strictly according to its intended functional design. Each 
differently tests the technological limits of the tape recorder and, in doing so, 
orients his process (as I have also observed in Beckett’s tape plays) to the 
possibility of failure. From an industry standpoint, the “effectiveness” of the tape 
recorder is measured according to its ability to reproduce clear and consistent 
“high fidelity” sound; tape echo’s characteristic swells and decays in volume and 
resolution “fail” by privileging the production of sonic differences. The elision of 
artistic intention, in these cases, thus entails less an evacuation of subjectivity, as 
the Taylorist ideal of automated decision-making (the computerized management 
of information flows) would suggest, and more an all-too-human offering of 
oneself over to the possibility of generating difference, of allowing accidents156 to 
                                                
156 In his album liner notes for Discreet Music, Brian Eno locates both accident 
and technological failure within his origin story of ambient music: “In January this 
year I had an accident. I was not seriously hurt, but I was confined to bed in a 
stiff and static position. My friend Judy Nylon visited me and brought me a record 
of 18th century harp music. After she had gone, and with some considerable 
difficulty, I put on the record. Having laid down, I realized that the amplifier was 
set at an extremely low level, and that one channel of the stereo had failed 
completely. Since I hadn’t the energy to get up and improve matters, the record 
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happen. Or, as Eno notes in an interview for the video documentary Imaginary 
Landscapes (1989), “Instead of using all these machines to reproduce something 
again and again perfectly, you use them to make something different again and 
again. So you use them as ways of generating variety rather than fixing 
something in place.”157 Keeping these ideas in mind, the soothing affective 
dimensions of Discreet Music manifest a crucial contradiction wherein the same 
process that poses the possibility of the accident also proffers its aural panacea. 
The accident looms in the polyrhythmic accumulation of echoes, which, if allowed 
to pile up indefinitely, would result in the screaming distortion of tape signal 
saturation. However, the careful presetting of feedback gain parameters ensures 
that that these gradually accumulating echoes also gradually fade away—in 
unpredictably overlapping patterns, it is true, but also within a carefully calibrated 
range of probabilities. 
The fragile beauty of Discreet Music thus manifests in a quality of 
wavering on a precipice but never spilling over, a persistently unfolding accident 
                                                                                                                                            
played on almost inaudibly. This presented what was for me a new way of 
hearing music – as part of the ambience of the environment just as the colour of 
the light and sound of the rain were parts of that ambience.”  
157 Brian Eno qtd. in Gabriella Cardazzo and Duncand Ward, Imaginary 
Landscapes (Eyeplugin Media Corporation and Mystic Fire Video, 1989), VHS 
cassette, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e9EkfGrkuEQ 
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of differences held in perpetual abeyance: a critical reflection in musical form of 
the mounting geopolitical crises of the Cold War (mutually assured destruction, 
containment, etc.) which repeat (with a difference), after the collapse of Soviet 
communism, in the cyclical economic crises of the globalized “free market”. 
Borrowing from René Thom’s catastrophe theory in mathematics, Henri Lefebvre 
designates the emergent global situation of conflict (and ultimately, collusion) 
between the interests of capital and those of the nation-state as a “space of 
catastrophe.” Simply stated, Thom’s catastrophe theory examines sudden 
changes arising from small shifts among controlling factors in biological, 
structural, and social phenomena. Lefebvre’s appropriation of the concept 
locates catastrophic space where the state’s technocratic tendency toward 
logistical planning, regulation, and control of capital conflicts with the interests of 
users and occupants of social space and “generates ruptures rather than 
stability.”158 In Lefebvre’s analysis, “The catastrophe consists in the fact that state 
space hinders the transformation that would lead to the production of a 
differential space. State space subordinates both chaos [induced by capitalist 
‘atomization’ and ‘pulverization’ of social spaces] and difference [produced by 
user/occupant appropriations of social spaces] to its implacable logistics. It does 
                                                
158 Henri Lefebvre, “Space and the State” in State, Space, World: Selected 
Essays, trans. Gerald Moore, eds. Stuart Elden and Neil Brenner (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 246. 
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not eliminate the chaos, but manages it.”159 Performance management and 
technological performance, as described via McKenzie in the previous chapter, 
thus trace the technocratic operations of the state in the “logic” of capitalist 
organization: at the level of management, capital and the state reflect one 
another in an ideological mirror of “efficiency.” Through its process of impersonal 
control, Discreet Music generates accidents (echoes, polyrhythms, unintentional 
melodies) and—by repeatedly forestalling a catastrophic shift into oversaturation 
and distortion—produces sonic differences. As such, the work negatively reflects 
the ideological underpinnings of catastrophic space even as it produces a 
differential, other space in sound. 
Thus it comes as little surprise that Eno frames his ambient music project, 
as a whole, in terms of producing a differential, other space. In a 1976 interview 
with Mary Harron for Punk magazine, Eno explains art in terms of disorientation: 
you can afford to expose yourself to uncertainties in art that you 
wouldn’t allow yourself in real life. You can allow yourself to get into 
situations where you are completely lost, and where you are 
disoriented. You don’t know what’s going on, and you can actually 
not only allow yourself to do that, you can enjoy it.160 
                                                
159 Ibid., 249. 
160 qtd. in Mary Harron, “Interview with Brian Eno. Punk, 1976, archived online at 
http://music.hyperreal.org/artists/brian_eno/interviews/punk76.html 
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Each of the four properly designated volumes of the Ambient series—Music for 
Airports (1978), The Plateaux of Mirror (1980), The Day of Radiance (Laraaji with 
Eno producing, 1980), and On Land (1982)—prominently features a small map 
fragment as its front cover album art. Taken together, none of these fragments 
match up to make a coherent whole and their intensely magnified details reveal 
less about their possible correspondence to actual geographical locations than 
they do about the texture and coloration of maps. In explaining his goals for 
ambient music, Eno notes: “I want to take music away from abstract collections 
of sounds and I want to make it like places you’ve been to. I want to make it 
sound like a place you’ve been to before.” (Imaginary Landscapes documentary) 
Gestures toward familiarity are probably most clearly realized in place of lyrical 
description, many song and album titles during his early ambient period signpost 
relative position or trajectory (On Land, “Falling Light”), reference spatial 
disorientation (“Lost in the Humming Air,” “Events in Dense Fog,” “An Echo of 
Night”), designate enclosures or built spaces (“Patrolling Wire Borders,” “A 
Measured Room,” “Wind in Lonely Fences,” Music for Airports), etc. Eno’s textual 
mapping provides a symbolic frame of reference or his listeners, a key to their 
passage through what he calls “imaginary landscapes”: a reference, of course, to 
John Cage’s Imaginary Landscapes series of five aleatory works for various 
electronic devices and acoustic percussion instruments composed and first 
performed intermittently between 1939 and 1952. In the documentary interview, 
Eno speaks of his ambient project as “expanding music out to the horizons” so 
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that “you just wouldn’t know what was music and what wasn’t, where it was a 
plateau and everything you could hear was music.” Eno’s aim of disorientation 
smoothes the chaotic rhythms of late-capitalism not only by superimposing sonic 
temporalities in echoes and delays but also by imaging a program for ambient 
music that critiques, even if it cannot quite resist, the territorializing force of real-
time. 
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—Chapter Four— 
Breaching, Scanning, Reworking: Reenactment, 
Repetition, and Enda Walsh 
 
My focus in this chapter bears upon a play by Enda Walsh entitled 
misterman, which was first written for Corcadorca Theatre Company and 
mounted as a one-man theatrical performance at the Granary Theatre in Cork, 
Ireland in 1999 with the playwright acting and Pat Kiernan directing. A rewritten 
and remounted version in 2011 with Cillian Murphy in the lead role (the version I 
focus on here) garnered worldwide acclaim for both actor and playwright. The 
one-person show revisits a day in the life of its main character Thomas Magill, a 
troubled youth living in a rural Irish village. Thomas reenacts the events of this 
day by physically interacting with tape-recorded conversations and sounds from 
village life: his mother, other villagers, neighborhood dogs, and so on. In his 
reenactment, Thomas positions himself as both Divine Creator of his village of 
Inishfree and as enforcer of a rigid, decidedly Old Testament, Judeo-Christian 
moral code. The action of the play opens with an ex nihilo act of Creation that 
closely parallels the Book of Genesis—Thomas wills his village into being with 
the power his voice, “It all began from Nothing. This loud crashing all began as a 
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whisper… but a whisper that was from God”161—and closes, as it begins, in the 
void of the Nobody in Thomas’ final spoken refrain “Nobody’s listening. Nobody’s 
listening. Nobody’s listening. Nobody’s listening...”162 The framing of the action of 
the play between the Nothing of creation and the Nobody of audition here stages 
a very particular engagement with Pascal’s Wager: a decidedly binary logical 
reasoning game wherein the existence of God can neither be proven nor 
disproven, but nonetheless must be decided upon by each human subject for 
him- or herself. In Pascal’s reasoning, the stakes of the game are such that if one 
wagers for the existence of God, then one gains everything and loses nothing, 
whereas if one wagers against, one loses everything and gains nothing. Thomas, 
of course, follows Pascal’s path and wagers for the existence of God and yet, in 
the end still loses everything: the audience is led to assume that Thomas’ 
reenactment of his murder of a young village girl (his “angel”) Edel forces him to 
flee his village and hide in the urban warehouse wherein he reenacts the events 
of that day ad infinitum to this day. In this sense, misterman undoes the binary 
logic of Pascal’s Wager even in its performance of it. 
In this movement through the Wager (from the “Nothing” of creation to the 
“Nobody” of audition), we can also discern a distinct engagement with the 
                                                
161 Enda Walsh, “misterman” in The Small Things and Other Plays (New York: 
Theatre Communications Group, 2011), 80. 
162 Ibid., 116. 
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psychoanalytic trope of the Oedipus Complex, especially as processed through 
(and exteriorized in) the Superego of tape-recorded voices from the past that 
“return to haunt” Thomas for his misdeeds. As the action of the play unfolds, the 
audience encounters a few moments where, despite older Thomas’ meticulous 
design, the village adults (Mr. McAnerny, are heard on tape admonishing young 
Thomas on tape. Moving from Mr. McAnerny’s more vague scolding (“I’m saying 
it for your own good, all right? Do you hear me, Thomas? […] This behavior has 
to stop.”163) to Mrs. McDonnell’s more pointed inquiries about his slaying of a 
neighborhood dog (“… is it true enough? Did you really kill him Thomas?”164) and 
finally culminating in a staged confrontation with the entire town near the climax 
of the dramatic action wherein, as the script notes, “A cacophony of voices is 
heard—the voices of the people of Inishfree judging him, mocking him.”165 We 
learn gradually throughout the play of Thomas’ physically and emotionally 
abusive father not only in his own emotional outbursts toward his mother in 
reenactment, but also in subtle hints in descriptions of the father by others. This 
is perhaps rendered most clearly in Thomas’ reenactment of a conversation with 
Simple Eamon Moran, wherein the latter says, ”You wouldn’t want to cross your 
Daddy. He could crush walnuts with his little finger, couldn’t he Tommy? ‘There 
                                                
163 Ibid., 89. 
164 Ibid., 101. 
165 Ibid., 112. 
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isn’t a walnut safe in Inishfree’, he used to say.”166 The virility attributed by the 
son and others to the father underscores the tension in Thomas’ own inability to 
fully contain his own Creation, which always threatens to spin out of his control. 
Moreover, Thomas’ relationship with the mother exudes a palpably libidinous 
quality, most explicitly evident in his reenactment of a massage: “Time to take 
your top off, Mammy! THOMAS lifts up an enormous tub of Swarfega. He opens 
it and begins to massage it into the table. We can hear MAMMY groan for some 
time.”167 This libidinally charged moment with Mammy immediately erupts into 
one of Thomas’ fantasies of himself in Heaven looking on the village, otherwise 
consistently associated with his love object in “Angel” Edel. Thomas’ strict 
religiosity does not permit these libidinal impulses to achieve full sexual 
expression, so he wavers between a marked fetishization of innocence in Edel 
and acting out aggressively when this ideal vision of her is punctured. All of this 
taken together suggests an Oedipal conflict at the heart of misterman that recalls 
not only Hamlet’s own conflicted relationship with his mother in William 
Shakespeare’s revenge tragedy as well as Woyzeck’s troubled relationship with, 
and murder of, Marie in Georg Büchner’s unfinished dramatic text. 
In misterman, these all-too-familiar human tropes encounter their 
technological other in tape recording and playback. This encounter returns us to 
                                                
166 Ibid., 92. 
167 Ibid., 103. 
   190 
 
familiar conceptual territory. In the first chapter, I traced the transductive 
relationship between human corporeality and tape through the concept of trauma 
in Steve Reich and Primo Levi. In the second chapter, I examined failure and 
technological performance in relation to Samuel Beckett’s tape plays and 
introduced Bernard Stiegler’s notion of industrialized memory. The third chapter 
developed these ideas further through Brian Eno’s and Alvin Lucier’s tape works 
by revisiting Reich’s “gradual processes” in the context of Stiegler’s tertiary 
memory and Gilbert Simondon’s phase shift. Here, I would like to more carefully 
consider the relationship between psychoanalysis and tape recording, by looking 
closely at a particular work by Jean-François Lyotard that brings psychoanalysis 
and the philosophy of technology I have been tracing together. This will also 
opportune historiographic considerations of recording and psychoanalysis in 
relation to important conversations in performance studies, particularly in the 
work of Peggy Phelan and Rebecca Schneider. I will return to the latter 
momentarily in my analysis of the play itself, but I would first like to turn to 
Lyotard’s synthesis of Stiegler and Freud. In a conference paper entitled “Logos 
and Techne, or Telegraphy” (1986), Lyotard differentiates three technological 
processes of memory or “memory-effects” as follows: “breaching [frayage], 
scanning and passing, which coincide more or less with three very different sorts 
of temporal synthesis linked to inscription: habit, remembering [rémémoration] 
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and anamnesis.”168 Following Bernard Stiegler’s theorizations of technology and 
the human in Technics and Time (3 vols., 1994, 1996, 2001), Lyotard conceives 
technology in terms of “an ‘objectification’ – i.e., a spatialization – of meaning, 
whose model is writing itself.”169 In his work, Stiegler critiques the reductive 
Western subject/object approach taken up by techno-science, which positions 
technology as mere instrument, i.e. as teleological extension of human will, 
industry, progress, reason, etc. Lyotard’s argument in “Logos and Techne” traces 
the broader contours of Stiegler’s thesis, which rethinks technologies as 
exteriorizations of human memory and, as such, constitutive of human 
spatiotemporal experience. For Lyotard, “new technologies” also function as 
exteriorizations of human memory insofar as they provide the material supports 
for these “temporal syntheses” (habit, remembering, and anamnesis). He maps 
these three syntheses onto the operative processes of memory in Sigmund 
Freud’s psychoanalytic technique: repeating, remembering, and working-through. 
The psychoanalytic model positions repeating as a memory that recurs through 
symptomatic action or “acting out,” remembering as the analysand’s voluntary 
and conscious recollection in free association through which the analyst traces 
                                                
168 Jean-François Lyotard, “Logos and Techné, or Telegraphy” in The Inhuman: 
Reflections on Time, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1992), 48. 
169 Ibid., 47. 
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the movement of the unconscious, and working-through as a process by which 
the analysand slowly overcomes his or her own resistances by means of 
accepting a the analyst’s interpretation of his underlying conflict. 
The three sections of this chapter that follow below treat each of these 
processes separately via an analysis of misterman. The play positions tape 
technology as not only a material support for the main character’s memory, but 
also (and perhaps even more prominently than Beckett’s tape plays) as an 
interlocutor in reenactment. The mise-en-scène of misterman carefully frames 
the theatricality of the performance space within an accumulation of lived reality:  
Pre-show and we’re looking at an abandoned depot/dilapidated 
factory. The space immediately feels inhabitable and dangerous 
with electrical cables everywhere. And yet dotted about it are small 
tiny ‘stages’, pristine in comparison to the surrounding debris. It 
suggests that someone is trying to live and has lived here for some 
time.170 
Similar to Beckett’s Krapp’s Last Tape, temporality accumulates in the 
performance space in an abundance of physical matter. The audience perceives 
that a human being has “lived here for some time” not only from the sheer 
volume of refuse piled up in this abandoned industrial interior, but also from 
those “tiny ‘stages’” that mark a rational, differentiating force long at work in 
                                                
170 Walsh, “misterman,” 77. 
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organizing the space. The electrical cables snaking through it, on the other hand, 
lend to it an ambiguous quality of being both “inhabitable and dangerous.” 
Properly channeled and contained, the electricity coursing through these wires 
supplies the comforts of modern living, but when unharnessed, this same energy 
promises almost certain death. The ambivalence bound up in these cables thus 
marks a human trace, i.e. the presence of “someone” in absence. The human is 
very much in evidence in the organized non-living, inhuman matter of the space, 
i.e. concretized in those technologies that differentiate it  (“debris,” ‘stages’), 
define its spatiotemporal limits (walls,  “dilapidated” industrial architecture), and 
connect it to the energies of an outside world (lights, electrical cables). Only once 
the lights that present this empty space to the audience “go down and fade back 
up,” does the trace of the human find presence in a human body: the principal 
character Thomas, a “thirty-three-year-old man […] standing in the space facing 
us out of breath and sweating.”171 
The action of the play reveals that the “tiny ‘stages’” scattered throughout 
the heaped debris of the performance space function, for the principal character 
Thomas Magill, as makeshift sites for reenacting memories: the kitchen in his 
childhood home, the street where he encounters various townsfolk, the cemetery 
that houses his father’s grave, Simple Eamon Moran’s garage, Mrs. Cleary’s 
café, the school hall that hosts a dance for Thomas’ peers, and a special spot 
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along the bank of a river that runs near the village. Thomas has arranged each of 
his “stages” around a reel-to-reel tape machine that plays back recorded events 
and conversations from a single fateful day in his rural Irish village of Inishfree. 
The frenzied action of misterman unfolds through Thomas’ staged interactions 
with these recorded sounds and voices from his past, props fashioned from the 
refuse cluttering his physical environment, and the tape recorders themselves. 
Over the course of this one man show, Thomas darts from “stage” to “stage” 
starting and stopping tape recorders, synchronizing his physical performance to 
these recorded memories of a single day in his life in rural Ireland: sometimes 
positioning the tape-recorded voices as his interlocutors and, at others, fully 
embodying those voices as characters and imitating them with his own voice. In 
this re-performance of the quotidian, Thomas’ raw physicality often erupts into 
aggression and violence even to the point of material destruction (tape recorders 
smashed by the blows of a hammer) and self-harm (knuckles bloodied from 
punching the floor). Ultimately, the rhythms of the performance rush toward two 
reenacted memories of extreme violence: Thomas’ kicking and punching of a 
villager’s dog to death and his bludgeoning and murder of a young girl named 
Edel with his portable tape recorder.  
The layered reenactments of place in misterman intermingle the brute 
physical reality of violence with the troubled inner emotional space of the main 
character Thomas. Its reenactment of the rural quotidian through the movements 
of a violently disturbed young man layers reality with fantasy and recollected 
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memory. Geographically speaking, Innisfree refers to a small, densely wooded 
island in Lough Gill on the western coast of Ireland notably uninhabited by 
human beings. W.B. Yeat’s poem “The Lake Isle of Innisfree” (1888) pastoralizes 
the island as a bucolic landscape where its narrator builds a small cabin in which 
can spend time in peaceful isolation from modern civilization. John Ford’s film 
The Quiet Man (1952), starring John Wayne as a retired Irish-born American 
boxer named Sean Thornton travelling back home to his place of birth, 
reimagines Yeats’ Innisfree as a small village wherein Wayne’s character must 
take up fist-fighting one last time to reclaim his Irish birthright and heritage. 
Ford’s film was based on a 1933 short story of the same title by Maurice Walsh 
(no relation to the playwright) and inspired by a popular song called “The Isle of 
Innisfree.” The song, originally written and composed in 1950 by Irish songwriter 
Dick Farrelly and rerecorded by Bing Crosby for Ford’s film, imagines the Isle 
through the eyes of an Irish exile longing for home. Through these intertextual 
and intercultural layerings, Thomas’ Inishfree (its spelling adds the “h” already 
audible in the Irish pronunciation) emerges as a readymade cultural metonym of 
Ireland steeped in premodern rural landscapes, regressive feudal ideals, and 
patriarchal nostalgia. In misterman, Thomas’ moralizing gaze reframes Inishfree 
as a composite of Eden and Sodom: a site of innocence and purity always 
already poised on the brink of hypocrisy and moral corruption. The disjointed 
structure of misterman’s narrative—characterized by sudden shifts in tone and 
mood, episodic recurrences, and frequent bursts of violence that nonetheless 
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accumulate toward a climax—brings these various elements together in a 
theatrical rumination upon the interrelationships of tape technology, human 
memory, and reenactment.  
Breaching, Repeating, Reenacting 
Lyotard links repetition to a natural process of breaching (observable in 
cellular mitosis, neural pathways, natural selection, social organization, etc.) 
which is “a putting into series of elements”172 that interact with one another by 
reciprocally determining their positions and relationships. In Lyotard’s 
assessment, new technologies adapt biological and social breaching processes 
through a ‘delocalization’ and ‘detemporalization’ of human neural and social 
networks (in our contemporary age, we are already in the habit of assuming the 
latter to be technological) in electronic information networks. This transformation 
proposes a new telegraphic model of memory as “writing at a distance,” that is, 
“freed from the supposedly immediate conditions of time and space.” In what 
Lyotard calls “telegraphic culture,” the human and the social body thus 
calls up a spontaneous production of the past in habit, a tradition of 
transmission of ways of thinking, willing and feeling, a sort of 
breaching, then which complicates, neutralizes and extenuates 
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earlier community breachings and in any case translates them so 
as to move them on too, make them transmissible.173 
If, in the psychoanalytic model, repeating refers to a psychic process of 
conversion that translates an unconscious idea into a symptomatic action (i.e. a 
compulsively repeated gesture or attitude or, as Freud describes it, “acting out”), 
telegraphic culture appropriates breaching in the transmission of spontaneously 
repeatable habits, customs, attitudes. 
In misterman, breaching or repeating manifests most clearly in Thomas’ 
mimetic performances of other characters. A key moment in the “prologue” set 
apart from the rest of the play by a ritualistic performance that I will address in 
detail later, establishes for the audience the mimetic conventions of 
impersonation: 
THOMAS fast forwards it and stops it. We hear the voice of DWAIN 
FLYNN. 
DWAIN FLYNN ON TAPE (screams). Are you recordin’ this? Once 
more for the record? You’re not fuckin’ wanted…! 
He fast forwards the tape again and stops. 
DWAIN FLYNN ON TAPE. And don’t ever stand there! 
Thomas stops the tape. Stands and looks to a spot beneath the 
platform. He impersonates DWAIN. 
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THOMAS. And don’t ever stand there! 
He spits. 
Good!174 
The presence of the tape recorder on the stage here and throughout the play 
reframes the conventions of the “one-person show” such that the usual change in 
position or comportment of the performer’s body, which signifies for the audience 
a switch in character, takes on more mechanical valence in its correspondence to 
the switch of the reel-to-reel. Thomas’ “impersonation” of Dwain Flynn registers 
not merely as a shift in characterization, but also as a vocal performance that 
mimics a recorded voice invested with the authority of documentary reality. This 
investment of the tape recording with the authenticity of the “real” is, of course, 
always already present for the audience in its identifications of tape technology 
with journalistic practice and criminal investigation: respectively, the “recorded 
interview” and the “surveillance tape.” Thomas’ performance after Dwain’s 
recorded voice—both in terms of its temporal succession and its performative 
labor of verisimilitude—redoubles the associations between the real and the 
document as well as the body and the theatrical. The “authentic” inheres in the 
past made present in sound by the material support of memory (tape), while 
Thomas’ performing body merely repeats a convincing imitation. In this sense, 
repetition in misterman turns on a switch between recording and performance, 
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reality and memory, document and reenactment. Here, this switch not only 
toggles between temporalities (the reel-time of the recorded past in playback and 
the repeated reenactment in the present), but also marks the spatio-temporal 
disorientation of playback. Upon first hearing the recorded prohibition, “Don’t ever 
stand there” the audience can infer that it means Thomas should not remain, or 
“ever” return to that particular point in space that they lack the visual context to 
establish. Thomas begins his reenactment with a gesture—he “looks to a spot 
beneath the platform” on which he stands—that reestablishes the spatial 
relationship between characters for the audience. Thomas’ imitation not only 
repeats the recording but also effectively overwrites the disorientation induced by 
recording’s disembodiment of the voice. It achieves this by re-embodying the 
voice of the absent interlocutor through the spatializing gesture of performance. 
 Outside of this initial framing moment, misterman presents the labor of 
repetition as a more integrated process of temporal switching and spatial re-
embodiment. In its most seamless moments, repetition works as a perfectly 
timed layering of recording and reenactment: 
He hits the play button on another reel-to-reel. He unlocks some 
invisible locks on an invisible door. The sound of the outside world 
from the recorder. THOMAS ‘steps outside.’ 
Car. 
 The sound of the car. 
Dog. 
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The sound of a dog. 
Billy. 
BILLY ON TAPE. How’ya Thomas!  
THOMAS. Hiya Billy! (Slight pause.) I feel the door the front door’s 
gentle shove behind me as I step out into Inishfree. The Lord God 
at my side… the day open and big! 
He adopts a suitable voice for Mrs. O’Leary. 
‘Oh the cold Thomas!’ 
Are ya full of the cold, Mrs. O’Leary?175 
In the first part of this sequence, a recurring transition establishes the “street 
scene” through a tightly ordered routine of playback, gesture, and verbal cue 
that, in this particular instance, opens flawlessly onto a spoken “dialogue” 
between Thomas and his impersonation of Mrs. O’Leary. (Per the conventions of 
the script, single quotation marks designate Thomas’ impersonations, while all 
lines not assigned to him are “spoken” by the tape machines.) His switching-on 
the tape recorder sets the scene in motion and (re)establishes his control over 
staged events. This street scene recurs three times with little variation, but the 
positioning of the second and third iterations after scenes of extreme emotion 
registers an affective difference in heightened dramatic tension from each to the 
next. The first scene quoted above follows an innocuous domestic scene that 
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ends in Thomas wishing his Mammy (who is “performed” by the “kitchen” reel-to-
reel) a pleasant farewell before stepping out for the day. The second picks up the 
context of the first—a domestic scene between Thomas and his Mammy (again 
“performed” by the tape machine)—but quickly escalates in emotional intensity 
when Thomas loses his temper over the gas bill and screams verbal abuse at the 
reel-Mammy; his noisy performance rouses the stray dogs living outside the 
abandoned factory/depot in which Thomas presently squats and in which the 
audience presently views his performance:  
THOMAS looks toward the metal door to the outside and shouts. 
THOMAS. Come on then—HOUND! 
He races to the door and smashes it with his fist. The dogs go 
crazy. THOMAS starts smashing the door and barking back at the 
dogs. 
MAMMY (crying). What are we going to do now, Thomas? What 
are we going to do… 
The music and the dogs swell. THOMAS turns back into the huge 
space he has created. A sudden power surge and the space is 
calling him back. THOMAS head drops as the music, dogs, lights 
continue aggressively. 
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Suddenly he walks up to the ‘street’ reel-to-reel and turns it on. 
THOMAS’s demeanour, bright and excited now as he opens those 
invisible locks on the invisible door.176 
From here the “street scene” repeats exactly as before, but opens onto Billy’s 
confrontation of Timmy O’Leary regarding the latter’s poor treatment of his own 
mother “like a dog” (more on this later). Unlike the previously noted transition, 
however, the switching-on of the “street” reel in this moment does not flow 
smoothly from the preceding action: Thomas approaches the metal door to 
antagonize the dogs “outside” the performance space only to turn “back into the 
huge space” of reenactment which is “calling him back.” Here, Thomas’ careful 
synchronization of temporalities—the “reel-time” of the recorded past in playback 
and the present of Thomas’ reenactment of himself-past—ruptures and moves 
out of phase with itself. His reenactment of the past intrudes upon the present, 
which in turn imposes itself upon the reenactment. Thomas’ turning-on the 
“street” reel, of course, marks a restoration of order by re-synchronizing those 
temporalities, even as his volatile actions threaten to peel them apart again.  
 I would like to dwell in this moment of Thomas’ “turning back” to the “huge 
space he has created” and the space’s reciprocal action of “calling him back.” 
Here, I invite the reader to recall Lyotard’s concept of breaching as not only a 
“putting into series” of elements (which maps pretty clearly onto Thomas’ “putting 
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into series” of spatiotemporal events by controlling the play’s narrative), but as a 
very particular sort of ordering that positions these elements in reciprocal 
relationships. Though Thomas’ constant tweaking of reel-to-reel transport 
controls (on/off, rewind/fast-forward), his meticulous arrangements of his living 
space in “tiny stages”, and his carefully synchronized reenactments all 
emphasize an effort toward mastery of time and space, the reciprocity between 
the space’s calling Thomas back and his own act of turning back to the space 
folds Thomas back into the process of reenactment. For Thomas, “turning back” 
is thus a re-turning to the repetition of a reenactment. In turning back at the metal 
door rather than walking through it, Thomas never traverses that boundary that 
would grant him access to some transcendent outside to the space of his 
memory. In her book Performing Remains (2011), Rebecca Schneider speaks of 
reenactment in terms of “a theatrical switch, a coup de théâtre, by which ‘now’ 
speaks or calls forward to (and through) ‘then’ in gestures that are not only a 
reiterative response (as a copy appears to cite an original) but also call toward 
the past’s future reply.”177 In context, Schneider’s analysis here refers to the 
Wooster Group’s Poor Theater (2003), which expressly engages the relationship 
between recording and live performance by projecting James Taggart’s 1968 film 
version of Jerzy Grotowski’s 1967 treatment of Stanislaw Wyspianski’s 1904 play 
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Akropolis while members of the Wooster Group reenact the film live onstage. As 
Schneider notes, director Elizabeth LeCompte’s careful attention to the layered 
temporalities within the live reenactment of a documented performance reframes 
Grotowski’s famous quote “I’m speaking to my ancestors” as a “mode of arguing” 
that (Schneider cites Jacques Derrida’s Archive Fever here) “‘dislocates the 
linear order of presents.’”178 In misterman, Thomas’ return to the “street” reel—
which effectively (and affectively) switches off the argument in his Mammy’s 
kitchen—marks a coup de théâtre that cuts short one violent dialogue between 
past and present and turns yet again to another: a “stepping outside,” a 
momentary reprieve that only returns Thomas to a confrontation with his past. 
“To speak to something is not necessarily to speak together, but to call to an 
auditor and demand an ear – to hail the object of the call […] into the congress of 
future reply,” Schneider’s analysis of Poor Theatre continues, “bringing it forward 
into being beside itself, as it were, subject and subjected to itself.”179  The coup 
de théâtre in misterman functions similarly in that Thomas calls his auditors from 
the past through playback and brings them forward into through reenactment, but 
since (as a matter of principle) these do not occur simultaneously, Walsh’s play 
adds an extra switch that oscillates between playback and reenactment. This 
extra switch grants Thomas an illusion of control, but also positions him as 
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“subject and subjected to” the call of the space. Since Thomas does not, cannot 
resist the space’s calling him back to reenactment and since his violent “acting-
out” persistently unsettles the process of that reenactment, repetition/breaching 
in misterman is neither merely automatism nor simply voluntary. 
Scanning, Remembering  
Unlike breaching, as Lyotard argues, the process of scanning has no 
analogue in biological adaptation, but rather marks the limit of the human 
species, i.e. the threshold of its differentiation from other animal species. 
Following Stiegler, who positions technology as material support of human 
memory (retention) rather than as instrumental object of human subjectivity or 
will (intention), Lyotard understands scanning as a thoroughly technological 
memory process that constitutes the human experience of space and time in an 
active selection and organization of non-living matter. For Lyotard, as for Stiegler, 
this human experience of space and time in the era of industrialized memory—
that is, since the advent of “industrial temporal objects” such as film and 
phonographic records in the late-nineteenth century—is marked by an 
heightened emphasis on the speed of accessing and retrieving information that 
approaches that of light itself (“real time”). The word “scanning” itself marks an 
emphasis on speed. If the orthographic mode of remembering (i.e. reading and 
writing) is concretized in the material support of the book or the writing pad, then 
its telegraphic mode (i.e. storage and retrieval) is concretized in that of the 
electronic database. As I have already outlined in previous chapters, the 
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“inscriptive surface” of the electronic database is ferro-magnetic material and the 
storage and retrieval process functions according to principles first developed for 
analog tape recording and playback, then adapted for binary digital coding. As 
Lyotard notes, “remembering implies not only the retention of the past in the 
present as present, but the synthesis of the past as such and its reactualization 
in the present (of consciousness).”180 A major challenge that scanning, as the 
technological complement to human remembering, poses is the narrowing 
spatiotemporal gap between the “retention of the past in the present” (i.e. as an 
accessible industrial temporal object) and its “synthesis” or “reactualization in the 
present” (i.e. in the process of retrieval). Lyotard poses the problem thus:  
It is clear that with techno-science in its current state, it is a power 
to ‘put in series’ that is at work on planet earth, and that the human 
race is its vehicle much more that its beneficiary. The human race 
has to ‘dehumanize’ itself, in the sense that it is still a bio-cultural 
species, so as to arise to the new complexity, so as to become tele-
graphic.181 
The fast-rewind and fast-forward transport controls of the reel-to-reel or cassette 
player, of course, clearly mark the function of scanning in tape technology. 
Scanning through a length of tape thus also implies a spatiotemporal 
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reorientation of human memory (a “dehumanizing”), since the operator calibrates 
his or her recollection to the speed of the tape machine’s transport controls. Not 
only this, but the operator also adapts by measuring his or her remembering out 
in spatiotemporal intervals: lengths of tape moving back and forth over the 
playback head, widths of tape remaining on supply and takeup reels, durations 
and sequences of blurred sounds, etc. For the tape operator, becoming “tele-
graphic” thus entails precise timing and spacing. 
misterman most clearly presents the scanning process in a single 
concentrated episode comprising the second half of the prologue, wherein 
Thomas searches preloaded tape reels for recorded material from his past. In the 
previous section, I isolated one moment from this larger sequence—Thomas’ 
playback and imitation of Dwain Flynn’s voice—and I now expand my focus to 
the surrounding material: 
He […] walks up a stairs that leads to a crumbling platform. Up 
there he sits behind a table with two reel-to-reels on it. 
THOMAS. Hello everyone! 
He turns on both machines and gets to work. We hear the voice of 
Simple Eamon Moran. 
SIMPLE EAMON MORAN ON TAPE. Aren’t ya talkin’ to me 
anymore? Why’d you run away from the garage…? …no need for 
it. 
THOMAS fast forwards it and stops it. 
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SIMPLE EAMON MORAN ON TAPE. …and will ya be goin’ to the 
dance in the school hall tonight, Starsky? 
THOMAS fast forwards it and stops it. We hear the voice of DWAIN 
FLYNN. […Dwain Flynn episode cut here…] He sits and fast 
forwards the tape. He stops and plays it. We hear the voice of 
MRS. O’DONNELL. 
MRS. O’DONNELL ON TAPE. …and maybe it’s best you went 
home. 
THOMAS. Yes! 
He’s found what he’s looking for. THOMAS rewinds it and stops. 
We hear more of MRS. O’DONNELL. 
MRS. O’DONNELL ON TAPE. You’ve takin’ things too far. Jesus 
look at your face—there’s still blood—you need help, Thomas. 
Don’t be goin’ inside the Hall. Maybe it’s best you went home, love. 
THOMAS stops both machines and stands up. He pauses and 
looks down at them momentarily. He places the chair in a definite 
position. He then takes a tape recorder in a canvas sling and puts it 
over his shoulder, securing it to his belt like a holster. Carefully he 
places a cassette tape in the machine. He pats it gently.182  
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On the most basic level, this part of the prologue establishes the narrative device 
of playback and reenactment for the audience, while also building anticipation 
and suspense in the plot by presenting de-contextualized excerpts from scenes 
staged later in full. Moreover, the ordered selection of spoken excerpts here lays 
out a condensed arc of the story, moving the audience chronologically forward 
and rapidly through time (Eamon, fast-forward/stop/play, Eamon again, fast-
forward/stop/play, Dwain Flynn, fast-forward/stop/play) until Thomas finds a 
particular moment of interest and then corrects by scanning again slightly 
backwards to more precisely locate its beginning (Mrs. O’Donnell, 
rewind/stop/play). This chronological acceleration through time, marked sonically 
by the blurred, vaguely rhythmic electronic warble of playback in fast-forward, 
presents causality in a decidedly linear sequence on a timeline pinned down to 
particular places (garage, school hall, home). Each of the voices played back 
here speaks to, or inquires after, Thomas’ movements—“run away from the 
garage […] goin’ to the dance […] went home”—and he reenacts all these later 
dashing to and fro between the ‘stages’ he has “dotted about”183 the performance 
space. The narrative of misterman—i.e. the selection and ordering of events 
partially under Thomas’ control, but frequently veering violently off track and 
beyond his ability to master them—proceeds much more haphazardly as it 
switches from ostensibly chronological sequences of events to series of episodes 
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more associatively linked, usually through violent acts and affects. Moreover, the 
narrative also frequently erupts into fantasy, as in Thomas’ visions from Heaven 
looking down on Innishfree, or drifts into a multilayered space of re-imagined 
remembering, most clearly evinced in his various interactions with his “angel” 
Edel. In short, the process of scanning presented to the audience in the prologue 
as chronological, linear, and teleological does not so easily map onto Thomas’ 
more jagged process of remembering throughout the rest of the play. Rather, 
scanning manifests on the stage as a more interactive process that switches 
between the human actor and the tape player. 
The ubiquitous presence of the cassette recorder slung talisman-like 
across Thomas’ chest throughout the performance, not only persistently 
underscores tape’s status as an active, creative force of memory in the play—in 
playback and reenactment, Thomas’ interlocutor, and in recording, his co-
conspirator in remembering—but simultaneously figures the machine as a 
potentially destructive, violent force: in the closing image of the prologue, 
secured to his belt “like a holster” and loaded with a cassette like a weapon. The 
persistent interweaving of fantasy and remembering and of the performance 
space with Thomas’ inner emotional landscape in misterman situates a 
fundamental ambiguity around questions of agency and automation in the play.  
The intense interplay between Thomas and his array of tape machines in the 
processes of breaching and scanning persistently poses the question as which 
actively remembers and which passively repeats. In defiance of both rational 
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logic and Thomas’ own design, the tape machines “magically” switch on and play 
back, seemingly of their own volition, at several crucial turning points in the 
narrative. Perhaps the most striking instance of this picks up the third repetition 
of the “street” scene sets into motion the final climax of the play: 
THOMAS turns off the reel-to-reel in the kitchen. He kisses the 
table like he was kissing the top of her [Mammy’s] head. 
He walks out of this space. He barely bothers with the ‘locks on the 
door.’ He steps to the outside. The street reel-to-reel magically 
turns on. 
The sound of a car passing. 
The sound of a dog barking. 
The sound of BILLY saying hello. 
BILLY ON TAPE. Howya Thomas! 
THOMAS. I feel the front door’s gentle shove behind me as I step 
out into Inishfree. My town. (Slight pause) I look across the road at 
the queue to get inside the Hall.184 
Yet again, we see Thomas, leaving his mother’s house (more calmly and 
deliberately this time) and stepping out into the “street.” Despite his forgetting to 
switch on the tape machine, it activates itself automatically. Unlike the previous 
two repetitions of the street scene, Thomas here no longer verbally cues car, 
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dog, and Billy before they sound. This underscores the crucial ambiguity of 
Thomas’ verbal cueing of sounds: where can one locate Thomas’ agency (or lack 
thereof) in missing his cue to verbally cue recorded sounds already playing 
back? Does he drop the lines in a deliberate attempt rush through the transition 
into the next scene or does he forget his lines in surprise of the “magical” 
automatic playback? Further, how does Thomas not merely repeat after the 
recording (following the “reel”) in the previous two iterations of the “street” scene? 
Where does human agency fall in reenactment? Where does it arise in 
remembering through playback? Further emphasizing this gap between (or 
overlap in) breaching and scanning, Thomas’ usual confidence in trajectory that 
follows his verbatim repetition of the transitional line (“I feel the door’s gentle 
shove…”) encounters a “slight pause” before finding its orientation: the Hall, the 
site of the community dance and of Thomas’ confrontation with the jeering 
townspeople (likely a composite of several encounters staged here for the 
audience in retrospect, as a delusion or fantasy). For the audience, the meaning 
and purpose of this “slight pause” remains as ambiguous as the (missed) verbal 
cues: could this interval be a hesitation in thought that marks Thomas’ conscious 
decision to follow his fate, or might it accent a dramatic pause that reveals the 
larger theatrical apparatus that at work in compelling him remember? These 
questions remain unanswered on the stage and ever present in the minds of the 
audience. The fundamental ambiguity of these moments crystallizes the play’s 
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constant switching between human control and automation, agency and 
instrumentality, remembering and repeating. 
 
Working Through, Passing, Reworking 
 Lyotard describes the third and final memory process, passing, as “a 
technique with no rule, or a negative rule, deregulation. A generativity with, if 
possible, no set-up other than the absence of set-up.”185 Unlike breaching and 
scanning, which function in accordance their own psychological mechanisms—
respectively, the repeated symptomatic gesture and remembering/recollection—
passing involves a much more complex and multi-leveled process of less 
identifiable as a singular mechanism and more along the lines of pure 
expenditure of energy irreducible, as Lyotard notes to an inscriptive support, i.e. 
a technology per se. As Lyotard notes, the point of passing “is to pass beyond 
synthesis in general. Or, if you like, to pass beyond the reminder of what has 
been forgotten. The point would be to recall what could not have been forgotten 
because it was not inscribed.’”186 While both breaching and scanning both entail 
some process of inscription (the repeated act inscribes the idea in a gesture, 
remembering traces the unconscious through free association), passing moves 
beyond techne and logos and instead seeks “a breaking presence which is never 
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inscribed nor memorable. It does not appear. It is not a forgotten inscription, it 
does not have its place and time on the support of inscriptions.”187  This breaking 
presence thus registers not so much as an inscription that marks the human in 
the technological (or vice versa) but rather as an originary act of violence that 
“broke the support of the writing or the memory,”188 a shattered surface from 
which we might only infer an event of breaking. Psychoanalysis designates this 
process, which excludes an inscrutable violent event even from inscription in the 
unconscious itself, as a primal repression. Furthermore, this violent blow 
constitutes the psychic mechanisms that operate henceforth—the repeating 
symptom, the memory-trace, even the unconscious itself—and as such remains 
inaccessible. 
To survey and assess this violent event of breaking that constitutes the 
operations of signification itself, Lyotard summons the psychoanalytic framework 
of Nachträglichkeit—translated from the German into French as après-coup, 
which in English means “a blow that comes after”—but challenges idea of a “first 
blow” that echoes through those inscriptive memory processes (symptomatic 
actions, memory traces in free association) that follow from it. He questions this 
because the “first blow” does not fall on the same surface as “later” inscriptions, 
but rather constitutes the very conditions of possibility for the inscriptive surface 
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of memory itself. Since the “first blow” (a mark, an inscription) cannot register as 
such, the constituting violence that gives inscription its force and shape remains 
beyond representation. In Lyotard’s critique of representation, the 
unrepresentable is that which remains within systems of inscription, not as a 
trace but as a momentary interruption of signification. As such, this interruption 
presents the unrepresentable constituting force through which inscriptive memory 
functions. Since this something (“let’s call it something,” Lyotard suggests) resists 
representation by interrupting it, it registers in discourse as a silence, a noise, a 
beat that disturbs the rational flow of inscription. Since, as Lyotard suggests, the 
surface of discourse is cracked, not smooth, one senses the presence of the 
unrepresentable in encountering the break, which is to say the breaking down of 
inscription. It should come as little surprise, then, why Lyotard, in refusing to 
resolve the problem of the “first blow” (which for him remains the central problem 
of Western metaphysics), merely gestures toward the psychoanalytic technique 
of “listening with the third ear, removing all the prescriptions of the other two 
(stopping them up), abandoning the already established syntheses, at whatever 
level: logical, rhetorical and even linguistic.”189 “Listening with the third ear,” 
borrowed from a 1948 book by psychoanalyst Theodor Reik that bears this 
concept as its title, refers a process of transference wherein the analyst’s 
unconscious connects to that of the analysand in the process of listening. Rather 
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focusing on the structure or content of free association, the third ear follows the 
affective rhythms of the patient, through cracks in the voice, the breaks in and 
breaking down of speech, the beating of the unconscious. I thus understand the 
memory process that Lyotard calls passing as the ear’s gliding along these 
ruptures, breaks, and breakdowns that present the unrepresentable in affective 
rhythms. 
The beating of the unconscious described above, the affective rhythms 
that spread through misterman consistently pass through and approach the 
question of violence. As I have already suggested in the previous sections of this 
chapter, the play stages violence in reenactment and plays it back in recollection. 
In the introduction I named the two violent acts around which the action of the 
play turns: the beating to death of a neighborhood dog and the bludgeoning 
murder of young girl from the village of Innishfree. In misterman, there’s no 
question as to what violence is represented. The question of its significance for 
Thomas is slightly more interesting and the play might be read as process of the 
main character’s working through his guilt for committing these acts of violence. 
Further, we could trace the workings of the character’s unconscious through the 
play to arrive and infer some constituting act of violence that drives and shapes 
Thomas’ violent actions. The play certainly invites this interpretation. By the 
playwright Enda Walsh’s design, the narrative of misterman takes us through 
Thomas’ journey in reenacting his violent past and, along the way, leaves subtle 
hints of the character’s own abuse by his deceased father. Following these 
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traces, however, only reproduces in criticism the conscious intention of Walsh. 
We could also dig through Walsh’s own past and arrive at some secret that might 
reveal to us how the violence of this play relates to his own worldly experience. 
We might even consider Walsh’s own stated reason for writing the play—“I tried 
to take a hammer to rural Ireland” and use it to draw out the significance of 
bludgeoning—in the play, for the author, in the cultural imagination of rural 
Ireland, etc. These are all valid and important readings, but they all approach the 
same goal of representing some underlying violence, giving it a singular name. In 
“depth analyses” such these, we move immediately past the surface and search 
for the secret that lies beneath, the truth deferred, but ultimately accessible, by 
following routines, traces, actions etc. I would like to resist the singularity that this 
process implies by passing through each, by listening for and following the 
rhythms that course through them. 
My resistance here thus seeks to follow the rhythms of play’s owns 
resistances, which we might pick up first by posing the question again: why tape 
in this play? One immediate response might read as some version of the 
following: tape represents human memory in the play in that its primary 
processes of recording and playback stand in for the inscriptive apparatus of 
human memory. This is the course I have traced through Lyotard’s ideas so far in 
this chapter, but along the way I have tried to underscore the importance of how 
the relationship between tape and human memory in misterman perturbs the 
question of staged representation. The play clearly identifies tape with the 
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apparatus of the theatre: playback functions not only as Thomas’ interlocutor, but 
also as his scenic and sound design assistant. However, the action of the play 
persistently presents the apparatus as one that breaks down, repeats itself, and 
beats against linear chronology with a muted violence that always threatens to 
disrupt representation. The associative link between the tape recorder and 
violence, framed early on in the play in the image of Thomas’ portable tape 
recorder as weapon, culminates in the final moments of the play when Thomas 
brutally bludgeons his “good angel” the young girl Edel to death, first with his 
fists, then with his portable tape recorder. The scene unfolds as follows: 
EDEL is heard being punched hard in the face. 
THOMAS ON TAPE. Out! 
EDEL ON TAPE. Oh Jesus no…! 
THOMAS ON TAPE. OUT DEVIL OUT! 
EDEL ON TAPE (screaming). NO THOMAS STOP! HELP! 
SOMEONE HELP ME! 
THOMAS punches her again and again. 
THOMAS ON TAPE. OUT! OUT! OUT! OUT! 
A sudden horrific noise of the tape recorder smashing against her 
head. 
THOMAS ON TAPE. Help me God… Help me… 
THOMAS smashes her head with the tape recorder over and over 
and over. THOMAS listens to it for some moments until he’s heard 
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enough. He stops the cassette player. Silence. How small he looks 
in this huge space. He turns to an ‘imaginary good angel’ and tries 
so hard to lose himself back in the pretend. 
THOMAS. And now good angel… I can kiss your hand. 
He kisses the microphone. 
Everything is so right here. Because nobody’s listening. Nobody’s 
listening. Nobody’s listening. Nobody’s listening. Nobody’s 
listening… 
For all his trying to escape his past… in the moment he knows the 
fight is lost. His hand slowly holds the microphone out from his 
body. He drops it. It smashes against the ground. Blackout.190  
In this closing scene, violent human action and tape technology intersect in a 
brutal beating and murder. The final stage directions (“for all his trying to escape 
his past”) would initially seem to position this scene as a psychic “first blow” that 
structures Thomas’ breaching and scanning processes, which would frame the 
entire play in terms of his traumatic working through of a violent past. The 
placement of violence against women within the redemption arc of a male 
protagonist who overcomes his trauma (a function of the actual physical trauma 
he inflicts on Edel) would pose some clear ethical problems here. However, the 
status of the tape recorder as a weapon in this scene never escapes its 
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persistent reframing throughout the play as part of a transductive memory 
process which circuits from machine through body and back again. Even 
positioned as the dramatic climax of the play, the presentation of the physical 
violence here in pure playback—we hear Thomas’ voice on tape rather than 
hearing him in reenactment, we witness him listening “for some moments until 
he’s heard enough”—momentarily disrupts this transductive circuit of memory 
and relocates it in a passive act of listening-in-horror. The passivity of this scene 
thus suggests that Thomas is very much subject to his process (and the moment) 
rather than master of it in working through. In short, the “fight is lost” here, only 
because Thomas’ guilt paralyzes his action and, in the world of the play beyond 
the limits of its narrative, this scene repeats again and again without resolution. 
The fight is lost in this moment because it is always lost in this moment, but it is 
not over. It does not end here for Thomas, who resets for the next performance 
and reenacts again. 
 Even if misterman does not ultimately present itself as a working through 
in the classical psychoanalytic sense, it does approach a related process in what 
Rebecca Schneider calls reworking. In her chapter on American Civil War 
reenactments, Schneider structures most of her argument around readings and 
re-readings of three short quotations by 1) a Civil War reenactor named Chuck 
Woodhead, 2) the motto for the Association of Lincoln Presenters, and 3) artist 
Miranda July. The concept of reworking emerges from her analysis of 
Woodhead’s quotation, which reads as follows: “The Civil War isn’t over, and 
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that’s why we fight. We fight to keep the past alive.”191 In a similar way, Thomas’ 
“fight” is not to put his past to rest (to recover from some “trauma”), but to 
preserve it, “keep the past alive” through reenactment. In her analysis of 
Woodhead’s quotation, Schneider offers the following thoughts on reworking: 
it is the very pastness of the past that is never complete, never 
completely finished, but incomplete: cast into the future as a matter 
for ritual negotiation and as yet undecided interpretive acts of 
reworking. In this way, events are given to be past, or to become 
past, by virtue of both their ongoingness and their partialness, their 
incompleteness in the present.192 
In this assessment, what defines the past is not its position opposite the future 
and anterior the present on a chronological timeline, but rather its duration in and 
through the present and its fragmentary quality. These qualities of the past 
necessitate its continual reworking in an ongoing present. Schneider continues:  
If the past is never over, or never completed, “remains” might be 
understood not solely as object or document material, but also the 
immaterial labor engaged in and with that incomplete past: bodies 
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striking poses, making gestures, voicing calls, reading words, 
singing songs, or standing witness.193 
Schneider’s “remains” here and elsewhere in her book, of course, critiques 
Peggy Phelan’s positioning of performance as that which “disappears” in strict 
opposition to the “recording” or the “document,” which seeks to preserve. For 
Schneider, the “remains” of the incomplete past suffuses things, documents, 
bodies, and voices engaged in reenactment. All of these belong to the process of 
reworking. In psychoanalysis, working through processes a “good enough” 
assessment of the uninscribed violent event with the goal of helping the patient 
release him or herself from his or her symptoms. Reworking does not propose a 
teleology, but rather labors in the present through an immanent process of 
renegotiation and reinterpretation. To consider this more carefully in relation tape 
recording, we should consider Phelan’s argument more closely. 
 As mentioned above, Phelan traces the ontology of performance through 
its disappearance. The frequently quoted opening passage from chapter seven of 
her book Unmarked: the Politics of Performance (1993) reads as follows:  
Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be 
saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the 
circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it 
becomes something other than performance. To the degree that 
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performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it 
betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. Performance’s 
being, like the ontology of subjectivity proposed here, becomes 
itself through disappearance.194 
In this chapter, entitled “The Ontology of Performance: Representation Without 
Reproduction”, Phelan positions performance against195 the late capitalist 
“economy of reproduction” that circulates commodified artworks as 
representations. Phelan’s understanding of reproduction here is coded in 
decidedly visual terms—her expressed interest is in the relationships 
                                                
194 Peggy Phelan, “The Ontology of Performance: Representation Without 
Reproduction” in Unmarked: the Politics of Performance (London: Routledge, 
1993). 
195 “Performance clogs the machinery of reproductive representation necessary 
to the circulation of capital. […] Performance implicates the real through the 
presence of living bodies. In performance art spectatorship there is an element of 
consumption: there are no left-overs, the gazing spectator must try to take 
everything in. Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility – in a 
maniacally charged present – and disappears into memory, into the realm of 
invisibility and the unconscious where it eludes regulation and control. 
Performance resists the balanced circulations of finance. It saves nothing; it only 
spends.” Ibid., 148. 
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between/among painting, photography, and performance—that arguably meet 
their conceptual limit in considerations of sound. What does it mean for a voice or 
a sound to disappear or to return, for instance? Where does recorded sound fit in 
Phelan’s schema? In the very moment when Phelan’s argument in this chapter 
does touch on sound, tape technology figures (I use that word advisedly) 
prominently. She analyzes the mise-en-scène of Angelika Festa’s durational 
suspension performance Untitled Dance (with fish and others) as follows: 
The spatial arrangement of the room – with Festa in the middle, the 
feet-screen behind her and to the left, the fish tape in front of her 
and also on the left, and the time-elapsed mini-monitor directly in 
front of her and raised, forces the spectator constantly to look away 
from Festa’s suspended body. In order to look at the projected feet, 
one has to look “beyond” Festa; in order to look at the fish embryo 
tape or the video monitor recording the performance itself, one has 
to turn one’s back to her. That these projected images seem to be 
consumable while the center image is, as it were, a “blind” image, 
suggests that it is only through the second-order of re/presentation 
that we “see” anything.196 
In this analysis, Phelan rather oddly grounds the sonic experience of Untitled 
Dance in the visual figure of the tape machine, i.e. by fixing recorded sound in 
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one place “in front of her and also on the left.” Indeed, the tape machine’s 
presence in the space does calls attention to sound’s mediation through the 
process of recording, but one need not “look” at the tape to experience the sonic 
dimension of the performance. One need not even “look” at the tape player at all 
to experience sound in its recorded-ness: “the fish tape stops at precisely the 
moment the fish breaks out of the embryo; then the tape begins again.”197 One 
sonically experiences the sound-as-recording through the repetition of the tape 
loop and one need not “look away” from the screen, the monitor, or the 
suspended body of the performer to do so. Despite Phelan’s attempts to locate 
sonic experience in the physical position of the tape machine, recorded sound 
nonetheless envelops the entire performance regardless of whether one “looks” 
at the sound source. The grounding of the experience of recorded sound in the 
figure of the tape recorder thus marks the conceptual limit of Phelan’s argument 
for performance’s ontology in ephemerality and disappearance. “Performance 
occurs over a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, but this 
repetition itself marks it as ‘different,’” as Phelan notes earlier in her chapter, 
“The document of a performance is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of 
memory to become present.”198 This emphasis on repetition as “difference” that 
marks each performance from iteration to iteration arguably works within the 
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audience’s experience of the tape loop: because one does not have to “look” at 
the machine to hear its recorded sound, one encounters each repetition of the 
loop differently as one’s eyes momentarily fix on the various visual elements of 
the mise-en-scène. Is this corporeal experience of difference while listening to 
the tape loop somehow not part of the performance? Is the tape machine, like the 
suspended body, not itself a “blind spot” of sorts? Is it not always disappearing as 
the eyes turn away, even as it still remains as a trace in the sound of the tape 
loop that the ears nonetheless continually hear? To return to Schneider’s 
vocabulary, the experience of recorded sound here is “never completely 
finished,” always unfolding: a continual reworking of the recorded past in the 
present of performance. With this in mind, I propose to extend Schneider’s 
reworking to the tape recorder as well. 
In misterman, the reworking process labors, as we have seen, through a 
tension between remembering and repeating as well as a conflicted collaboration 
in listening and reenactment between Thomas and his tape machines. We can 
trace the rhythmic permutations of the violent beating death of Edel in the closing 
moments of misterman back through the rest of the play and beginning in its 
earliest moments. We can pick up the beat of this beating in the earliest action of 
the prologue (even before Thomas’ scanning routine), which unfolds as follows: 
Suddenly Doris Day can be heard singing ‘Everybody Loves a 
Lover’. THOMAS turns startled. He walks quickly towards a tape 
recorder and picks it up. He hits the stop button but nothing. He 
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unplugs it from the back but the song continues. He takes out the 
batteries but there’s no stopping Doris. He places it down on the 
ground like it was a bomb. He must try to ignore it.199 
In this moment, the energy that drives the tape recorder proceeds from neither 
wired-in nor stored electricity; its mode is neither that of breaching (putting in a 
series) nor scanning (storage and retrieval), but rather an energy that passes 
beyond these syntheses and derives from a mysterious unseen and unknowable 
force. The smooth croon of Doris Day’s voice, fully disembodied since it finds no 
representation in Thomas’ reenactments here or elsewhere, shadows the 
unrepresentable force that drives its playback. The action continues:  
He walks quickly to the back of the space, bends down and picks 
up something. He walks back towards the tape recorder holding a 
hammer. He smashes it down on the tape recorder. The song skips 
back to the very start and remains intact.200 
Here, the blow of Thomas’ hammer, which responds to a spontaneous cueing of 
playback, prompts the tape to cue again from the beginning. The temporal 
structure of violent action, rendered comically in this sequence, performs the 
après-coup: Thomas’s volley with a hammer responds to an unmarked “first 
blow” (the press of the playback button by an unknowable presence) in a violent 
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act of breaking that will not break the machine. The uncanny doubling of Doris 
Day’s voice in the song’s final verse, where (thanks to tape multitracking 
techniques) she performs a brief duet with herself earlier singing the chorus, 
likewise folds the après-coup into its song structure. The repetition induced by 
the blow of the hammer thus repeats a repetition and the violent action taken by 
Thomas to silence the voice of Doris Day in playback itself is reworked in the 
bludgeoning murder of Edel also presented in playback. Here, in its function as 
symptomatic action, the machine both anticipates and forecloses the resolution 
of Thomas’ hammering: he strikes, it repeats, and the play reworks all of this in 
the beating of Edel. Reworking thus entails a renegotiation of the relationship 
between the tape recorder and weapon, and misterman records the passage of 
the tape recorder from memory support to blunt instrument of murder. 
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—Conclusion— 
  
The research pursued in this dissertation stages an interdisciplinary 
encounter between two different fields of inquiry: theatre/performance studies 
and sound studies. It mediates this encounter through a philosophy of technology 
that brings the Frankfurt School and the Simondon-Stiegler-Lyotard axis of 
French thought into conversation with each other. As grounded in an immanent 
critique of concrete aesthetic objects, my approach here brings the philosophy of 
technology to bear on aesthetic practices in theatre and music. As such, it 
proposes a unique opportunity for the philosopher to examine the interplay 
between technology and aesthetic technique. Conversely, it also invites 
historiographers of theatre, performance and music to critically reevaluate their 
respective disciplines’ relationships to technology. In what ways can we expand 
our understandings of theatre and performance as technologies of hearing as 
well as seeing? How does this expanded understanding revise prevailing 
Westerns notions of representation so firmly grounded in visuality? How also can 
we understand recording and playback as performance? In what ways does this 
transform our conceptions of both musical and theatrical performance, especially 
vis-à-vis the status of the document and the copy in relation to the “original” and 
the “live”?  These are just a few of the broader implications prompted by this 
dissertation. More particularly, the concept of “reel-time,” which this dissertation 
unfolds slowly over its course, represents a novel critical approach for not only 
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thinking through the status of cultural memory vis-à-vis the body and technology 
in key debates of theatre and performance studies, but also in resituating the 
understudied medium of tape recording within sound studies. 
 Reel-time, as it emerges through the various chapters of the dissertation, 
implies an onto-historical relationship between tape’s materiality and its 
temporality in performance. In the first chapter, my grounding of tape’s “origin” in 
the industrial machinery of the Holocaust implies its situation within the violence 
of totalitarianism and, ultimately capitalism. As each chapter proceeds, I retrace 
the violence of this “origin” through various material practices of tape 
performance and the historical contexts within which they are embedded. 
Notable among these—and implicit (if not explicit) throughout—is the figure of 
rupture or break, which we see in schematizations of analog/digital and 
modern/postmodern, in the contradictory and catastrophic spaces of late-
capitalism, as well as in the on/off switch of the tape recorder itself redoubled in 
the physicality of performance. Each of the aesthetic objects I have chosen 
references the violence of tape’s origin and also brushes against its grain by 
making the process of recording and playback audible in its particular 
performative practice. As with any technology or practice embedded within the 
structures of late-capitalism, tape cannot and should not be considered “neutral” 
or “innocent” from the standpoint of human history. Like any historical document, 
as Walter Benjamin suggests, tape too indexes both civilization and barbarism as 
two sides of the same process. However, the plays and musical pieces 
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highlighted in the preceding chapters also suggest the potentiality of critical 
practices using tape that, even if they do not wholly succeed in extricating the 
technology from the larger apparatus of techno-science that produces it, do mark 
possible moments of resistance even from within late-capitalism. My analysis of 
reel-time attends to both sides of this question: the redemptive and the critical. 
 In positioning itself this way, my dissertation seeks a common space 
between that rather reductive opposition set up between Adorno’s “pessimism” 
and Benjamin’s “optimism” by reconsidering the limits of humanism vis-à-vis 
technology as configured within the tradition of Marxist thought more broadly. In 
reapproaching the traditional Marxist understanding of technology-as-instrument 
through the thought of Gilbert Simondon, Bernard Stiegler, Jean-François 
Lyotard and others, I am not only able to preliminarily sketch some common 
ground between the two major figureheads of the Frankfurt School but to also 
position them in conversation with other thinkers often institutionalized as 
diametrically opposed to their approach. More crucial than this mapping of 
common ground between theoretical paradigms, however, is the space that it 
affords for a critique of technology that need not displace critical attention to its 
ontological and historical ground in late-capitalism in favor of celebratory 
fetishizations of technology, techno-human hybrid identities, and so on of which 
Marxist thinkers are all too often (and wisely) suspicious. In a similar spirit, 
posthuman thought need not be tethered to some antihuman impulse either. The 
conceptual thread running through the work of Simondon, Stiegler, and Lyotard 
   232 
 
brings to the Frankfurt School a reconfiguration of the relationship between 
technology and human beings as mutually constitutive and (at least potentially) 
viably sustainable. This reconfiguration of the human as always already 
technological does not short circuit the critical impulse of Adorno’s negative 
dialectics or Benjamin’s dialectics at a standstill, but rather it enriches their 
promise by allowing the technological object (here, tape) more mobility within the 
constellation of critical thought: technology’s relationship to human endeavor 
need not be conceived as wholly libratory nor necessarily oppressive. By 
allowing my perspective on tape technology to toggle through these various 
positions, this dissertation sets forth a possible first sketch of a shared territory 
between the technological and the human applicable to, and generative for, both 
theatre/performance studies and sound studies alike. 
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